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Abstract
In current medical practice, therapy is delivered in critical care environments (e.g., the ICU) by clinicians who
manually coordinate sets of medical devices: The clinicians will monitor patient vital signs and then
reconfigure devices (e.g., infusion pumps) as is needed. Unfortunately, the current state of practice is both
burdensome on clinicians and error prone.
Recently, clinicians have been speculating whether medical devices supporting ``plug & play interoperability''
would make it easier to automate current medical workflows and thereby reduce medical errors, reduce costs,
and reduce the burden on overworked clinicians. This type of plug & play interoperability would allow
clinicians to attach devices to a local network and then run software applications to create a new medical
system ``on-demand'' which automates clinical workflows by automatically coordinating those devices via the
network.
Plug & play devices would let the clinicians build new medical systems compositionally. Unfortunately, safety
is not considered a compositional property in general. For example, two independently ``safe'' devices may
interact in unsafe ways. Indeed, even the definition of ``safe'' may differ between two device types.
In this dissertation we propose a framework and define some conditions that permit reasoning about the
safety of plug & play medical systems. The framework includes a logical formalism that permits formal
reasoning about the safety of many device combinations at once, as well as a platform that actively prevents
unintended timing interactions between devices or applications via a shared resource such as a network or
CPU. We describe the various pieces of the framework, report some experimental results, and show how the
pieces work together to enable the safety assessment of plug & play medical systems via a two case-studies.
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ABSTRACT
FOUNDATIONS FOR SAFETY-CRITICAL ON-DEMAND MEDICAL
SYSTEMS
Andrew L. King
Insup Lee
In current medical practice, therapy is delivered in critical care environments (e.g.,
the ICU) by clinicians who manually coordinate sets of medical devices: The clin-
icians will monitor patient vital signs and then reconfigure devices (e.g., infusion
pumps) as is needed. Unfortunately, the current state of practice is both burden-
some on clinicians and error prone.
Recently, clinicians have been speculating whether medical devices support-
ing “plug & play interoperability” would make it easier to automate current med-
ical workflows and thereby reduce medical errors, reduce costs, and reduce the
burden on overworked clinicians. This type of plug & play interoperability would
allow clinicians to attach devices to a local network and then run software ap-
plications to create a new medical system “on-demand” which automates clinical
workflows by automatically coordinating those devices via the network.
Plug & play devices would let the clinicians build new medical systems com-
positionally. Unfortunately, safety is not considered a compositional property in
general. For example, two independently “safe” devices may interact in unsafe
ways. Indeed, even the definition of “safe” may differ between two device types.
In this dissertation we propose a framework and define some conditions that
permit reasoning about the safety of plug & play medical systems. The framework
includes a logical formalism that permits formal reasoning about the safety of
many device combinations at once, as well as a platform that actively prevents un-
iii
intended timing interactions between devices or applications via a shared resource
such as a network or CPU. We describe the various pieces of the framework, re-
port some experimental results, and show how the pieces work together to enable
the safety assessment of plug & play medical systems via a two case-studies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Traditionally, safety-critical systems have been designed and integrated as mono-
lithic units before they are delivered to the customer. Typically, a prime contractor
manages development of the system from design through final systems integra-
tion. Because the prime contractor manages the entire development process, they
are in a unique position to assess the completed product for safety: They know
what components comprise the system, how those components interact (e.g., as
verified via integration testing), the intended use of the system and the system-
level safety requirements. Very often in regulated domains, such as aviation and
medical systems, the prime contractor must also construct a regulatory submission
that contains an argument (and supporting evidence) that their system behaves
safely and effectively. The system in question cannot be marketed or otherwise
deployed until the regulator accepts the argument and approves and/or certifies the
system.
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In medicine, clinicians currently deliver therapy by manually coordinating col-
lections of independently developed devices. Now that many devices marketed
today already include some form of network connectivity (serial ports, Ethernet,
802.11 or Bluetooth wireless) clinicians are recognizing the potential to automate
device coordination via external control applications [70]. Ideally, future medi-
cal devices would support plug & play protocols which would allow clinicians to
construct networks of medical devices on-demand that automatically interoperate
to automate life-critical clinical workflows [69]. The integration model for on-
demand systems would differ from traditional systems because they would not be
supplied or integrated by a single vendor. Instead, a Health Delivery Organiza-
tion (HDO) would purchase interoperable devices, infrastructure (i.e., computa-
tional platforms) and software applications implementing clinical algorithms (i.e.,
“apps”) from a variety of different vendors. Specific medical systems would then
be assembled from devices on-hand to address a particular clinical need.
While practical use of such systems is still in the future, the ability for the
operator to construct new systems on-demand from off the shelf components has
the potential to yield several important benefits:
• Reduce Errors & Clinical Workloads - The ability to automate workflows
can reduce clinical errors, improving patient outcomes, while at the same
time reducing clinician workload [70, 134].
• Avoid Vendor Lockin - Vendor neutral interoperability protocols means
that HDOs would not be locked into a single vendor for all their medical
systems. They would be able to create “best-of-breed” systems of systems
by purchasing the best devices produced by different manufacturers [69].
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Furthermore, it allows the HDO more flexible device procurement strategies
in general [184].
• Enable Innovation - Interoperability could enable new startups to con-
tribute new capability to the interoperable “ecosystem” via software ap-
plications. Currently, it is difficult for a company to create new medical
systems capability unless that company is an incumbent because it is not
practically feasible to add new capability independent of a physical medical
device.
In anticipation of interoperable plug & play medical systems and the benefits
they will bring there are a number of on-going efforts to create interoperability
standards [156, 88, 23, 139, 71], build prototype implementations that aim to sup-
port this vision [108, 155], and develop new regulatory frameworks [105, 172].
1.2 Challenges
Plug & play medical systems will be assembled by their (non-technical) users
which means that there will not be a single entity with technical competency (e.g.,
prime contractor) positioned to assess the safety of a specific combination of de-
vices. The lack of a traditional prime contractor poses a challenge to ensuring the
safety of these systems for two reasons: First, safety is a property of systems that
arises from the interactions between system components [126, 128]. Second, what
constitutes safe inter-device interactions will vary considerably between different
clinical scenarios. Often, we say that these two facets of safety mean that safety
is an emergent property [126, 38, 127]. It is critical to ensure that interactions
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between devices are predictable and that those interactions satisfy the safety re-
quirements of the given clinical scenario. Since it will not be known specifically
which devices will be assembled into the composite system a priori, we are pre-
sented with a number of challenges to achieving safe interoperability. Here we
identify three significant challenges we try to address in this dissertation that must
be overcome if safe interoperable plug & play systems are to be achieved.
Challenge 1: Current Regulatory Frameworks Won’t Scale
Current regulatory frameworks (e.g., the US FDA device approval process) are
not designed with large scale, vendor neutral interoperability in mind. While the
FDA approval process does not explicitly disallow interoperable or plug & play
capabilities, it does make the approval of truly interoperable devices prohibitively
costly.
For example, as a device manufacturer, it is possible to develop a device de-
signed to work with other devices via a network interface. The FDA regulations
would then treat the other devices as “accessories” [62, 142] and subject each
possible combination of devices to regulatory approval. From the perspective of a
safety assesment, subjecting each combination isn’t a bad idea: It gives the manu-
facturer (and regulator) the opportunity to detect any unsafe interactions between
specific devices.
However, If we want a large ecosystem of interoperable devices, regulating
each combination is hugely impractical. Consider an ecosystem with n devices.
If its possible for every pair of devices to interoperate this would require n2 reg-
ulatory submissions (and approvals). Additionally, many medical systems would
likely involve more than just pairs of devices. If we want to combine m deivces
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together, then we will need nm regulatory submissions and approvals (and if we
want to combine up to m its nm!!). Since the regulatory process is expensive
for both manufacturers and regulators, the current approach is not practical for
anything other than small values of n and m.
Challenge 2: Standardization of Behavior is not Practical
Historically, standards bodies have chosen to achieve interoperability by devel-
oping large, complex, and detailed standards that attempt to cover many (if not
all) aspects of the interoperable domain. For example, consider the IEEE-11073
interoperability standard for medical devices. IEEE-11073 standardizes a nomen-
clature (a mapping of numerical codes to device types), a comprehensive domain
information model (a definition of physiological signals and what device types can
provide those signals), a communications model (how information is exchanged)
and a data encoding specification [2]. The development of large complex stan-
dards is time-consuming and difficult: Work on IEEE-11073, started in 1986 [73]
(as IEEE-1073) but didn’t officially stabilize until 2005 [2]. Furthermore, the
complexity and long development cycles of large complex standards can hinder
their adoption, as has apparently been the case with IEEE-11073 [88].
Most standards like IEEE-11073 only cover data interoperability, i.e., how to
exchange data and how to interpret the data that is exchanged. However, reason-
ing about safety fundamentally comes down to reasoning about behavior. One
approach could be to follow the footsteps of what the IEEE-11073PHD [52, 47]
standard does for data but with behavior. IEEE-11073PHD defines the types of
data each different type of device (e.g., glucometer, scale, or pulse-oximeter) must
be able to report. We could imagine doing the same, but for behavior (e.g., define
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precisely how an PCA pump ought to behave and bake it into the standard).
However, we contend that standardized behavior is not practically achievable.
IEEE-11073 took almost two decades, was only about data, and hasn’t found sig-
nificant adoption. Device behavior adds another significant layer of complexity.
Furthermore, among devices of the same type, their behavior can vary signif-
icantly between manufacturer and even model. Getting manufacturers to imple-
ment devices with precisely the same behavior is unlikely. There needs to be some
other mechanism for devices to communicate their beahvior in a standardized way
that also lets manufacturers and regulators assess safety.
Challenge 3: Timing Predictability in Open & Distributed Systems
Typical safety-critical systems are closed, meaning the components that comprise
the system do not change while the system is active and deployed. The behavior of
closed systems are easy, relative to open systems, to predict because the systems
developers can constrain the possible component interactions at design time.
For example, consider a distributed, time-sensitive, closed system like the
avionics on a modern commercial or military aircraft. Flight control signals gen-
erated by the flight control computer must reach the target flight-control surface
at the right time or the aircraft will not fly as intended. In less extreme examples
control authority would be diminished (loss of expected performance). In more
extreme examples the aircraft could depart stable flight and possibly crash (loss of
safety). Aircraft designers can ensure the distributed timing behavior of avionics
systems because they know precisely what nodes are on the network, how much
data each node will send, when each node will send data, and the timing require-
ments for each data flow. They can then use real-time scheduling theory [164] to
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devise a transmission schedule that satisfies the timing requirements and special-
ized networking hardware (e.g., Avionics Full-Duplex Switched Ethernet [150])
to enforce that schedule.
Unfortunately, plug & play medical systems are inherently open, meaning its
users can add or remove components and otherwise change the configuration of
the system while it is running. The designers of plug & play medical systems
won’t have the luxury of knowing specifically what components comprise the
system, or what the timing requirements of the complete system are a priori.
Traditional techniques and technologies designed to robustly ensure the timing
behavior of the system can not be relied upon.
It will be important to find some way of guaranteeing the timing behavior
of plug & play medical systems. Many of the clinical scenarios [139] that can
benefit from plug & play medical systems outlined by the MD Plug & Play pro-
gram involve device coordination that is fundamentally time sensitive. Further-
more, most medical closed-loop control systems require some bounds on timing
to remain safe. While there are many medical system designs where a failure to
achieve desired timing behavior (e.g., a missed message delivery deadline) won’t
strictly cause an immediate safety violation (See, for example, the systems de-
signs in [20, 104] or [21]) a divergence from the expected timing behavior usually
causes the system to compensate with a fail-safe state (e.g., deactivate an infusion
pump) that will diminish the clinical utility of the system and should be avoided.
Of course, Challenges 1-3 are not the only challenges confronting safe plug &
play medical systems, they are only the challenges we are seeking to address at
some level in this work. Indeed, plug & play interoperability for medical devices
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has been described as a wicked problem (i.e., “resistant to solutions; incomplete,
contradictory, and changing requirements; and complex dependencies?”) [72].
For example, one broad, challenging, and important area this dissertation does not
directly address is the security of plug & play medical systems (See [173, 174] or
[22] for some of the security challenges).
1.3 Contributions
We propose a number of ways to partly address Challenges 1-3 and then evaluate
our proposals. Our contributions are:
A Regulatory Framework & Assurance Argument Pattern
We propose and describe a “platform-oriented” regulatory framework that will
allow for a type “compositional certification” and avoid the problem of a com-
binatorial number of regulatory submissions associated with current regulatory
regimes (Challenge 1). The framework regulates three types of system compo-
nents: interoperable medical devices, medical applications (apps), and medical
application platforms (MAPs). The medical devices are certified to comply with
an interface, applications are certified assuming they are used with devices that
satisfy some stated interfaces, and the platforms run the applications and ensure
applications are only coupled with compatible devices. The premise of our work is
that application vendors will be able to to produce system-level safety arguments
by leveraging assurances provided by the regulatory framework and ecosystem.
We give an assurance argument pattern that captures essential reasoning needed
to bring assurance associated with certified components into a system-level saftey
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claim.
Time Parametric Modal Specifications
We describe Time Parametric Modal Specifications (TPMS). TPMS is a new in-
terface theory with several features that make it useful for describing the device
interfaces needed by our proposed regulatory framework. While we designed
TPMS to work under our proposed regulatory framework, it is novel as an inter-
face theory on its own. To our knowledge, TPMS is the first interface theory to
allow the modeling of timing variability separately from functional variability and
also allow for the parallel composition of interfaces. Both of these features can
be useful to model families of real-time systems in general. In the context of our
proposed regulatory framework, it will let us model device behavior (Challenge 2)
and help formally reason about system behavior in a top-down fashion (Challenge
1).
The On-Demand Systems Description Language
We propose and describe the On-Demand Systems Description Language
(ODSDL). The ODSDL lets application designers implement the algorithm of
their application and specify both the logical architecture of their application and
what devices their application requires. The ODSDL uses TPMS to let app de-
velopers and device manufacturers directly specify the behavior needed from the
devices, avoiding the need to standardize the behavior of different device types
(Challenge 2). The ODSDL also has Logical Execution Time (LET) semantics for
both application tasks and distributed interactions (e.g., signaling over a network).
The LET semantics precisely define how the application behave with respect to
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time, making it easier for the application developer to predict the behavior of their
application when it is deployed (Challenge 3).
A Prototype Medical Application Platform
We describe the Medical Device Coordination Framework / MIDdleware Assur-
ance Substrate (MDCF/MIDAS). MDCF/MIDAS is a protoype medical applica-
tion platform where we implement many of the capabilities required of MAPs by
our proposed framework. We focus primarily on how the MDCF/MIDAS is able
to achieve the ODSDL’s LET semantics in an open and distributed environment
(Challenge 3) and perform an experimental evaluation of our implementation.
1.4 Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2 we first provide several detailed motivating clinical examples.
These examples will serve as running examples throughout the rest of the disser-
tation. Next, we describe our proposed regulatory framework and the associated
assurance argument pattern.
In Chapter 3 we describe Time Parametric Modal Specifications (TPMS). We
define TPMS, define and prove important properties (e.g., refinement, property
preservation, compositional reasoning) of TPMS, and then give some algorithms
to decide important decision problems (e.g., refinement & reachability checking)
of TPMS.
In Chapter 4 we propose the On-Demand Systems Description Language
(ODSDL). We give a sketch of the language and provide some simple examples
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of its use to program a plug & play medical application. We also define its (LET)
semantics and show how its semantics result in input determinism (i.e., system
behavior is completely determined by its inputs).
Chapter 5 we describe the MDCF/MIDAS. We enumerate its features, show its
software architecture, and discuss the design features and scheduling techniques
it uses to achieve the LET semantics required by ODSDL applications. We evalu-
ate our implementation by running randomly generated ODSDL applications and
showing that the implementation in fact achieves LET semantics.
Chapter 6 reports on two case studies. We use these case studies to illustrate
how the different aspects of our contributions all work together to enable a system
safety. For our case studies we picked two of the running examples originally
described in Chapter 2. For each running example we describe some key as-
sumptions on the regulatory framework and interoperability ecosystem, design an
application using ODSDL, verify the safety of the designs, and produce a safety
argument using the assurance case pattern originally introduced in Chapter 2. We
also use the ODSDL artifacts produced for the case-studies to evaluate one of the
important TPMS decision procedures using realistic examples.
In Chapter 7 we conclude by summarizing the work and performing a gap
analysis. The gap analysis identifies the technical advances and social develop-
ments needed to make the framework described in this dissertation viable.
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Chapter 2
Motivating Examples & a
Regulatory Framework
2.1 Introduction
In this Chapter we first describe a number of real clinical scenarios that could ben-
efit from plug & play medical systems. These scenarios will be used as running
examples throughout this dissertation. Each of these scenarios represents a situa-
tion where automation could prevent clinical errors and subsequent injury to the
patient. Automation of the type needed is generally not available due to the lack
of interoperability between different devices and device types produced by differ-
ent manufacturers. Under current regulatory frameworks, the creation of medical
systems supporting the type of automation required would need device manufac-
turers to work together and prepare joint regulatory submissions; something that
current manufacturers aren’t likely to justify given the costs and perceived busi-
ness benefits [125].
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After we introduce the motivating examples we propose a regulatory frame-
work based on a “platform-oriented” ecosystem of interoperable medical compo-
nents. We give an overview of the stakeholders, their safety/assurances respon-
sibilities, and the regulatory processes the different types of interoperable com-
ponents will be subject to. Our goal is to allow application vendors to produce
system-level safety arguments by leveraging assurances provided by the regula-
tory framework and ecosystem. We show how ecosystem level assurance can be
combined into a system-level safety argument using an “assurance case pattern”.
Assurance cases are informal (but structured) documents that give an argument
why we should believe that a system satisfies some property. While an assurance
case is not a proof, we give an informal discussion of the underlying logic of our
argument.
2.2 Motivating Examples
2.2.1 Xray/Ventilator Coordination
A simple example of automating clinician workflows via cooperating devices ad-
dresses problems in acquiring accurate chest x-ray images for patients on ventila-
tors during surgery [118]. To keep the lungs movements from blurring the image,
doctors must manually turn off the ventilator for a few seconds while they ac-
quire the x-ray image, but there are risks in inadvertently leaving the ventilator
off for too long. For example, Lofsky [131] documents a case where a patient
death resulted when an anestheseologist forgot to turn the ventilator back on due
to a distraction in the operating room associated with dropped x-ray film and a
jammed operating table:
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A 32-year-old woman had a laparoscopic cholecystectomy performed
under general anesthesia. At the surgeons request, a plane film x-ray
was shot during a cholangiogram. The anesthesiologist stopped the
ventilator for the film. The x-ray technician was unable to remove the
film because of its position beneath the table. The anesthesiologist
attempted to help her, but found it difficult because the gears on the
table had jammed. Finally, the x-ray was removed, and the surgical
procedure recommenced. At some point, the anesthesiologist glanced
at the EKG and noticed severe bradycardia. He realized he had never
restarted the ventilator. This patient ultimately expired.
These risks can be minimized by automatically coordinating the actions of the
x-ray imaging device and the ventilator. Specifically, a centralized automated co-
ordinator running a pre-programmed coordination script can use device data from
the ventilator over the period of a few respiratory cycles to identify a target image
acquisition point where the lungs will be at full inhalation or exhalation (and thus
experiencing minimal motion). At the image acquistion point, the controller can
pause the ventilator, activate the x-ray machine to acquire the image, and then sig-
nal the ventilator to unpause and continue the respiration [74]. Note that this case
above involves a very simple form of coordination logic that can significantly im-
prove the safety or the effectiveness of treatment for the patient. In our experience,
once the concept of device coordination is explained to a surgical clinician, they
can almost always come up with an scenario that they have encountered where
device coordination would be beneficial. For example, consider the example from
modern ear-nose-throat surgery in the next sub-section.
14
2.2.2 Laser-Ventilator Interlock
Many modern Ear-Nose-Throat (ENT) surgeries are now performed with a laser-
scalpel. While laser-scalpels can have different designs and utilize different phys-
ical processes to create the laser (e.g., [141] or [8]), the fundamental concept of
operations is the same: Laser-scalpels create a high energy laser beam that sur-
geons can use to cut flesh [106]. When the surgeon wants to begin cutting s/he
will aim the scalpel where s/he wants to cut and then toggles the beam on. When
the cut has been completed s/he toggles the beam off.
In many cases, laser scalpels provide a number of benefits and better patient
outcomes versus normal blades [16, 178, 153]: First, laser scalpels can result in
less bleeding because the heat generated by the laser beam automatically cauter-
izes the wound. Second, swelling can be reduced because the cauterizing effect
also seals nerve endings and small lymph vessels. Finally, since there is no con-
tact between the surgical instrument and the patient, there is a reduced risk of
infection.
Laser-Ventilator Hazards
While there are several accepted benefits of laser-scalpels for ENT surgeries, the
introduction of a laser to ENT surgeries increases the risk of surgical fire [166,
167]. The increased fire risk arises from the fact that ENT surgeries are performed
under general anesthesia: The patient will be unconcious and supported by me-
chanical ventilation where they will be intubated with a breathing tube carrying a
gas mixture of concentrated O2. The close proximity of an oxidizer (O2) with a
heat source (laser scalpel) is dangerous and can lead to a fire inside the patient if
the surgeon accidentally impinges the breathing tube [147].
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In current practice this hazard is mitigated manually by the surgical team:
When the surgeon wants to cut, s/he will signal to the anethesiologist, who will
reduce the O2 flow to the patient (if it is safe to do so). As the surgeon cuts, the
anethesiologist will monitor the SpO2 levels of the patient. When the SpO2 ap-
proaches some defined lower threshold the anesthesiologist will ask the surgeon
to stop cutting and they will resume the flow of O2.
Despite these hazard mitigation efforts, approximately 650 surgical fires are
reported in the United States each year and it is estimated that nearly four times
that number go unreported [117, 61]. Clearly, some more effective measures are
needed. One possible solution is to build a system of medical devices that auto-
matically enforces mutual exclusion between laser-scalpel and ventilator activity.
2.2.3 Closed-Loop Management of Patient Controlled Analge-
sia
The use of Patient Controlled Analgesia (PCA) infusion pumps has emerged as the
premier process for meeting the goals of pain management. The computerized
pump is loaded with an analgesic drug such as morphine, fentanyl, or hydromor-
phone and can be programmed with a background, or basal, infusion rate as well
as a bolus dose. The basal infusion rate is delivered constantly and is selected
to be sufficient to control the patients normal pain level. The bolus dose is an
additional quantity of drug that is delivered only when the patient requests it by
pressing a button. The pumps are also programmed with dose limits that are set
for the specific patient, e.g., only allowing one dose to be delivered within a cer-
tain time frame. In addition to the drug delivery mechanism itself, components of
the PCA process include appropriate patient selection, proper patient education,
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frequent patient assessment, and collaboration among the prescriber, pharmacist
and nursing staff.
Patient controlled analgesia provides consistent control of pain by allowing
patients to self-administer doses of a drug. Evidence from systematic reviews of
randomized controlled clinical trials indicate that the use of IV PCA leads to bet-
ter pain relief, improved patient outcomes (e.g., reduction in pulmonary complica-
tions) and increased patient satisfaction compared with conventional nurseadmin-
istered parenteral opioids [91]. The ability of patients to maintain some control
over their care appears to be a strong contributor to PCA associated improve-
ments in patient satisfaction. One of the major opioid side effects is respiratory
depression. Opioids have a direct effect on the respiratory center in the medulla
[44]. Respiratory depression increases progressively with dose. The use of back-
ground infusions in some patients may provide increased pain relief however this
increases the risk of respiratory depression and has led to a general recommenda-
tion of eliminating background infusions. Symptoms of respiratory depression in-
clude increasing sedation, decreased respiratory rate, decreased oxygen saturation
and increased end tidal carbon dioxide [115]. Breathing may become irregular
and periodic.
To address these issues, current nursing standards of care for monitoring pa-
tients during PCA administration include assessment of pain and sedation, along
with heart rate, blood pressure and respiration rate every four hours. Pulse oxime-
try (SpO2) is used to monitor falling arterial oxygen saturation.
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PCA Hazards
Despite these positive outcomes, PCA pumps are also associated with a large
number of adverse events [82, 100]. The most common type of adverse event is
oversedation [133]. An excessive dose of the analgesic can cause neurologic de-
pression which may lead to respiratory depression and eventually respiratory dis-
tress. In extreme cases the patient may not be able to breathe adequately, leading
to death. Overdoses may have many causes including programming errors [75],
the use of the wrong concentration of drug, drug interactions, and PCA-by-proxy.
Programming errors may be caused by confusing drug names, e.g., hydromor-
phone and morphine or morphine and meperidine [82], by making a mistake in
dose or drug concentration calculations [179, 82] or entering the wrong values for
bolus dose size, infusion rate, or lockout interval. A common source of error is
entering a value that is off by a power of 10 or using the wrong units. For ex-
ample, entering 5 mL / minute instead of 5 mG / minute or programming a pump
with a drug concentration of 1 mG/mL when it is actually 10 mG/mL [82]. [179]
discusses a number of cases where patients were fatally overdosed because of an
improperly programmed drug concentration.
When someone other than the patient presses the button to request a bolus
dose, it is called PCA-by-proxy. Normally if the patient is oversedated they are
unable to press the button to get another bolus dose. If someone else presses the
button, this safeguard is bypassed and an overdose may occur. In 2004 the Joint
Commission made PCA-by-proxy their 33rd sentinel-event. Sentinel events are
occurrences that must be reported and investigated to their root cause or the facil-
ity risks losing their accreditation [99]. Healthcare facilities that have completed
staff education programs and incorporated a warning about PCA-by-proxy into
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their patient education have seen lower overall rates of oversedation [99].
An analysis of reports to the MAUDE database maintained by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA)s Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH)
from 1984 to 1989 found that 67% of problems associated with PCA pumps were
caused by operator error [46]. This early study took place before the 1990 change
in Federal Reporting Guidelines that requires reporting of incidents involving de-
vice malfunctions and serious injuries or deaths to FDA. A later study [76] found
that nearly 80% of the 2009 reported incidents in 2002 and 2003 were blamed on
device malfunctions and that nearly 65% of these suspected device malfunctions
were confirmed by the device manufacturers. The human factors of pump inter-
face design are an important means of reducing use errors [19, 20]. Respiratory
depression associated with PCA varies between 0.3% and 6% depending on the
patient population and how respiratory depression is defined [152]. Most cases of
respiratory depression do not lead to permanent harm to the patient, but these still
represent serious incidents with the potential to harm or kill patients.
The Institute for Safe Medicine maintains a voluntary database of medication
errors. This MedMarx database contains 9500 PCA related errors in the span
2000 - 2004 [82]. These account for only 1% of the medication errors submit-
ted to the database, but this 1% accounts for 6.5% of harmful outcomes. This
almost certainly under-reports the actual number of occurrences, since the volun-
tary database can only track the rate of reporting, not the rates of errors or adverse
events [123]. Adequate pain control provides benefits including improved patient
satisfaction, lower rates of complication, reduced length of hospital stays, and
lower rates of litigation [82]. Some biomedical engineers take the attitude that the
only safe medical device is one thats never taken out of the box, but discontinuing
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use of PCA pumps is simply not an option. While providing inadequate levels of
medication would indeed reduce the chance of overdose, pain management is an
essential part of the care of these patients.
As noted earlier, patients receiving PCA therapy are usually also connected to
a patient monitor that records their vital signs. These monitors typically measure
at least heart rate, blood pressure, respiratory rate, and oxygen saturation (SpO2).
The monitor has simple alarms which sound when the vital signs go outside of
some preset limits. If the patient receives an overdose, their vital signs will even-
tually go outside of the limits and the alarms will sound, summoning a caregiver
to the bedside.
However, by the time their vital signs drop far enough to cause the alarm
to sound, damage may have already been done. Caregivers are desensitized by
frequent false positive alarms, and they may not respond as quickly as would be
optimal. Furthermore, the infusion pump continues running until it is manually
stopped by a caregiver, which may not happen immediately on their arrival at the
bedside.
If there was an ecosystem of interoperable or plug and play medical devices
with the appropriate capabilities it would be possible to write an application that
automatically takes data from a monitoring device like a pulse-oximeter and then
deactivates the pump if there is the potential for overdose.
2.3 A Platform-Oriented Ecosystem
We believe that a platform-oriented ecosystem of medical components, if appro-
priately designed, could be used to ensure the safety of plug & play medical
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systems. In this paper, we define an ecosystem as as set of devices, software
applications and computational platforms intended to interact with one another
using standardized plug & play interoperability protocols; the stakeholders that
organize, manufacture, and use these products; as well as the explicitly defined
processes that are followed to develop, certify, and use these products.
Our proposed ecosystem contains three categories of interoperable system
components. The component categories are device, application, and platform.
Devices expose a logical interface that acts like an API which applications can
use to control or receive data from the device. Applications implement the clin-
ical algorithms used to address a specific clinical scenario. Applications are not
just executable code; they have a requirements specification which declares what
interfaces compatible devices must implement and a QoS specification that de-
clares timing requirements (e.g., periods and deadlines on program execution).
Each platform consists of a network, computational resources (CPU, RAM, etc.),
real-time operating system and platform services. The platform’s job is to act as
a trusted base to enforce the correct assembly of on-demand systems: When the
Health Delivery Organization (HDO) plugs a device into the platform the device
will upload its interface specification. Then, when the HDO staff tries to launch
an application with a set of selected devices the platform will (1) check if those
devices’ interfaces are compatible with the application requirements and (2) ver-
ify that the application’s requested QoS can be guaranteed. If either 1 or 2 is false
the platform will prevent application launch.
There are a number of actors that participate in our vision of the ecosystem.
Each actor has different responsibilities and assurance obligations:
• The Ecosystem Standards Consortium consists of representives of the other
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actors and follows a consensus process to define ecosystem standards: The
connectivity protocols used by each component to exchange data, the logi-
cal interfaces devices can implement, what it means for a device to be com-
patible with an application, and the compliance requirements that each type
of component (applications, devices, and platforms) must satisfy before that
component can be certified as a member of the ecosystem. We emphasize
that the consortium does not explicitly define specific systems - rather it es-
tablishes constraints on the architecture and interfaces of such systems and
their sub-components.
• The Device Vendor designs, manufactures, and markets their devices. Be-
fore their device can be admitted to the ecosystem they must provide assur-
ance (e.g., via an assurance case) that their device satisfies the ecosystem
compliance requirements for all interfaces the device claims it implements.
• The Application Vendor is responsible for providing assurance that their ap-
plication is safe when instantiated with compatible devices. Application
vendors play a role analogous to“system integrators” in conventional sys-
tems: They define the overall system function, and reason about overall sys-
tem safety. However, the distinction is that they define the system using a
software application and requirements/assumptions on the devices and plat-
forms. They do not specify a single system but a family of possible system
instances that satisfy the functional and safety goals of the clinical scenario.
Thus, the integration is “virtual”: they do not integrate specific physical de-
vices and platforms but specifications of devices and platforms where each
such specification represents a set of compliant components.
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• The Platform Vendor must provide assurance that their platform will cor-
rectly perform its responsibilities. Because the platform is the trusted base
for each system these responsibilities include correctly executing applica-
tion code, correctly implementing the ecosystem device-application com-
patibility check and providing adequate system security.
• The Certification Authority polices component membership in the ecosys-
tem: The certification authority only grants certification to components that
satisfy the ecosystem compliance requirements. When a component be-
comes certified the authority will sign the component with a digital certifi-
cate. If postmarket surveillance reveals that a component has a previously
undetected problem resulting in non-compliance, the certification authority
can revoke the certificate associated with that component’s make and model.
The digital certificate enables the platforms to use cryptographic methods to
verify whether or not applications or devices have been certified. [77] con-
tains an overview of how cryptographic methods can be used to establish
trust and how the platform acts as a trusted base for this process.
• The HDO does not have assurance responsibilities per se (i.e., they are not
required to provide assurance to any other ecosystem actor) however, they
must still use the application as intended. If the HDO uses an application
in an unintended way (i.e., off-label use [30, 168, 163]) then the (safety)
assurances provided by the Application Vendor for that application are not
guaranteed to apply.
The ecosystem assurance and compliance obligations (combined with the run-
time checks performed by the platform) create a series of “gating functions” that
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prevent the HDO from assembling potentially unsafe combinations of devices and
applications. Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between the ecosystem actors,
ecosystem components, the gating functions and the final physical instantiation of
a system. The unringed circles indicate steps in development or assembly of the
physical system. Lines indicate interactions between the actors. The ringed circles
indicate completion of one of the primary assurance steps and represent the gates.
First the Ecosystem Standards Consortium must establish the ecosystem standards
and component compliance requirements. Once the standards have been defined
the component manufacturers can design their respective components. The certi-
fication authority enforces the first set of gates: components are only allowed into
the ecosystem if they satisfy their respective compliance requirements. The final
set of gates are enforced by the platform: The platform will only let the applica-
tion run if it is being paired with compatible and compliant (i.e., certified) devices
and if the platform can guarantee that the application’s QoS requirements will be
met.
Interfaces, Compatibility, and Device Compliance:
For the purposes of this chapter1 we imagine that device and application inter-
faces are analogous to software interfaces from programming languages like Java:
When an application specifies that it requires a device interface it is much the same
as declaring a field variable in a Java class to have an interface-type: Any object
that implements that interface can be substituted for that variable. Compatibility
checking between devices and applications thus amounts to checking if the device
implements the required interface(s). A device is compliant with an interface if it
1Later chapters will introduce a more sophisticated interface theory: TPMS.
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Figure 2.1: Ecosystem actors, their interactions and certification activities.
satisfies the Consortium defined compliance requirements for that interface type.
Consider the PCA pump from the motivating example. The Ecosystem Consor-
tium could define a standardized interface for PCA pumps called
“void InfusionTimedTicket(x)” which applications could use to send a timed ticket
to the pump. The Consortium would then define the behavior a PCA pump must
have in order to comply with that interface. In this case, the pump should cor-
rectly implement the ticket timer and cease infusion after some mandated amount
of time.
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Platform Assurance & Compliance:
A compliant platform must correctly implement compatibility checking and re-
source management. Ideally, applications would be portable across platforms in
the ecosystem. This means that the Consortium would also standardize an exe-
cution model for the applications (i.e., application byte code format, semantics,
and available APIs). A compliant platform must then also correctly implement
the standard model of execution. Different applications will have different levels
of criticality: Applications with low criticality do not pose serious consequences
in the event of failure while failure of a high-criticality application may result
in catastrophic consequences. Because the application is totally dependent on
the platform to function correctly, the assurance requirements for each platform
should be at least as stringent as the assurance requirements for the most critical
application that will be admitted to the ecosystem. While the specifics of these
requirements are well beyond the scope of this paper, we can imagine that the
Consortium could mandate that all Platform Vendors follow guidance that would
result in levels of assurance similar to that of DO-178C Level A. [83].
2.4 The Platform Argument Pattern
Each on-demand application defines a set of possible systems: One for each al-
lowed combination of devices and platform with the application. The multitude
of potential systems implied by a single application presents a challenge for both
the application developer and Certification Authority. The application vendor will
need to devise an assurance argument that explains why all these possible com-
binations are safe. Practically, it won’t be possible for the vendor to analyze or
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test each combination individually because the number of possible combinations
would prohibitively large. Additionally, new components (i.e., platforms & de-
vices) may be admitted to the ecosystem after the application is certified. Because
the application vendor will not be able to directly analyze all possible device com-
binations they will have to use some form of model-based reasoning: They would
analyze their application for safety using models as proxies for the concrete de-
vices. In theory, as long as the models capture the range of behavior allowed by
the different ecosystem gating functions (i.e., the compliance/certification checks
and the platform compatibily checks) then safety conclusions derived from the
model-based reasoning should hold for any allowed instantiation of the applica-
tion.
Of course, in practice, it is generally impossible to capture all the allowed
behavior of a physical system in a model. If an application vendor is using model-
based reasoning to support safety-claims they should justify why the models they
used are adequate. In our context, adequacy depends on the intended use of the
application (i.e., the meaning of adequate will vary from application to applica-
tion) as well as the assurances on each component provided by the ecosystem
itself. To this end we propose an assurance argument pattern that requires ap-
plication vendors to make model adequacy arguments explicit. Our hope is that
it can help both application vendors and the Certification Authority to quickly
identify assurance deficits or other fallacious reasoning in application assurance
arguments, especially those related to model-based reasoning. The remainder of
this section is organized as follows: First we define the terms the pattern uses.
Then we introduce and explain the platform argument pattern. We will show how
this pattern can be instatiated with our case studies later in Chapter 6.
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2.4.1 Pattern Terms
Figure 2.2 maps out the terms used in the pattern. Our terms make an explicit dis-
tinction between models2 and physical embodiments. We ultimately care about
the physical embodiments but we are left with the models to analyze. The rows
correspond to the different types of ecosystem components (with the addition of
a row for the environment and instantiated system). The columns separate out
different abstractions for each of the component categories: The specifications re-
fer to the actual specification artifacts created by either the application developer
or device manufacturer, the models are semantic (i.e., analyzable) objects created
by the application developer based on the specifications. The last column (physi-
cal embodiments) represent the physical object that correspond to the models and
specifications.
Each entity in Figure 2.2 is defined as follows: The l devices admitted to the
ecosystem are D1, . . . , Dl. Each Di is compliant with its interface DIi, Each ap-
plication consists of anA and set ofAIj . TheA is the algorithm of the application
and represents executable code. Since these applications are typically real-time
we assume any QoS specifications in the application are contained within A. The
AIjs represent the application’s required device interfaces (If the application uses
n devices then 1 ≤ j ≤ n). The physical emobodiment of each AIj is the set
of devices that implement the interface AIj (we use ' to represent the compat-
2Through out this section we adopt a formal notation that might lead some readers to believe
that when we use the term “model” we are explicitly refering to formal models (i.e., ones that
could be analyzed by a model-checker). This is not the case. We are using “model” in a very
general sense and a model could range from an informal “mental model” to an executable model
that could be simulated to a fully formal model that could be analyzed by a model-checker.
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Model Specification Physical Embodiment
Devices - DI1, . . . , DIl D1, . . . , Dl
App
Algorithm
Interface
Am A P (A)
AImj AIj Dj = {Di | DIi ' AIj}
Platform - - P
Environment Em - E
System Am ||nj=1 AImj || Em A ||nj=1 AIj {P (A) ||nj=1 Dj || E | Dj ∈ Dj}
Figure 2.2: Pattern Terms: The relationship between models, specifications,
and physical embodiments.
ibility relation). The AImj are models created by the application developer and
are intended to capture all the behaviors of the devices that implement the AIjs.
Since A is a program, it has no physical embodiment until it is executed on a plat-
form, therefore P (A) represents platform P executingA. The device interfaces of
an application are syntactic objects. They don’t have explicit semantics but they
do imply a set of behaviors (i.e., the union of the behaviors of all the compliant
devices that are compatible with that interface)3. Each platform is represented
by a P . E represents the environment where the application will be deployed
and Em is the model of that environment. The last row are the system entities.
Am ||nj=1 AImj || Em is the model of the system. It is the composition of the
application model, the device models, and the environment model (We borrow the
parallel composition operator, ||, from process algebras to denote the combination
of two or more components running together). A ||nj=1 AIj (i.e., the application)
represents a specification of the system. {P (A) ||nj=1 Dj || E | Dj ∈ Dj} is the
3This is true for the purposes of this section. Later, we will introduce a specification theory
called TPMS for device interfaces that does have semantics.
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set of possible physical systems specified by the application (one system for each
compatible combination of application and device(s)).
2.4.2 The Pattern
Figure 2.3 is a specification of the argument pattern using Goal Structured Nota-
tion (GSN) [102]. There are five components of a GSN-formatted diagram. First,
goals, which are represented by squares, establish some claim to be argued for.
Second, solutions, which are represented by circles, explain how those goals will
be met (and are usually used to refer to evidence). Third, strategies, which are
represented by parallelograms, establish an argumentation strategy (the soundness
of which is typically either intuitive or established externally). Fourth, contexts,
which are represented by stadiums, provide a specification of “the context within
which safety is to be argued” [102]. Contexts apply to all children of the node the
context is attached to. Finally, diamonds represent undeveloped goals (also often
used as placeholders for goals that are elided due to space). Because Figure 2.3
is a pattern specification the subject(s) in each node are variables surrounded by
curly braces; this indicates that the variables are placeholders that will be filled in
with concrete subjects when the pattern is instantiated. If a connector contains a
dot next to a variable (e.g., n), that indicates a multiplicity of sub-goals that must
be unrolled when the pattern is instantiated.
The top level goal (G:AllSat) states that all instantiantions of the applica-
tion must satisfy some property φ in a specified environment. Assurance for
this claim is argued via the platform argument strategy (S:PlatArg). The strat-
egy must always be applied in at least two contexts: One referencing the models
used in the model-based reasoning and the other referencing the ecosystem as-
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surance and compliance requirements. S:PlatArg requires adequate assurance
for three sub goals. The first goal (G:ModelSat) is the model-based reasoning
step. The argument application vendor must argue that the chosen models sat-
isfy φ. The remaining two goals explicitly relate the models used in G:ModelSat
to the possible physical systems via the ecosystem assurance and compliance re-
quirements. G:ModelsAdequate asks the developer to argue why the models
chosen in G:ModelSat capture all the possible (relevant) behaviors allowed by
the application’s specification. Typically, the arguments for the adequacy of the
environment, application, and devices models will all take on a different character
so the pattern separates the arguments for each as a different sub-goal (Note the
multiplicity on the G: DevModel{N}Adq. that forces a sub-goal for each device
model). G:PlatformAssurance asks the developer to argue why the minimum
level of assurance provided by any ecosystem compliant platform is sufficient to
support the application: The application developer relies on the platform to cor-
rectly execute their application and ensure that the application is only instantiated
with compatible devices. If a platform fails to do either of these correctly, then φ
could be violated even if sound models were used in G:ModelSat.
2.5 Related Work
The original impetus for the research that resulted in this dissertation came from
the Medical Device Plug & Play (MD PnP) program at CIMIT [139]. The ultimate
goal of the MD PnP program is a medical device ecosystem where medical de-
vices can seamlessly integrate in a plug & play manner. The MD PnP program has
spawned a great deal of research seeking to understand the safety aspects of inter-
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assurance.
G: AlgModelAdq
The model Am  captures the 
behavior of A relevant to ɸ.
n
Figure 2.3: The argument pattern for application assurance.
operable medical systems and much of that research either inspired or influenced
the contents of this dissertation.
One result of the MD PnP program is the Integrated Clinical Environment
(ICE) standard [23]. ICE defines a functional architecture for plug & play med-
ical systems (see Figure 2.4). The architecture consists of a supervisor computer
to run supervisory applications, a network controller to manage communications
between devices and applications, and the interoperable devices themselves. In
terms of the vocabulary of this dissertation we can think of the supervisor and net-
workcontroller as the platform. While ICE defines a platform-based architecture
at a high-level it does not specifically proscribe the technologies required to make
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Figure 2.4: The Integrated Clinical Environment functional architecture.
the system work, nor does it describe how to formulate a regulatory framework or
make assurance arguments.
There have been a number of research efforts to understand how to engineer
medical applications assuming an interoperable ecosystem exists. [20] describe
how to design an formally verify an application that synchronizes the operation of
an x-ray and ventilator. [104] developes a device coordination protocol to ensure
that a laser scalpel and ventilator can safely synchronize even in the presence of
network faults. [149] developed and verified a closed-loop algorithm that manages
the delivery of opiods administered by a PCA pump and maintains patient safety
even in the presence of network outages.
One problem faced by the platform approach is trust, i.e., how can a platform
trust that a device actually has the capabilities it claims it has and is not counter-
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feit? One solution to this problem was described in [77]. Their solution allows
the platform to determine the authenticity of a device by examinging a device’s
cryptographic certificate: Whenever a device is certified the certifier will sign the
devices cryptographic certificate. Then the platform determines the authenticity
of the device much in much the same way as a web browser determines the au-
thenticity of a remote server via SSL.
While, as far as we know there has not been any work on assurance arguments
for plug & play or on-demand systems, there has been some work on assurance
arguments for model-based development [28]. The authors of [28] describe an
assurance argument pattern for systems developed using a model-based develop-
ment process. Like our proposed pattern, their pattern requires that the argument
preparer to first prove a propery using a model, and then justify the use of that
model. Their pattern does not address the peculiarities of model based reason-
ing for on-demand systems. There has been some interesting work on modular
certification [161] and compositional safety arguments [103]. These works are
primarily concerned with argument reuse but introduce some concepts that may
be applicable to providing assurance for on-demand systems.
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Chapter 3
Time Parametric Modal
Specifications
Our goal is to make a formal specification language to model device behavior
suitable for use in a regulatory framework as described in Chapter 2. Application
developers would use the formalism to express requirements on device behav-
ior and would embed the requirements specification into the application. Device
manufacturers would use the formalism to express the behavior of their device
and would embed the behavior specification into the device. When the user tries
to start an application with a set of devices, the platform will check to see if the
devices behavior specification satisfies (i.e., is compatible with) the applications
requirements. Ideally, the formalism would allow for explicit descriptions of re-
active component behavior, allow for variability (i.e., let application developers
indicate acceptable variability), enable top-down model-based reasoning, support
automated compatibility checking between device behaviors and application re-
quirements, and allow us to model variablilty in allowed behavior (both functional
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and timing).
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Figure 3.1: Labeled Transition Systems for three different types of PCA
pumps. devices.
Modal specifications [15] are category of formalisms with attributes that make
them attractive as a formalism for device behavior modeling. First, they allow for
the explicit modeling of component behavior via labeled transition systems (LTS).
For example, Figure 3.1 shows the (unitmed) behavior of three different types of
infusion pumps modeled as LTSs. The labels on the edges indicate interactions
with the environment. The pump in Figure 3.1a is very simple, it outputs flow
as long as it receives an on signal, and it outputs no flow while it receives an off
signal. Figure 3.1b models a simple PCA pump. It behaves like the pump of
Figure 3.1a except that it outputs an increased flow when it gets a bolus signal.
Figure 3.1c models a “smart” PCA pump. The pump will automatically shut itself
off if it detects some dangerous situations (e.g., motor overheating or bubbles in
the infusion line).
Second, modal specifications are designed to allow for functional variability.
Modal specifications get their name because they extend classical labeled transi-
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Figure 3.2: Example MTS specification of a PCA pump.
tion systems with a modality on transitions. Must-transitions specify behaviors all
satisfying implementations are required to contain. Figure 3.2 shows an example
modal input/output automata (MIOA) [121] specifying a family of infusion pump
behaviors. The solid lines indicate must-transitions and the dotted lines indicate
may-transitions. Implementations (i.e., LTSs with no may-transitions) are related
to specifications via a refinement relation. We say that an implementation refines
(i.e., satisfies) a specification if it has all the required behavior of the specifica-
tion and all of its behavior is allowed by the specification. The pumps modeled
in Figure 3.1 are all refinements of the MIOA specification in Figure 3.2. In this
way, modal specifications would let application designers succinctly specify the
set of device behaviors compatible with the safety and effectiveness goals of their
application.
May/must modality is useful for an on-demand ecosystem because it allows
application developers to be explicit about which behaviors are necessary and
which behaviors are irrelevant. For example, lets say an application developer
knows that their application needs an infusion pump but the safety of their appli-
cation is not affected by the pump shutting itself off for some unspecified reason.
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They could specify the device requirements of their application using the MIOA
in Figure 3.2. This specification would let users use any of the pumps from Fig-
ure 3.1 with the application (as well as any others that refines the specification),
increasing the flexibility of the application.
Third, many modal specification theories inherently allow for top-down rea-
soning. For most modal specification formalisms it is possible to show they pre-
serve many useful properties (e.g., safety or liveness) under composition and re-
finement. Imagine if our on-demand ecosystem used modal specifications to ex-
press device behaivor and uses modal refinement as a means to check device appli-
cation compatibility. If so, it would be possible to verify system safety properties
by verifying a system model created by composing a model of the application
with its device requirements specification. Then, because the platforms would use
refinement to check compatibility between applications and devices we would be
ensured that any allowed combination will satisfy the safety properties.
Lastly, it’s important for a behavior specification formalism to have the ability
to model behavior w.r.t. wall clock time: Most medical systems are inherently
real-time systems, i.e., if they do something at the wrong time their safety or
effectiveness could be compromised. While there are a collection of modal spec-
ification formalisms with support for modeling time (e.g., [68, 182, 35, 56, 34]),
they either dont treat timing variability separately from functional variability (e.g.,
to model differences in the precision of actuators or processing capabilities of dif-
ferent devices), or they dont support the composition of specifications (e.g., [32]).
The inability to model timing variability separately from functional variability
can be awkward in practice: Effectively, it means all implementations of a timed
modal specification must inherit all of its timing behavior, including any non-
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determinism or imprecision. We argue that it is important for designers to specify
whether implementations can refine the timing behavior of specifications, e.g., to
allow for implementations that are faster or more precise.
In this Chapter we introduce Time Parametric Modal Specifications (TPMS).
TPMS allow for the specification of functional variability separately from tim-
ing variability, support parallel composition, and preserve important (safety and
liveness) properties under refinement and composition. To the best of our knowl-
edge, TPMS is the first modal specification theory that explicitly supports parallel
composition of specifications and the modeling of timing variability.
This Chapter is organized as follows: First we give a notation glossary in Sec-
tion 3.1. Then, we formally define TPMS, their semantics, notion of refinement,
parallel composition and property preservation in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 gives
a number of procedures for deciding important decision problems (i.e., reacha-
bility checking and refinement checking). Section 3.3 gives a survey of related
work and explains why other modal specifications don’t separate functional from
timing variability.
3.1 Notation Glossary
I,M,P ,Q,S,X ,Y . . . . . . . A specification (i.e., a IOTA, MIOTA, or TPMS).
I,M, P,Q, S,X, Y . . . . . . . . . . . . Transition transition system (TTS or MTTS).
α, β, γ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Parameters.
a, b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Actions.
c, x, y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Clock variables.
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v, p, f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Valuations.
r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Clock reset set.
s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . State.
S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . States.
Θ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The set of natural-numbered parameters for a TPMS.
∼ . . . . . . . . Used where the comparison operators <,≤, >, or ≥ could be used.
|=3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . May satisify.
|=2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Must satisify.
↪→2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Syntactic must transition (sometimes set of).
↪→3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Syntactic may transition (sometimes set of).
→2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Semantic must transition (sometimes set of).
→3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Semantic may transition (sometimes set of).
→d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Semantic delay transition (sometimes set of).
;2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Zone-graph must transition (sometimes set of).
;3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Zone-graph may transition (sometimes set of).
;d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Zone-graph delay transition (sometimes set of).
v . . . . . . . Refinement between syntactic specifications (e.g., TPMS or MIOTA).
<∼ . . Weak refinement between syntactic specifications (e.g., TPMS or MIOTA).
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 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Refinement between transition systems (e.g., TTS or MTTS).
- . . . . . . . . . Weak refinement between transition systems (e.g., TTS or MTTS).
JMK . Semantics ofM. IfM is an MIOTA JMK is an MTTS. IfM is a TPMS
then JMK is a set of MTTS.
φ, ψ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . State property (linear formula over clocks and locations).
3.2 Modal Specifications for Timing Variability
In this section, we propose a new notion of time-parametric modal specifica-
tions which can be used to describe the variability of timing and functional be-
havior in corresponding implementations. We first define parametric clock con-
straints in Section 3.2.1, and present the syntax and operational semantics of time-
parametric modal specifications in Section 3.2.2. We develop the specification
theory on modal refinement, property preservation and compositional reasoning
in Sections 3.2.3, 3.2.4 and 3.2.5, respectively.
3.2.1 Clocks
As in the classical theory of timed automata [5], we use a finite set of real-valued
clock variables, called clocks for short, to describe the progress of time. Given a
finite set of clocks Clk , we refer to a function v : Clk → R≥0 as a clock valuation.
Given d ∈ R≥0, let v+d denote the clock valuation that assigns all clocks x ∈ Clk
to v(x)+d. The set of all clock valuations is denoted by RClk≥0 . We use 0 to denote
the clock valuation that assigns 0 to all clocks in Clk . Clocks can be reset to zero:
for r ⊆ Clk , let v[r 7→ 0] denotes the clock valuation that resets all clocks in
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r to 0 and keeps the value v(x) for clocks x ∈ Clk \ r. A clock constraint is
a conjunctive formula of atomic predicates x ∼ c, where x ∈ Clk is a clock,
∼ ∈ {≤, <,=, >,≥} is an equality/inequality relation operator and c ∈ N is a
constant. A clock valuation v satisfies a clock constraint g, denoted by v |= g, iff
the proposition formula of g resolves to true when substituting all occurrence of
clock x with value v(x).
To specify timing variability, we extend the notion of clock constraints to para-
metric clock constraints, which are conjunctive formulae of predicates x ∼ (c+α)
where α is a non-negative integer parameter bounded by a set of linear constraints
C. Let Θ be a set of parameters, we call a function f : Θ → N a parameter
assignment. A parameter value f(α) is valid if it satisfies the linear constraints
C and c ± f(α) ∈ N. Let g be a parametric clock constraint; by assigning a set
of valid values f to its parameters Θ, we obtain an instance of g as a clock con-
straint, denoted by g[f(Θ)]. For example, a parametric clock constraint x ≤ 1+α
bounded by 1 ≤ α ≤ 3, α ∈ N has three instances: x ≤ 2, x ≤ 3 and x ≤ 4.
A clock valuation v satisfies a parametric clock constraint g, denoted by v |= g,
iff v satisfies all instances of g; and we say that v partially satisfies g, denoted by
v |=p g, iff v satisfies some instances of g. Let gi for i = 1, 2 be two paramet-
ric clock constraints, each of which is bounded by a set of linear constraints Ci
over parameters Θi; their conjunction g = g1 ∧ g2 is then bounded by the linear
constraints C = C1 ∧ C2 over parameters Θ = Θ1 ∪Θ2.
For the rest of the paper, we use B(Clk) (resp. P(Clk)) to denote the set
of clock constraints over clocks in Clk (resp. parametric clock constraints over
clocks Clk and parameters in Θ). We have B(Clk) ⊆ P(Clk), since a clock con-
straint can be considered as a special case of parametric clock constraints whose
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instance is itself.
3.2.2 Syntax and Semantics
Now we propose the notion of time-parametric modal specifications, sometimes
called specifications for short in this paper, to capture the timing and functional
variability of different implementations modeled as Input/Output Timed Automata
(IOTA) (timed automaton [33] that distinguishes input, output and internal ac-
tions. Our IOTA is comparable to the restricted class of Lynch’s Timed I/O Au-
tomata (TIOA) whose trajectories can be modeled with what Lynch calls Alur-Dill
automata [101]
Formally a IOTA is defined as follows:
Definition 3.2.1 (Input/Output Timed Automata). An Input/Output Timed Au-
tomata (IOTA) A is a tuple (Loc, l,Clk ,Act , Inv , ↪→2, ↪→3) where
• Loc is a finite set of locations, and l ∈ Loc is an initial location
• Clk is a finite set of clocks
• Act = Act I unionmultiActO unionmulti τ is a finite set of actions partitioned into input Act I ,
output ActO and internal Act τ actions
• Inv : Loc → B(Clk) assigns invariants to locations
• ↪→2 ⊆ Loc×B(Clk)×Act×2Clk×Loc is the transition relation describing
the action transitions.
The semantics of a IOTA specification is an infinite transition system (Defini-
tion 3.2.2) that models the time-delay and action transitions allowed by the clocks
constraints:
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Definition 3.2.2 (Timed Transition System). A timed transition system (TTS) M
is a tuple (S, s,Act ,→2,→3,→d) where
• S is an (infinite) set of states, s ∈ S is an initial state, and Act is a set of
actions
• →2⊆ S×Act ×S is the action transition relation, and→d ⊆ S×R≥0×S
is the delay transition relation
Definition 3.2.3 (Semantics of IOTA). The semantics of an I/O timed automaton
A = (Loc, l,Clk ,Act , Inv , ↪→2, ↪→3), written JAK, is a timed transition system
(TTS) represented as a tuple (S, s,Σ,→) where
• S = {〈l, v〉 ∈ Loc × RClk≥0 | v |= Inv(l)} is an infinite set of states
• s = 〈l,0〉 is an initial state
• Σ = Act ∪ R≥0 is the alphabet
• 〈l, v〉 a−→2 〈l′, v′〉 if there is an action transition l g,a,r↪→ 2 l′ in A such that
v |= g, v′ = v[r 7→ 0] (each clock in r is reset to 0) and v′ |= Inv(l′)
• 〈l, v〉 d−→d 〈l, v + d〉 for d ∈ R≥0 if v + d |= Inv(l)
A transition l
g,a,r
↪→ l′ is enabled at location l when guard g ∈ B(Clk) holds and
action a ∈ Act occurs; any clock in r ⊆ Clk will be reset to 0 once the transition
has been taken and the new location is l′.
IOTA can be extended to capture functional variability by distinguishing be-
tween may and must transitions [183, 50]. May-transitions represent allowed be-
havior, while must-transitions capture the required behavior. This extension of
IOTA are called modal IOTA (MIOTA). Formally, MIOTA are defined as follows:
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Definition 3.2.4 (Modal I/O Timed Automaton). A modal I/O timed automaton
(MIOTA) A is a tuple (Loc, l,Clk ,Act , Inv , ↪→2, ↪→3) where
• Loc is a finite set of locations, and l ∈ Loc is an initial location
• Clk is a finite set of clocks
• Act = Act I unionmultiActO unionmulti τ is a finite set of actions partitioned into input Act I ,
output ActO and internal Act τ actions
• Inv : Loc → B(Clk) assigns invariants to locations.
• ↪→2 ⊆ Loc × B(Clk) × Act × 2Clk × Loc is the must transition relation
describing required behavior
• ↪→3 ⊆ Loc × B(Clk) × Act × 2Clk × Loc is the may transition relation
describing allowed behavior. We require that ↪→2⊆↪→3
We say an MIOTA
Definition 3.2.5 (Implementation). We say that A is an implementation (i.e.,
IOTA), if there is no variability, i.e., ↪→2=↪→3.
The operational semantics of MIOTA are then given by modal Timed Transi-
tion Systems (i.e., MTTS), which likewise extend TTS with may/must distinction
on transitions. The transitions of the MTTS inherit their modality from the modal-
ity of the edge that induces them in the MIOTA:
Definition 3.2.6 (Modal Timed Transition System). A modal timed transition sys-
tem (MTTS) M is a tuple (S, s,Act ,→2,→3,→d) where
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• S is an (infinite) set of states, s ∈ S is an initial state, and Act is a set of
actions
• →2 ⊆ S×Act×S is the must action transition relation,→3 ⊆ S×Act×S
is the may action transition relation, and→d ⊆ S × R≥0 × S is the delay
transition relation
Definition 3.2.7 (Operational Semantics of MIOTA). The operational semantics
of a modal timed I/O automaton A = (Loc, l,Clk ,Act , Inv , ↪→2, ↪→3), denoted
by JAK, is a modal timed transition system (MTTS) represented as a tuple (S, s,Σ,→
) where
• S = {〈l, v〉 ∈ Loc × RClk≥0 | v |= Inv(l)} is an infinite set of states
• s = 〈l,0〉 is an initial state
• Σ = Act ∪ R≥0 is the alphabet
• 〈l, v〉 a−→2 〈l′, v′〉 (resp. 〈l, v〉 a−→3 〈l′, v′〉) if there is a must (resp. may)
action transition l
g,a,r
↪→ 2 l′ (resp. l g,a,r↪→ 3 l′) in M such that v |= g, v′ =
v[r 7→ 0] and v′ |= Inv(l′)
• 〈l, v〉 d−→d 〈l, v + d〉 for d ∈ R≥0 if v + d |= Inv(l)
We extend MIOTA to support timing variability by allowing natural number
valued parameters in the clocks contraints. We call this extension Time Para-
metric Modal Specifications. Syntactically, a time-parametric modal specification
looks similar to a MIOTA; it distinguishes must and may transition relations for
functional variability, and also allows parametric clock constraints for timing vari-
ability:
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Definition 3.2.8 (Time-Parametric Modal Specification). A time-parametric modal
specification (TPMS)M is a tuple (Loc, l,Clk ,Θ,Act , Inv , ↪→2, ↪→3, C(Θ)) where
• Loc, l,Clk and Act are the same as in Definition 3.2.4
• Θ is a set of parameters that can take on values from N.
• Inv : Loc → P(Clk) assigns parametric clock constraints in the form of
x ≤ c± α or x < c± α to locations, where c, α ∈ N
• ↪→2 ⊆ Loc × P(Clk) × Act × 2Clk × Loc is the must transition relation
describing required behavior
• ↪→3 ⊆ Loc × P(Clk) × Act × 2Clk × Loc is the may transition relation
describing allowed behavior
• C(Θ) is a set of linear constraints on a finite set of non-negative integer
parameters Θ that are used in P(Clk)
We consider only consistent specifications where ↪→2⊆↪→3, i.e., a required
transition should also be allowed. Definition 3.2.8 coincides with Definition 3.2.4
if ↪→2=↪→3, P(Clk) = B(Clk) and Θ = ∅.
Intuitively, we can see that a time-parametric modal specification is a succint
way to specify a set of MIOTA; one for each valid valuation of the parameters.
Example Figure 3.3 shows a time-parametric modal specification for an infu-
sion pump, which has 4 locations: detect, disabled, start and infusion. The
initial location detect is indicated with an incoming arrow. There is only one
clock variable x. The actions include input (“bolus?”, “off pump?”) and out-
put (“alarm!”, “pump ison!”, “pump isoff!”). There are three parameters Θ =
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infusiondetect start
bolus?
x := 0
pump ison!
x ≥ α
x ≤ β
alarm!
pump isoff!
off pump?
C : α ≤ β ≤ 3 and γ ≤ 4 and α, β, γ ∈ N
x ≥ γ
disabled
x := 0 x ≤ γ
off pump?
x := 0
off pump?
x := 0
x ≥ 5
Figure 3.3: An example of time-parametric modal specification.
{α, β, γ}, bounded by the linear constraints α ≤ β ≤ 3 ∧ γ ≤ 4 and α, β, γ ∈ N.
The invariant on detect and disabled is true (omitted in the figure), while the
invariants on start and infusion are the parametric clock constraints x ≤ β and
x ≤ γ, respectively. Must (resp. may) transitions are indicated by solid (resp.
dashed) lines in the figure. For example, once a pump detects a “bolus?” request,
it must move to the start location. If the pump is in detect or start it will be
disabled if it receives a “off pump” signal. Implementations are allowed to stay
disabled or return to detect after 5 units of time has elapsed.
Then, the semantics of TPMS can be defined in terms of the semantics of
MIOTA:
Definition 3.2.9 (Semantics of TPMS). For a time-parametric modal specification
M = (Loc, l,Clk ,Act , Inv , ↪→2, ↪→3, C(Θ)), its semantics, denoted by JMK, is
a finite set of MTTSs such that there is a one-to-one mapping between each valid
parameter assignment f(Θ), an MIOTA and its MTTS M = (S, s,Act ,→2,→3
,→d).
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3.2.3 Modal Refinement
We say that a MIOTA satisfies a TPMS if the MIOTA refines the TPMS. Before
we can formally define refinement between a MIOTA and a TPMS we need to
define refinement between two MIOTA. We say that a MIOTAM1 refines another
MITOA M2 if the operational semantic MTTS of M1 refines the operational
semantic MTTS ofM2:
Definition 3.2.10 (Modal Refinement of MTTSs). Let Mi = (Si, si,Act ,→2,i
,→3,i,→d,i) for i = 1, 2 be two MTTSs. We say that M1 modally refines M2,
denoted by M1  M2, iff there exists a binary relation R ⊆ S1 × S2 containing
(s1, s2) such that for each (s, t) ∈ R we have
• for all (t, a, t′) ∈→2,2 there is some (s, a, s′) ∈→2,1 with (s′, t′) ∈ R
• for all (s, a, s′) ∈→3,1 there is some (t, a, t′) ∈→3,2 with (s′, t′) ∈ R
• for all (s, d, s′) ∈→d,1 there is some (t, d, t′) ∈→d,2 with (s′, t′) ∈ R, and
for all (t, d, t′) ∈→d,2 there is some (s, d, s′) ∈→d,1 with (s′, t′) ∈ R
Thus,M1 must exhibit all the required behavior ofM1, andM2 must exhibit
all the allowed behavior of M1. Since a TTS (Definition 3.2.7) can be consid-
ered as a special case of MTTSs where →2=→3, the above definition is also
applicable for A M where A is a TTS and M is a MTTS.
Definition 3.2.11 (TPMS Refinement). Let A be a MIOTA and M be a TPMS
over the same actions. We say that A refines M, denoted by A v M, if there
exist a MTTS M ∈ JMK such that JAK M . IfA is an implementation, then we
say that A implementsM.
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infusiondetect start
bolus?
x := 0
pump ison!
x ≥ 2
x ≤ 3
pump isoff!
off pump?
x ≥ 4
disabled
x := 0 x ≤ 4
off pump?
x := 0
off pump?
x := 0
x ≥ 5
(a)
infusiondetect start
bolus?
x := 0
pump ison!
x ≥ 1
x ≤ 3
pump isoff!
off pump?
x ≥ 5
disabled
x := 0 x ≤ 5
off pump?
x := 0
off pump?
x := 0
x ≥ 2
(b)
Figure 3.4: Two example MIOTAs.
A time-parametric modal specificationMmay admit a set of implementations
with timing and functional variability. By fixing a parameter assignment for the
specification, a MTTS M ∈ JMK representing certain timing behavior is chosen;
and by checking whether the operational semantics of A modally refines M , we
compare their functional behavior. A is an implementation ofM when both the
timing and functional requirements are met. Later in Section 3.3.5, we present a
symbolic method to check the refinement relation.
Example Consider the time-parametric modal specification shown in Figure 3.3.
The MIOTA in Figure 3.4a is an implementation of the specification, where the
may transition from disabled to detect is implemented and the parameters are
fixed for α = 2, β = 3, γ = 4. The MIOTA in Figure 3.4b is not a valid imple-
mentation for two reasons. First, both the specification and implementation can
reach the location infusion with x = 0. The system in Figure 3.4b can then delay
up to 5 timeunits while in location infusion (the invariant is x ≤ 5), but the spec-
ification only allows for a delay of γ timeunits with γ ≤ 4. Second, the transition
from disabled to detect becomes disabled after only 2 units of time has elapsed.
Often we only care about the “internal” behavior of a component; we don’t
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care how a component reaches some externally visible behavior only that it does.
Like many other types of modal specifications we provide a notion of weak refine-
ment and implementation which hides the internal computation of a component.
Before we can proceed to weak-refinement (and implementation) we need to de-
fine weak action transitions and weak delay transitions. Unlike normal delay tran-
sitions, weak-delay transitions have a (may-must) modality. We write d=⇒2d for the
set of must-delay transitions and d=⇒3d for the set of weak-delay transitions. This
distinction is required because what is externally observed as a delay transition
may internally involve τ steps, which are either may or must.
Definition 3.2.12 (Weak Transitions). The weak must (resp. may) action transi-
tion a=⇒2 (resp. a=⇒3) and weak must (resp. may-delay) delay d=⇒2d (resp. d=⇒3d)
are defined via the following rules:
s
a−→2 s′ a ∈ Act
s
a
=⇒2 s′
s
a−→3 s′ a ∈ Act
s
a
=⇒3 s′
s
τn−→2 s′, n ∈ N
s
0
=⇒2d s′
s
τn−→3 s′, n ∈ N
s
0
=⇒3d s′
s
d−→2 s′
s
d
=⇒2d s′
s
d−→3 s′
s
d
=⇒3d s′
s
d1=⇒2d s′, s′ d2=⇒2d s′′
s
d1+d2===⇒2d s′′
s
d1=⇒3d s′, s′ d2=⇒3d s′′
s
d1+d2===⇒3d s′′
In other words, any number of consecutive τ transitions are observed as a
0−delay transition. If one or more of the τ transitions in the sequence are not
must-transitions then then the delay transition is a “may” delay-transition.
Armed with a definition for weak-transitions we can now relax Definition
3.2.10 into a defintion for weak-refinement of MTTSs:
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Definition 3.2.13 (Weak Modal Refinement of MTTSs). LetMi = (Si, si,Act ,→2,i
,→3,i,→d,i) for i = 1, 2 be two MTTSs. We say that M1 weakly modally refines
M2, denoted by M1 -M2, iff there exists a binary relation R ⊆ S1 × S2 contain-
ing (s1, s2) such that for each (s, t) ∈ R we have
• for all (t, a, t′) ∈⇒2,2 there is some (s, a, s′) ∈⇒2,1 with (s′, t′) ∈ R
• for all (s, a, s′) ∈⇒3,1 there is some (t, a, t′) ∈⇒3,2 with (s′, t′) ∈ R
• for all (s, d, s′) ∈⇒d2,2 there is some (t, d, t′) ∈⇒d2,1 with (s′, t′) ∈ R
• for all (s, d, s′) ∈⇒d3,1 there is some (t, d, t′) ∈⇒d3,2 with (s′, t′) ∈ R
Note that the differences between strong (Definition 3.2.10) and weak refine-
ment are the replacement of the transition relation with the weak version and an
extra rule to account for the existence of may-delay transitions.
Definition 3.2.14 (Weak Implementation). Let A be a MIOTA andM be a time-
parametric modal specification over the same actions. We say that A is a weak
implementation of M, denoted by A <∼ M, if there exist a MTTS M ∈ JMK
such that JAK -M .
It is also clear that implementation implies weak implementation:
Lemma 3.2.1 (Implementation implies Weak Implementation). LetA be a MIOTA
andM be a TPMS. Then A vM implies A <∼ M.
3.2.4 Property Preservation
Property preservation (i.e., the satisfaction of certain property on a specification
implies that all implementations also satisfy the property) is crucial for any speci-
fication theory because it allows designers to predict how systems will behave by
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analyzing their specifications. In this section, we prove that the TPMS implemen-
tation relation preserves state-reachability, quiescence-freedom, and
timelock-freedom.
Reachability
Let φ be a linear formulae over the locations and clocks of some specificationM.
We say that φ is reachable in M if there is some path from M’s initial state to
a state satisfying φ. Reachability checking is crucial for safety analysis: If we
can define a set of “bad” or “unsafe” states we want to ensure that those states
cannot be reached in any implementation (i.e., that it is not may-reachability).
Conversely, we may also want to determine if all implementations are able to
reach some useful state (i.e., the state is must-reachable).
Before we can reason about reachability preservation we need to formally de-
fine may and must reachability:
Definition 3.2.15 (May-reachability). LetM be a TPMS and φ be a formula over
locations and clock values (i.e., states). Then if there is some path fromM’s initial
state to a state satisfying φ consisting of may-transitions in at least one MTTS
M ∈ JMK then we say that φ is may-reachable inM (writtenM |=3 EF φ).
Definition 3.2.16 (Must-reachability). LetM be a TPMS and φ be a formula over
locations and clock values (i.e., states). Then if there is some path fromM’s initial
state to a state satisfying φ consisting of must-transitions in all MTTS M ∈ JMK
then we say that φ is must-reachable inM (writtenM |=2 EF φ).
Note thatM |=2 EF φ impliesM |=3 EF φ because all must transitions are
also may transitions.
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When it comes to safety analysis we generally want to know that if the speci-
fication cannot reach some bad state then neither can any of its implementations.
The TPMS refinement relation preserves negative may-reachability:
Lemma 3.2.2. Let A be a MTTS and M be a MTTS such that A  M . Let ψ be
a formula over the states of M . Suppose M 6|=3 EF ψ, then A 6|=3 EF ψ.
Proof. Because M 6|=3 EF ψ we know that there is no path consisting of may
or delay transitions in M from M ’s starting state through the states of M that
passes through some state s such that s |= φ. By definition of refinement of
MTTS (Definition 3.2.10) we know that A has a subset of the may and delay
transitions from M . We can conclude that there is no path consisting of may or
delay transitions in A from A’s starting state through the states of A that passes
through some state s such that s |= φ.
Theorem 3.2.3. Let A be a MIOTA implementation of a time-parametric modal
specificationM, i.e., A vM. Let ψ be a formula over the states ofM. Suppose
M 6|=3 EF ψ, then A 6|=3 EF ψ.
Proof. Since A vM, based on Definition 3.2.14, there must exist a MTTS M ∈JMK such that JAK M . Given thatM 6|=3 EF ψ, we know thatM 6|=3 EF ψ for
every M ∈ JMK. Thus, based on Lemma 3.2.2, we have that A 6|=3 EF ψ.
Sometimes one wants to know if a state can be reached in all implementations.
The implementation relation preserves positive must-reachability:
Lemma 3.2.4. Let A be a MTTS and M be a MTTS such that A  M . Let ψ be
a formula over the states of M . Suppose M |=2 EF ψ, then A |=2 EF ψ.
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Proof. Because M |=2 EF ψ we know that there is a path pi consisting of must
and delay transitions in M from M ’s starting state through the states of M that
passes through some state s such that s |= φ. By definition of refinement of MTTS
(Definition 3.2.10) we know that A has all the must and delay transitions of M .
Therefore, we conclude that there is a path pi consisting must and delay transitions
in A from A’s starting state through the states of A that passes through some state
s such that s |= φ.
Theorem 3.2.5. Let A be a MIOTA implementation of a time-parametric modal
specificationM, i.e., A vM. Let ψ be a formula over the states ofM. Suppose
M |=2 EF ψ, then A |=2 EF ψ.
Proof. Since A vM, based on Definition 3.2.14, there must exist a MTTS M ∈JMK such that JAK M . Given thatM |=2 EF ψ, we know thatM |=2 EF ψ for
every M ∈ JMK. Thus, based on Lemma 3.2.4, we have that A |=2 EF ψ.
Quiescence Freedom
Informally, a state is quiescent if it is “inactive”, i.e., a system is quiescent if
it will not engage in any actions in the future. We can think of quiescence as
a deadlock-like state where time is still allowed to pass. The implementation
relation preserves negative reachability of quiescent states.
Definition 3.2.17 (Quiescent States). Let s be some state of TPMSM. We say
that s is may-quiescent (written s |=3 Ω) if all the paths starting at s consist of
only delay transitions and may transitions.
Lemma 3.2.6. Let A be a MTTS and M be a MTTS such that A  M . Let Ω be
the quiescence property. Suppose M 6|=3 EF Ω, then A 6|=3 EF Ω.
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Proof. BecauseM 6|=3 EF Ω we know that there is no reachable state s inM such
that s |=3 Ω. There are two cases to consider:
• Case 1: There is some state s in A which is may-quiescent. Then by Theo-
rem 3.2.3 we know it is not reachable.
• Case 2: There is no state which is may-quiescent in M . This means that
for all states s in M there are paths starting at s consisting of both delays
and must-transitions. By definition A must include all those transitions and
therefore all those paths. We conclude that there are no may-quiescent states
in A.
Theorem 3.2.7. Let A be a MIOTA implementation of a time-parametric modal
specificationM, i.e.,A vM. Let Ω be the quiescence property. SupposeM 6|=3
EF Ω, then A 6|=3 EF Ω.
Proof. Since A vM, based on Definition 3.2.14, there must exist a MTTS M ∈JMK such that JAK  M . Given thatM 6|=3 EF Ω, we know that M 6|=3 EF Ω
for everyM ∈ JMK. Thus, based on Lemma 3.2.6, we have thatA 6|=3 EF Ω.
Timelock Freedom
A state is timelocked if time cannot progress. It is possible to express a TPMS
where some implementation has a timelocked state. Like quiescence-freedom,
the implementation relation preserves negative reachability of timelocked states.
Definition 3.2.18 (Timedlocked States). Let s be some state of TPMSM. We say
that s is may-timelocked (written s |=3 EF Γ) if all the paths starting at s consist
only of may transitions or the 0-delay transition.
56
Lemma 3.2.8. Let A be a MTTS and M be a MTTS such that A  M . Let Γ be
the timelock property. Suppose M 6|=3 EF Γ, then A 6|=3 EF Γ.
Proof. BecauseM 6|=3 EF Γ we know that there is no reachable state s ofM such
that s |=3 EF Γ. There are two cases to consider:
• Case 1: There is some state s in A which is has may-timelocked. Then by
Theorem 3.2.3 we know it is not reachable.
• Case 2: There is no state which has may-timelock in M . This means that
for all states s in M there are paths starting at s consisting either of delay
transitions such that d ≥ 0 or must-transitions. By definitionAmust include
all those transitions and therefore all those paths. We conclude that there are
no may-timelocked states in A.
Theorem 3.2.9. Let A be a MIOTA implementation of a time-parametric modal
specificationM, i.e., A v M. Let Γ be the timelock property. SupposeM 6|=3
EF Γ, then A 6|=3 EF Γ.
Proof. Since A vM, based on Definition 3.2.14, there must exist a MTTS M ∈JMK such that JAK M . Given thatM 6|=3 EF Γ, we know that M 6|=3 EF Γ for
every M ∈ JMK. Thus, based on Lemma 3.2.8, we have that A 6|=3 EF Γ.
The theorems in this subsection also hold for weak implementation. The struc-
ture of the proofs do not change, one only has to reason over weak paths in the
place of strong paths.
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3.2.5 Compositional Reasoning
We now introduce the notion of composition, which is important for component-
based design. LetM1 andM2 be two time-parametric modal specifications. They
are composeable iff they have disjoint sets of clocks and parameters, i.e., Clk 1 ∩
Clk 2 = ∅ and Θ1 ∩ Θ2 = ∅, and their actions only overlap on complementary
types: (Act I1∪Act τ1)∩(Act I2∪Act τ2) = ∅ and (ActO1 ∪Act τ1)∩(ActO2 ∪Act τ2) = ∅.
Definition 3.2.19 (Composition). Given two composeable time-parametric modal
specificationsMi = (Loci, li,Clk i,Act i, Inv i, ↪→2,i, ↪→3,i, Ci(Θi)) for i = 1, 2.
Their composition product, denoted byM1‖M2, yields a specification (Loc1 ×
Loc2, (l1, l2),Clk 1 ∪ Clk 2,Act , Inv , ↪→2, ↪→3, C(Θ)) such that
• Act = Act I unionmultiActO unionmultiAct τ where Act I = (Act I1 \ActO2 )∪ (Act I2 \ActO1 ),
ActO = (ActO1 \ Act I2) ∪ (ActO2 \ Act I1)
• Inv(l1, l2) = Inv 1(l1) ∧ Inv 2(l2)
• ↪→2 and ↪→3 are defined by the following rules (interchangeable for M1
andM2):
(l1, g1, a!, r1, l
′
1) ∈ ↪→γ,1 (l2, g2, a?, r2, l′2) ∈ ↪→γ,2(
(l1, l2), g1 ∧ g2, τ, r1 ∪ r2, (l′1, l′2)
) ∈ ↪→γ (synchronizing)
(l1, g1, a, r1, l
′
1) ∈ ↪→γ,1 a /∈ Act2 ∨ a = τ(
(l1, l2), g1, a, r1, (l′1, l2)
) ∈ ↪→γ (interleaving)
where γ ∈ {2,3}: if ↪→γ,1=↪→2,1 and ↪→γ,2=↪→2,2 in the synchronizing
rule, or ↪→γ,1=↪→2,1 in the interleaving rule, then ↪→γ=↪→2; otherwise,
↪→γ=↪→3.
• Θ = Θ1 ∪Θ2 and C(Θ) = C1(Θ1) ∧ C2(Θ2).
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We also define composition at the semantic level for MTTS:
Definition 3.2.20 (Composition of MTTS). Given two MTTS Mi = (Si, si,Act i,
→i2,→i3,→id) for i = 1, 2. Their composition product, denoted by M1‖M2,
yields a specification (S1 × S2, (s1, s2),Act1 ∪ Act2,→2,→3,→d) such that
• →2, →3 and →d are defined by the following rules (interchangeable for
M1 and M2):
(s1, a!, s
′
1) ∈→1γ (s2, a?, s′2) ∈→2γ(
(s1, s2)), τ, (s′1, s
′
2)
) ∈→γ (action synchronizing)
(s1, d, s1 + d) ∈→1d (s2, d, s2 + d) ∈→2d(
(s1, s2)), d, (s1, s2) + d
) ∈→d (delay synchronizing)
(s1, a, s
′
1) ∈→1γ a /∈ Act2 ∨ a = τ(
(s1, s2), a, (s′1, s2)
) ∈→γ (interleaving)
where γ ∈ {2,3}: if →1γ=→12 and →2γ=→22 in the action synchroniz-
ing rule, or →1γ=→12 in the interleaving rule, then →γ=→2; otherwise,
→γ=→3.
Since a MIOTA can be considered as a special case of time-parametric modal
specifications, the above definition is also applicable for the composition of two
MIOTAs (resp. a MIOTA and a TPMS), which yields a product MIOTA (resp.
TPMS). Compositional refinement is important for component based reasoning
because it enables top-down reasoning with component specifications: Let X
and Y be two TPMS. Compositional refinement means that if X1 v X then
X1‖Y v X‖Y . TPMS refinement is compositional. We conclude this section
by proving the compositionality of TPMS refinement and that compositionality
preserves reachability properties.
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First we show that composition of syntax is equivalent to composition of
MTTS:
Lemma 3.2.10 (Equivalence of Syntactic and Semantic Composition). LetX1 and
X2 be two MIOTA. Then JX1K‖JX2K = JX‖X2K.
Proof. It suffices to show that the transitions of JX1K‖JX2K are subsets of the tran-
sitions of JX‖X2K and vice-versa. We prove both directions of the equality.
Case: Left to right . There are two subcases to consider, one for the action tran-
sitions and one for the delay transitions. (We do not need to distinguish
between may and must. The arguments the follow can be instantiated to
apply to either may or must transitions by substituting 3 or 2 for γ).
Case: action transitions . Assume towards a contradiction that there is
some ((s1, s2), a, (s′1, s
′
2)) in the action transitions of JX1K‖JX2K but
not in the action transitions of JX1‖X2K. W.o.l.o.g. we only con-
sider the action synchronizing case. By Definition 3.2.20 there must
be some (s1, a, s′1) ∈→1γ and (s2, a, s′2) ∈→2γ . But by Definition 3.2.7
there must be some transition (l1, g1, a, r1, l′1) ∈↪→γ,1 and
(l2, g2, a, r2, l
′
2) ∈↪→γ,2 where s1 |= g1 ∧ s2 |= g2 and s′1 is the same
as s1 except with location l′1 and all clocks in r1 reset and s2 is the
same as s2 except with location l′2 and all clocks in r2 reset. Now
if we follow Definition 3.2.5 it must be the case that ((l1, l2), g1 ∧
g2, a, r1∪r2, (l′1, l′2)) is a transition in X1‖X2. We can apply Definition
3.2.7 again to see that ((s1, s2), a, (s′1, s
′
2)) is an action transition ofJX1‖X1K.
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Case: delay transitions . Assume towards an contradiction that JX K‖JYK
has a delay transition ((s1, s2), d, (s1, s2) + d) not in JX1‖X2K. Then
by Definition 3.2.20 there is a (s1, d, s1 + d) in the transitions ofJX1K and a (s2, d, s2 + d) in the transitions of JX2K and there is no
((s1, s2), d, (s1, s2) + d) in the transitions of JX1‖X2K. Let l1 be the
location associated with s1 and l2 be the location associated with s2.
Then it must be the case that s1 + d |= Inv(l1) and s2 + d |= Inv(l2).
Since Inv(s1, s2) = Inv(s1)∧ Inv(s2) by Definition 3.2.19 it must be
the case that (s1, s2) + d |= Inv(l1, l2). By Definition 3.2.7
((s1, s2), d, (s1, s2) + d) is a transition of JX1‖X2K.
Case: Right to left There are two subcases to consider, one for the action transi-
tions and one for the delay transitions.
Case: action transitions Assume towards a contradiction that there is some
((s1, s2), a, (s
′
1, s
′
2)) in the action transitions of JX1‖X2K but not in the
action transitions of JX1K‖JX2K. By Definition 3.2.7 if
((s1, s2), a, (s
′
1, s
′
2)) is a transition of JX1‖X2K there is some transition
((l1, l2), g1 ∧ g2, a, r1 ∪ r2, (l′1, l′2)) in X1‖X2 for appropriate
l1, l2, g1, g2, r1 and r2. By Definition 3.2.19 if ((l1, l2), g1 ∧ g2, a, r1 ∪
r2, (l
′
1, l
′
2)) is a transition of X1‖X2 then (l1, g1, a, r1, l′1) is a transi-
tion of X1 and (l2, g2, a, r2, l′2) is a transition of X2. This means that
(s1, a, s
′
1) is a transition of JX1K and (s2, a, s′2) is a transition of JX2K.
We can apply the action synchronizing rule of Definition 3.2.20 to
show that ((s1, s2), a, (s′1, s
′
2)) is a transition of JX1K‖JX2K.
Case: delay transitions Assume towards an contradiction that there is some
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((s1, s2), d, (s1, s2) + d) in the transitions of JX‖YK but not inJX1K‖JX2K. Let (l1, l2) be associated with the state (s1, s2). Observe
that by Definition 3.2.7 if ((s1, s2), d, (s1, s2) + d) is a transition ofJX‖YK then it is because (s1, s2)+d |= Inv(l1, l2). We know then that
by Definition 3.2.19 that it must be the case that (s1)+d |= Inv(l1) and
(s2) + d |= Inv(l2). This means that by Definition 3.2.7 (s1, d, s1 + d)
is a transition of JX1K and (s2, d, s2 + d) is a transition of JX2K. We
can now apply Definition 3.2.20 to show that ((s1, s2), d, (s1, s2) + d)
is a transition of JX1K‖JX2K.
Before we proceed with the proof of compositionality we introduce a “con-
venience lemma” to help us relate specifications that have been specified with
different syntax (e.g., location names, clock variable names, graph structure) but
have the same behavior (i.e., they are equivalent). This convenience lemma will
simplify our proof of compositionality.
Lemma 3.2.11 (Syntactic Equivalence). Let X1 be an MIOTA, X be a TPMS and
X1 <∼ X . Then by definition there is some X2 <∼ X such that X2 is defined over
the same locations, and clock constraints asX and JX2K - JX1K and JX1K - JX2K.
We say that the two specifications are equivalent (written X1 ∼ X2).
Proof. The conclusion follows directly from the definition of TPMS and MIOTA
refinement. (Definitions 3.2.14, 3.2.10 and 3.2.13).
Lemma 3.2.11 says that for any MIOTA X1 that refines (resp. implements) a
TPMS X , we can find some other MIOTA X2 created by syntactic manipulation
62
of X (i.e., turning may edges into must edges, fixing parameter values, etc.), that
has the same behavior as X1
Theorem 3.2.12 (Compositionality of Refinement). Let X and Y be two TPMSs
and let X1 and Y1 be two MIOTA such that X1 v X and Y1 v Y . Then X1‖Y1 v
X‖Y .
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that it is not the case that X1‖Y1 v X‖Y .
There are three cases to consider: 1) JX1‖Y1K is missing a required must-transition,
2) JX1‖Y1K has an extra may-transition, 3) JX1‖Y1K has delay transitions not al-
lowed by any valid parametric substitution:
Case 1 JX1‖Y1K is missing a required must-transition. Then either JA′K or JB′K is
missing a required must-transition. But JX1K or JY1K can’t be missing any
required must transition because X1 v X and Y1 v Y .
Case 2 JX1‖Y1K has an extra may-transition. Then either JX1K or JY1K has an
extra may-transition. But JX1K or JY1K can’t have an extra may-transition
because X1 v X and Y1 v Y .
Case 3 JX1‖Y1K has delay transitions not allowed by substituiting valid values
for parameters:
By Lemma 3.2.11 there is some X2 and Y2 s.t. X1 ∼ X2 and Y1 ∼ Y2
and both X2 <∼ X and Y2 <∼ Y . By Lemma 3.2.10 we have that JX1‖Y1K =JX1K‖JY1K. We can see by Definition of MTTS composition that if JX1‖Y1K
has different delays than permitted then both JX1K and JY1K have different
delays allowed by taking the invariants of either X or Y and substituting
valid values for parameters. But because X1 ∼ X2 and Y1 ∼ Y2 and that
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X2 and Y2 are specifications created by substituting valid values for param-
eters we know that the delays of X1 and Y1 are precisely those allowed by
substituting valid values for parameters.
Theorem 3.2.13. Let X and Y be either TPMSs or MIOTAs. Let φ be some
reachability property (including timelock and quiescence freedom) over the states
of X and/or Y . Let ψ be some reachability property (not including timelock and
quiescence freedom) over the states of X and/or Y . Then for all Y1 s.t. Y1 v Y ,
if X‖Y 6|=3 EF φ then X‖Y1 6|=3 EF φ. Likewise, if X‖Y |=2 EF ψ, then
X‖Y1 |=2 EF ψ.
Proof. The conclusion follows directly from Theorems 3.2.9 (preservation of time-
lock freedom) 3.2.7 Quiescence freedom, 3.2.5 (preservation of must-reachability),
and 3.2.3 (preservation of negative may-reachability), and 3.2.12 (compositional-
ity of refinement).
3.3 Symbolic Semantics and Verification
In this section we propose some methods for checking reachability properties and
refinement of TPMSs. As it turns out, it is simple to reduce may-reachbility of
TPMSs to reachability checking on Parametric Timed Automata (PTA). This re-
duction is advantageous, because there are existing tools and techniques for check-
ing reachability on PTA. As far as we know, must-reachability and refinement
checking cannot be checked efficiently via a reduction to an existing problem for
which there are existing tools or techniques. For each problem we devise some
novel extensions of existing algorithms.
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First, we show how to reduce TPMS may-reachability checking to PTA reach-
ability checking and give an overview of existing tools. Second, we show how
may-reachability of TPMS can be encoded as a recursive Horn-clause problem
(See [87] for a practical description of the recursive horn-clause problem). Encod-
ing may-reachability as a horn-clause problem enables the use of modern “fully
symbolic” SAT-based model-checking algorithms. These two techniques each
offer different potential advantages which we discuss in their respective sections.
Next, we show how parametric zone-graphs can encode the state-space of a TPMS
and how the parametric zone-graph can be used as the basis of an algorithm for
must-reachability checking (Sections 3.3.4 and 3.3.3). Lastly, we show how ex-
isting algorithms for checking the modal-refinement of MIOTAs can be extended
to efficiently check refinement of TPMSs (Section 3.3.5).
3.3.1 Reduction to PTA Parameter Synthesis
Parametric Timed Automata (PTA) [6] take classical Timed Automata and extend
them to allow parameters in clock-constraints. The original conception of PTAs
allow the parameters to take on values from the non-negative reals (R+). There
are also versions that restrict the parameters to the natural numbers or require that
the parameters take on values that satisfy some linear formula (as in TPMS) [10].
Much of the existing literature on PTAs focus on the parameter synthesis problem,
i.e., what values of the parameters make a some (e.g., a reachability) property true.
In general, the parameter synthesis problem is undecidable for the more gen-
eral forms of PTAs (e.g.,, the ones that don’t restrict the parameter values to some
finite set) [6]. However, once we restrict ourselves to PTAs that don’t admit an
infinite number of parameters there are a number of techniques available [14, 13]
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and high quality tools [10, 11, 12, 135] that decide the parameter synthesis prob-
lem. The prime practical advantage of reducing may-reachability to PTA parame-
ter synthesis is that we can take advantage of mature tools and techniques.
The reduction of may-reachability of TPMSs to parameter synthesis of PTAs
is straightforward. First we define the restricted class of PTAs which are the target
of our reduction:
Definition 3.3.1 (Parametric Timed Automata). A Parametric Timed Automata
(PTA) is a tuple (Loc, l,Clk , Inv , ↪→, C(Θ)) where
• Loc, l,Clk are the same as in Definition 3.2.4
• Inv : Loc → P(Clk) assigns downwards closed parametric clock con-
straints in the form of x ≤ c± α or x < c± α to locations
• ↪→⊆ Loc × P(Clk)× Act × 2Clk × Loc is the transition relation.
• C(Θ) is a set of linear constraints on a finite set of non-negative integer
parameters Θ that are used in P(Clk)
Observe that Definition 3.3.1 is the same as for TPMS except there is no may/-
must distinction on transitions. Thus, we can create a PTA to represent the may-
behavior of a TPMS by treating the may transitions of the TPMS as the transitions
of the PTA. Checking may-reachibility is answered by checking whether there ex-
ists a parameter valuation such that the target state is reachable in the PTA: Let X
be a TPMS and X ′ be a PTA created by removing the must-transitions of X . Let φ
be a simple state formula over the locations and variables of X . Then X |=3 EF φ
if there exists some parameter valuation p |= C(Θ) s.t. X ′ |= EF φ.
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3.3.2 May Reachability as a Recursive Horn-Clause Problem
Another way to check may-reachability of TPMS is by encoding and solving a
recursive horn-clause problem. Note, that this method also decides the param-
eter synthesis problem of PTAs: As far as we know the technique presented
here also represents a new algorithm to decide the parameter synthesis problem
of PTAs. The central idea of this technique is to encode instances of the may-
reachability problem as a set of recursive Horn-clauses so they can be solved by
recent symbolic model-checking techniques such as Interpolation Model Check-
ing (IMC) [138] and generalized versions of the IC3/Property Directed Reacha-
bility algorithm (PDR) [86, 43, 42].
One potential advantage of these techniques is that they are fully symbolic:
They avoid unrolling the explicit state transition graph of the model by instead
manipulating characteristic formula representing the reachable set and transition
relation. Consequently, these techniques have the potential to verify reachability
properities of TPMS with large discrete state spaces much faster (and utilizing less
memory) than the zone-graph technique of Section 3.3.4. Another advantage is
that, unlike traditional model-checking, these techniques can generate certificates
explaining why a reachability property is not satisfied. The certificate takes the
form of a formula that represents an inductive invariant over the transition rela-
tion of the model and implies the contradiction of the reachability property. The
certificate could then be used as evidence in an assurance case argument or other
type of regulatory submission.
In this section we describe a simple extension to the Horn-Clause encoding
for reachability of Timed Automata given by Hoder et al. in [86]. In order
to make the presentation simpler, we show the encoding for a modified (but se-
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mantically equivalent) definition of TPMS: We redefine a TPMS M as a tuple
(l, Init, c, Inv , ↪→2, ↪→3,Θ, C(Θ)) where
• l : Dn is a vector of n variables, ranging over some finite domain D.
• Init : Dn → B is a predicate over Dn (i.e., the variables of l) that returns
true if the argument satisfies the initial states of the TPMS.
• Θ : Np is a vector of p of 0 or non-negative integer parameters.
• c : Rm is a vector of m real-valued clock variables.
• Inv : Dn ×Rm ×Np → B is a predicate over c, l, and Θ that returns true if
the valuation of c satisfies the invariant constraint associated with l.
• ↪→2 ⊆ (Dn → B) × (Rm → B) × 2Clk × (Dn → B) is the must-transition
relation describing required behavior.
• ↪→3 ⊆ (Dn → B) × (Rm → B) × 2Clk × (Dn → B) is the may-transition
relation describing allowed behavior.
• C : Np → B is the linear constraint over the parameters in Θ.
This modified definition, treats each location as a valuation of the discrete
variables which in turn allows for a compact representation of the specification’s
transition relation using characteristic formula over the variable valuations. The
transitions are specified as guarded commands: Characteristic formula over the
location and clock valuations are used to indicate both the states the transitions
are enabled in and the constraints on the values of the successor states (the primed
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variables). Additionally, the actions associated with transitions are dropped be-
cause they are not relevant for the reachability problem (we only consider the τ
actions as all other actions are disabled in a closed system).
Extending Hoder et al.’s timed-automata encoding, the semantics of the may-
transitions of the TPMS can be directly encoded with the following system of
universally quantified recursive Horn-clauses. Let Θ ∈ Np, l, l′ ∈ Dn, d ∈ R+,
and c, c′ ∈ Rm. Then:
∀
Θ, l
Init(l) ∧ C(Θ)→ R(l, 0,Θ)
(3.1)
∀
Θ, l,l′, c,c′
R(l, c,Θ) ∧ T (l, c, l′, c′,Θ)→ R(l′, c′,Θ)
(3.2)
∀
Θ, l,l′, c,c′
∨
(gl,gc,r,g′)∈↪→3
(
gl(l) ∧ gc(c,Θ) ∧ g′(l) ∧
(
∧
ci∈r
c′i = 0
))
→ T (l, c, l′, c′,Θ)
(3.3)
∀
Θ, l, c,c′, d
Inv(l, c′,Θ) ∧ c′ = c+ d→ T (l, c, l, c′,Θ)
(3.4)
where R : Dn × Rm × Np → B is an uninterpreted predicate representing the set
of reachable states and T : Dn × Rm × Dn × Rm × Np → B is an uninterpreted
predicate that represents the transition relation. Equation 3.1 encodes the set of
reachable states: Any valuation of location and parameter variables that satisfies
the inital state and parametric constraint predicates is in the reachable set. Equa-
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tion 3.2 specifies that any state reachable in a single step from the reachable set is
also in the reachable set. Equation 3.3 encodes the may-action transitions of the
TPMS: If the valuation of the location and clock variables satisfy the transition
guards then that transition is enabled. Equation 3.4 encodes the delay transition;
clocks are allowed to advance as long as the invariant predicate Inv is satisfied.
May-reachability using the Horn encoding can be checked by asserting Equa-
tions 3.1-3.4 to a suitable solver (e.g., Z3 [57]) and then querying the following
formula:
∃
Θ∈Np l∈Dn c∈Rm
Φ(l, c) ∧R(l, c,Θ) (3.5)
where Φ : Dn × Rm → B is a predicate specifing the set of states we want to
check for may-reachability. If equations 3.1-3.4 and 3.5 are satisfiable together,
then states satisfying Φ are may-reachable. If they are unsatisfiable then no states
specified by Φ are may-reachable.
Our Horn clause encoding of may-reachability for TPMS simply treats the
parameters as discrete variables that never change. In fact, the only difference be-
tween the our encoding for may-reachability of TPMS and the encoding of Timed
Automata reachability given by Hoder et al. in [86] is the addition of variables
representing the parameter valuations and the constraints over the valuation of
those variables. Thus, if a Horn-clause solver is able to decide reachability for
Hoder et al.’s Timed Automata encoding (such as the solver described in [86]
and available in the Z3 SMT solver) it will decide may-reachability of TPMS us-
ing the above encoding.
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3.3.3 Symbolic Semantics: Parametric Zone-Graphs
Some techniques (e.g., [92]) for analysis of parametric timed systems extend the
classical notion of zones and zone-graphs for timed automata [33] to parametric
zones and zone-graphs. A parametric zone is in the form of a parametric clock
constraint (defined in Section 3.2.1), representing the maximal set of clock valua-
tions satisfying any instance of the parametric clock constraint. Let v be a clock
valuation and D be a parametric zone, we define v ∈ D iff v satisfies the para-
metric clock constraint of D, i.e., v |= D. Sometimes (as in must-reachability
checking) we want to know if v ∈ D for all possible parametric assignments. We
define v ∈ D for all possible parametric assignments iff v |=2 D (Likewise, we
can extend the notion to sets of valuations constrained by a formula φ: φ |=2 D
iff φ satisfies D for every valid parameter valuation). Given two parametric zones
D1 and D2, if v ∈ D1 implies v ∈ D2, then zone D1 is included in D2, denoted by
D1 ⊆ D2. We define D↑ = {v + d | v ∈ D, d ∈ R≥0} for the zone progression,
and r(D) = {v[r 7→ 0] | v ∈ D} for the clock reset of zones. A parametric zone-
graph is a graph where each node consists of a location and a parametric zone.
We define the symbolic semantics of time-parametric modal specifications based
on parametric zone-graph as follows.
Definition 3.3.2 (Specification’s Symbolic Semantics). The symbolic semantics
of a time-parametric modal specification M = (Loc, l,Clk ,Act , Inv , ↪→2, ↪→3
, C(Θ)), denoted by JMKz, is a parametric zone-graph (S, s,Act ,;2,;3,;d
, C(Θ)) where
• S = {〈l, D〉 ∈ Loc × P(Clk) | D ⊆ Inv(l)} is a finite set of symbolic
states, and s = 〈l, D0〉 is the initial state
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• symbolic must action transition: 〈l, D〉 a;2 〈l′, r(D ∧ g) ∧ Inv(l′)〉 if there
is a must transition l
g,a,r
↪→ 2 l′ inM and g |=2 D and r(D ∧ g) |=2 Inv(l′)
• symbolic may action transition: 〈l, D〉 a;3 〈l′, r(D ∧ g) ∧ Inv(l′)〉 if there
is a may transition l
g,a,r
↪→ 3 l′ inM
• symbolic delay transition: 〈l, D〉;d 〈l, D↑ ∧ Inv(l)〉
A symbolic state 〈l, D〉 in JMKz corresponds to a set of states in the semantics
ofM. A symbolic transition 〈l, D〉 ;γ 〈l′, D′〉 with γ ∈ {2,3, d} implies that,
for every v′ ∈ D′, there must exist at least one MTTS M ∈ JMK which has a
transition 〈l, v〉 →γ 〈l′, v′〉 for some v ∈ D. Indeed, we show that the symbolic
semantics given in Definition 3.3.2 is a correct and full characterization of the
operation semantics given in Definition 3.2.9 as follows.
Theorem 3.3.1. Let M be a time-parametric modal specification, JMKz be its
symbolic semantics and JMK be its operational semantics.
• (Soundness) if the initial symbolic state 〈l, D0〉 in JMKz must (resp. may)
lead to a target state 〈lf , Df〉, then for all vf ∈ Df , state 〈lf , vf〉 must (resp.
may) be reachable from the initial state 〈l,0〉 in some M ∈ JMK
• (Completeness) if, in any M ∈ JMK, a target state 〈lf , vf〉must (resp. may)
be reachable from the initial state 〈l,0〉, then state 〈l, D0〉 in JMKz must
(resp. may) lead to 〈lf , Df〉 for some Df such that vf ∈ Df
Proof. We will prove by induction on the length of paths. Without loss of gen-
erality, we assume that all paths are expressed in the form of alternating (must
or may) action transitions and delay transitions, i.e., · · · 〈li−1, vi−1〉 a−→ 〈li, vi〉 d−→
〈li+1, vi+1〉 · · · for a ∈ Act and d ∈ R≥0.
72
(Soundness) Assume 〈l, D0〉 ;∗ 〈ln, Dn〉 σ; 〈ln+1, Dn+1〉, where ;∗ rep-
resents a succession of transitions. By induction, we have 〈l,0〉 →∗ 〈ln, vn〉
for all vn ∈ Dn. We need to prove for all vn+1 ∈ Dn+1, there is a transition
〈ln, vn〉 σ−→ 〈ln+1, vn+1〉. There are two cases, since σ can be an action or a delay.
• Suppose 〈ln, Dn〉 a;3 〈ln+1, Dn+1〉 for a ∈ Act . Based on Definition 3.3.2,
we have ln
g,a,r
↪→ 3 ln+1 and Dn+1 = r(Dn ∧ g) ∧ Inv(ln+1). By Defini-
tion 3.2.9, there is a transition 〈ln, vn〉 a−→3 〈ln+1, vn+1〉 in some M ∈ JMK
such that vn ∈ g. Thus, for all vn+1 ∈ Dn+1, there is a vn ∈ Dn such that
vn ∈ g, vn+1 ∈ Inv(ln+1) and vn+1 = vn[r 7→ 0].
• Suppose 〈ln, Dn〉 a;2 〈ln+1, Dn+1〉 for a ∈ Act . Based on Definition 3.3.2,
we have ln
g,a,r
↪→ 2 ln+1 and Dn+1 = r(Dn ∧ g) ∧ Inv(ln+1) and g |=2 Dn
and r(Dn ∧ g) |=2 Inv(ln+1). By Definition 3.2.9, there is a transition
〈ln, vn〉 a−→2 〈ln+1, vn+1〉 in all M ∈ JMK such that vn ∈ g. Thus, for all
vn+1 ∈ Dn+1, there is a vn ∈ Dn such that vn ∈ g, vn+1 ∈ Inv(ln+1) and
vn+1 = vn[r 7→ 0].
• Suppose 〈ln, Dn〉 d;d 〈ln+1, Dn+1〉 for d ∈ R≥0. From Definition 3.3.2, we
have ln = ln+1 and Dn+1 = D↑n ∧ Inv(ln). Due to the definition of zone
progression, we have Dn+1 = {vn + d | vn ∈ Dn, d ∈ R≥0 and vn + d ∈
Inv(ln)}. Based on Definition 3.2.9, we have 〈ln, vn〉 d−→d 〈ln, vn + d〉 if
vn + d ∈ Inv(ln). Thus, for all vn+1 ∈ Dn+1, there is a vn ∈ Dn such that
vn+1 = vn + d and vn, vn+1 ∈ Inv(ln).
(Completeness) Assume 〈l,0〉 →∗ 〈ln, vn〉 σ→ 〈ln+1, vn+1〉. The induction
step gives 〈l, D0〉 ;∗ 〈ln, Dn〉 and vn ∈ Dn. We need to prove that 〈ln, Dn〉 σ;
〈ln+1, Dn+1〉 for some Dn+1 and vn+1 ∈ Dn+1. There are two cases:
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• Suppose 〈ln, vn〉 a−→3 〈ln+1, vn+1〉 for a ∈ Act in any M ∈ JMK. Based
on Definition 3.2.9, there is a transition ln
g,a,r
↪→ 3 ln+1 in M and vn ∈ g,
vn+1 = vn[r 7→ 0] and vn+1 ∈ Inv(ln+1). By Definition 3.3.2, we have
〈ln, Dn〉 a;3 〈ln+1, Dn+1〉 and Dn+1 = r(Dn ∧ g) ∧ Inv(ln+1). Thus,
vn+1 ∈ Dn+1.
• Suppose 〈ln, vn〉 a−→2 〈ln+1, vn+1〉 for a ∈ Act for all M ∈ JMK. Based
on Definition 3.2.9, there is a transition ln
g,a,r
↪→ γ ln+1 inM and vn |=2 g,
vn+1 = vn[r 7→ 0] and vn+1 |=2 Inv(ln+1). By Definition 3.3.2, we have
〈ln, Dn〉 a;2 〈ln+1, Dn+1〉 andDn+1 = r(Dn∧g)∧Inv(ln+1) with g |=2 Dn
and r(Dn ∧ g) |=2 Inv(ln+1). Thus, vn+1 ∈ Dn+1.
• Suppose 〈ln, vn〉 d−→d 〈ln+1, vn+1〉 for d ∈ R≥0. Then we have ln = ln+1,
vn+1 = vn + d and vn, vn+1 ∈ Inv(ln). From Definition 3.3.2, we get
〈ln, Dn〉 d;d 〈ln+1, Dn+1〉 and Dn+1 = D↑n ∧ Inv(ln) = {vn + d | vn ∈
Dn, d ∈ R≥0 and vn + d ∈ Inv(ln)}. Thus, vn+1 ∈ Dn+1.
The clock differences in a (parametric) zone-graph may increase unboundedly
due to transitions which reset some clocks but not others, which can result in an
infinite zone-graph. We can apply techniques such as zone normalization to nor-
malize zones and guarantee a finite zone graph. See [33] for an indepth discussion
on how these clock differences can increase unboundedly and how to implement
zone normalization techniques.
Example Figure 3.5 illustrates the parametric zone-graph induced from the time-
parametric modal specification shown in Figure 3.3. There are 7 symbolic states
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〈detect, x = 0〉
〈detect, x ≥ 0〉
〈start, x = 0〉
〈start, x ≤ β〉
〈infusion, x = 0〉
〈infusion, x ≤ γ〉
off pump?
bolus?
alarm!
alarm!
pump ison!
off pump?
off pump?C : α ≤ β ≤ 3 and γ ≤ 4 and α, β, γ ∈ N
〈disabled, x = 0〉
bolus?
off pump?
bolus?
pump isoff!
off pump?
Figure 3.5: Parametric zone-graph of the specification in Figure 3.3.
in the zone-graph; for example, 〈infusion, x ≤ γ〉 is a state associated with a
location infusion and a parametric zone x ≤ γ, which is bounded by the linear
constraint: γ ≤ 4.
In Figure 3.5, solid lines represent symbolic must action transitions, e.g., there
is a must transition labeled with action “bolus?” from state 〈detect, x = 0〉 to
〈start, x = 0〉; dashed lines are for the symbolic may action transitions, e.g., state
〈start, x ≤ β〉 may loop back to 〈detect, x = 0〉 with action “alarm!”; and dash
dotted lines are for symbolic delay transitions, e.g., state 〈detect, x = 0〉 evolves
to 〈detect, x ≥ 0〉 via zone progression.
3.3.4 Zone-Graph Symbolic Reachability Analysis
Reachability analysis lies at the core of many verification problems, e.g., we can
verify safety properties by checking whether some bad states are reachable. In-
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Algorithm 1 Must (resp. may) reachability analysis on parametric zone-graphs
Precondition: G is a a parametric zone-graph whose initial state is 〈l,D0〉
Postcondition: returns “YES”, if 〈lf , φf 〉 is reachable from 〈l,D0〉; “NO”, otherwise
1: function REACHABILITYCHECK(G, 〈lf , φf 〉)
2: seen← ∅, wait← {〈l,D0〉}
3: while wait 6= ∅ do
4: 〈l,D〉 ←pop(wait)
5: if l = lf and D ∩ φf 6= ∅ for all (resp. some) valid f(Θ) then
6: return “YES”
7: end if
8: if D 6⊆ D′ for all 〈l,D′〉 ∈ seen then
9: seen← seen ∪ 〈l,D〉
10: for 〈l′, D′〉 such that (〈l,D〉, 〈l′, D′〉) ∈;d and;2 (resp. ;3) do
11: wait← wait ∪ 〈l′, D′〉
12: end for
13: end if
14: end while
15: return “NO”
16: end function
spired by the zone-graph based reachability algorithm in [33], we propose a sym-
bolic algorithm for the reachability analysis of parametric zone-graphs, which is
useful for the verification of time-parametric modal specifications.
As illustrated in Algorithm 1, we check whether a target state 〈lf , φf〉 is reach-
able from the initial state 〈l, D0〉 by exploring the state-space of parametric zone-
graph 1 on-the-fly. Note that we twist Algorithm 1 for both the must and may
reachability analysis. The algorithm maintains two sets of states: PASSED for
those having been traversed and WAIT for those to be considered. Starting with
1We assume a normalized zone-graph with finite transition relations.
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the initial state 〈l, D0〉, the algorithm processes each element 〈l, D〉 of WAIT till
the set becomes empty. Note that a transition is a must transition (;2) only if
it is enabled for all parameter assignments. If l = lf and D ∩ φf 6= ∅ for all
valid parameter assignment f(Θ), then the target must be reachable. This can be
checked by querying an SMT solver with an assertion of the following form:
∃Θ [C(Θ) ∧ ¬∃Clk (D ∧ φf )]
If the above is satisfiable, then there exists an assignment to parameters Θ
that satisfy P(Clk) such that there is no possible valuation of the clocks Clk that
intersect with the target valuation φf . On the other hand, we say that 〈lf , φf〉
may be reachable if D ∩ φf 6= ∅ is only true for some f(Θ), in the sense that
the target may (not) be reachable for some implementation of the time-parametric
modal specification. If 〈l, D〉 does not hit the target and has not been traversed,
then the algorithm adds 〈l, D〉 to PASSED and all its successor states to WAIT.
The algorithm terminates when WAIT is empty, and outputs that the target state
〈lf , φf〉 is not reachable.
The termination of Algorithm 1 is guaranteed, because the parametric zone-
graph G has a finite set of symbolic states and finite transition relations, i.e., the
size of WAIT is finite. The correctness of Algorithm 1 is given by Theorem 3.3.1.
Example Consider the parametric zone-graph shown in Figure 3.5. A target
〈infusion, x ≤ 0〉 must be reachable, because there is a path
〈detect, x = 0〉 → 〈start, x = 0〉 → 〈start, x ≤ β〉 → 〈infusion, x = 0〉
and, for any valid parameter values satisfying the constraint: 0 ≤ α ≤ β ≤
3 ∧ 0 ≤ γ ≤ 4, we always have that x = 0 ∩ x ≤ γ 6= ∅. Suppose the target is
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〈infusion, x = 3〉, then it may be reachable, because (x ≤ γ) ∩ (x = 3) 6= ∅ is
true for some parameter assignments, e.g., γ ≥ 3, but false for others, e.g., γ < 3.
3.3.5 Symbolic Modal Refinement Checking
Recall from Section 3.2.3 that we verify whether a MIOTA is an implementation
of a TPMS via a modal refinement check. We can directly apply the definition of
TPMS refinement (Definition 3.2.14) by reducing the problem to the timed refine-
ment check of MIOTA, where standard zone-graph based algorithms (e.g., [183])
are available: Given a time-parametric modal specificationM and potential im-
plementation I, we first solve the linear constraints C(Θ) and obtain a finite set
of parameter assignments. For each parameter assignment f , we substitute all the
occurrences of parameters Θ with values f(Θ), resolving the timing variability of
the specification and leaving a set of concrete specifications JMK. JIK <∼ M iff
I - S for some S ∈ JMK.
Unfortunately, brute-force checking refinement of I vs. each possible para-
metric concretization of M can be too slow for practical applications. If one
multiplies all the constants in the specifications by some factor (e.g., to increase
the resolution of the time units considered), the number of possible parametric
concretizations increases exponentially (i.e., it is “scaling-sensitive”). Further-
more, for a given implementation I and specificationM only a few (perhaps only
one) of the parametric concretizations of M witnesses I <∼ M. We want to
avoid checking as many irrelevent concretizations as possible because the known
procedures for checking the timed refinement of modal timed automata can be
expensive2.
2The zone and region techniques described [183, 182, 48] are EXPTIME.
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The rest of Section 3.3.5 is devoted to a TPMS implementation checking algo-
rithm that avoids brute-force checking of each possible parametric concretization.
Our algorithm attempts to quickly narrow the parameter search space by leverag-
ing information learned from repeatedly applying a modified version of Weise et
al.’s refinement checking algorithm [183]. First we describe Carsten et al.’s algo-
rithm and import the relevant theorems from [183]. Then we we give a modified
version of Carsten et al.’s original algorithm and show how it can be used as part
of a procedure that avoids searching irrelevant parameter valuations. Finally, we
prove the correctness of our algorithm.
Weise’s Algorithm for Checking Refinement Between MIOTAs
Algorithm 2 is psuedo-code of an algorithm for checking timed-bisimulation orig-
inally presented in [183] and extended for checking timed-refinement in [182].
First, the algorithm constructs the syntactic product of the two specifications P
and Q (Definition 3.3.3). Then the algorithm unrolls a Backward Stable (BS)
zone-graph (see Definition 3.3.4) of the syntactic product. The BS zone-graph of
the product is a symbolic representation of an overapproximation of the refine-
ment relation between the input specifications. Finally, the algorithm iteratively
removes all the non-closed zones until all remaining zones in the zone-graph are
closed (i.e., each state in each zone can match the required action and delay tran-
sitions, see Definition 3.3.5). If the initial zone is removed then it is not the case
that P  Q.
Definition 3.3.3 (Syntactic Product of MIOTA). The syntactic product of two
MIOTA P = (LocP , lP ,ClkP ,ActP , InvP , ↪→2,P , ↪→3,P) and
Q = (LocQ, lQ,ClkQ,ActQ, InvQ, ↪→2,Q, ↪→3,Q) is
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PQ = (LocP ×LocP , (lP , lQ),ClkP ∪ClkQ ∪ {t},ActP ∪ActQ, InvPQ, ↪→2,PQ
, ↪→3,PQ) where:
• InvPQ((lP , lQ)) = InvP(lP) ∧ InvQ(lQ).
• ↪→2,PQ and ↪→3,PQ are defined by the following rules:
(l1, g1, a, r1, l
′
1) ∈ ↪→γ,P (l2, g2, a, r2, l′2) ∈ ↪→γ,Q(
(l1, l2), g1 ∧ g2, a, r1 ∪ r2, (l′1, l′2)
) ∈ ↪→γ,PQ (synchronizing)
(l1, g1, τ, r1, l
′
1) ∈ ↪→γ,X X ∈ {P ,Q}(
(l1, l2), g1, τ, r1 ∪ t, (l′1, l2)
) ∈ ↪→γ,PQ (interleaving)
• t is a fresh clock.
Definition 3.3.4 (Backward Stable Zone Graph). A zone graph is called backward
stable if each state in each zone is reachable by some state in each predecessor via
an action transition: 〈l, D〉 a; 〈l′, D′〉 implies that ∀v′∈D′ ∃v∈D↑ s.t. 〈l, v〉 a→
〈l′, v′〉 is in the corresponding MTTS.
Definition 3.3.5 (Product Zone Closure). All the points in a zone 〈lpq, Dpq〉 from
the zone-graph of MIOTA PQ are closed with respect to MIOTA specifications
P and Q if each point can match the delays of P & Q, match the may-actions of
P , and match the must-actions of Q. More formally, all the points of 〈lpq, Dpq〉
are closed w.r.t. P and Q iff the following formula holds (we abuse notation and
treat zones and clock constraints as sets of valuations or points that satisfy those
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Algorithm 2 On-the-fly version of Weise’s zone algorithm to check whether a
Timed Modal Specification P  Q.
Precondition: Two MIOTA P & Q
Postcondition: returns TRUE if P  Q, FALSE otherwise
1: function REFCHECK(P,Q)
2: PQ← SYNTACTICPRODUCT(P,Q)
3: seen← ∅, check ← EMPTYSTACK()
4: PUSH(check, 〈lpq,0〉)
5: while NOTEMPTY(check) do
6: 〈lpq, Dpq〉 ← POP(check)
7: if RELEVANT(〈lpq, Dpq〉) then
8: if NOTCLOSED(〈lpq, Dpq〉) then
9: if 〈lpq, Dpq〉 = 〈lpq,0〉 then
10: return FALSE
11: end if
12: REMOVE(〈lpq, Dpq〉)
13: PUSHALL(check, PRED(〈lpq, Dpq〉)
14: end if
15: end if
16: if 〈lpq, Dpq〉 /∈ seen then
17: seen← seen ∪ 〈lpq, Dpq〉
18: PUSHALL(check, SUCC(〈lpq, Dpq〉)
19: end if
20: end while
21: return TRUE
22: end function
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constraints):
D↑pq ∩ Inv(lp) ⊆ D↑pq ∩ Inv(lpq) (3.6)
∧ D↑pq ∩ Inv(lq) ⊆ D↑pq ∩ Inv(lpq) (3.7)
∧
∧
a∈MAY(ActP∪ActQ)
D↑pq ∩ Inv(lpq) ∩ GPQ(a, lpq) ⊆ D↑pq ∩ Inv(lpq) ∩ GQ(a, lq)
(3.8)
∧
∧
a∈MUST(ActP∪ActQ)
D↑pq ∩ Inv(lpq) ∩ GQ(a, lq) ⊆ D↑pq ∩ Inv(lpq) ∩ GPQ(a, lpq)
(3.9)
Where MAY (resp. MUST): 2ActP∪ActQ → 2ActP∪ActQ is a helper function
that filters out the set of actions associated with may (resp. must)-transitions and
GX : ActX × LocX is a helper function that gives the union of all the guards of
the edges associated with the specified action and location of specification X (the
null set is given if there is no such edge for the specified location).
Our presentation of Weise’s algorithm has one important difference compared
to what was originally described in [183]. In the original presentation, instead of
removing non-closed zones from the zone graph (line 12 of Algorithm 2), only the
non-closed regions of a zone were removed (Weise called this reducing a zone).
Does simply removing the zone affect the correctness of the algorithm when ap-
plied to MIOTA? As it turns out, if the two specifications are action determined
(Definition 3.3.6), then the product zone graph exactely represents the refinement
relation if the the implementation is valid.
Definition 3.3.6 (Action Determined MIOTA). Let X be some MIOTA specifi-
cation and Let R be the greatest refinement relation satisfying Definition 3.2.10
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over JX K. We say that some MIOTA X is action determined if (s′, s′′) ∈ R when
(s, a, s′), (s, a, s′′) ∈→2,X or (s, a, s′), (s, a, s′′) ∈→3,X .
Definition 3.3.6 simply states that, for a given state, the specification cannot
have more than one transition with the same action-label if those transitions lead
to inequivalent states.
Lemma 3.3.2 (Product ZG Closure). Let P and Q be MIOTA. Let both P and Q
be action determined. If JPK  JQK then the product zone-graph of P and Q is
closed.
Proof. Supposed towards a contradiction that P  Q but there is some zone
〈l′pq, Dpq〉′ in the zone-graph of the product that is not closed. There are two pos-
sibilities: 〈l′pq, D′pq〉 is the initial zone or it is some successor zone. We examine
each case:
1. 〈l′pq, D′pq〉 is the initial zone. If 〈l′pq, D′pq〉 is the initial zone then it is not the
case that P  Q.
2. 〈l′pq, D′pq〉 is some succesor zone. Then either its predecessor 〈lpq, Dpq〉 is
not fully closed, or the states represented by the predecessor are not action
determined. Why? if the predecessor is closed, then there must be some
other transition 〈lpq, Dpq〉 → 〈l′′pq, D′′pq〉 in the product zone graph labeled
with the same action and 〈l′′pq, D′′pq〉. If 〈l′′pq, D′′pq〉 is closed but 〈l′pq, D′pq〉
isn’t, then (〈l′′pq, D′′pq〉, 〈l′pq, D′pq〉) /∈ R and therefore aren’t action deter-
mined.
The argument above can be inductively applied backwards until one reaches
the initial zone.
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Since the product zone graph must represent the refinement relation for action
determined specifications, simply removing unclosed zones (as opposed to reduc-
ing) from the product graph is safe. This ability will be essential when we extend
Weise’s algorithm to check refinement of TPMSs. We don’t believe the restric-
tion to action determined TPMSs much a hardship: developers will likely want to
avoid action non-deterministic specifications for medical devices if possible.
Algorithm for Checking Refinement Between TPMSs
Algorithm 3 Scale-insensitive algorithm to check whether TPMS P is an imple-
mentation of Q.
Precondition: Two TPMS P & Q.
Postcondition: Returns TRUE if P <∼ Q, FALSE otherwise.
1: function REFCHECK(P,Q)
2: Ω← C(Θ)Q
3: while TRUE do
4: (R,Ω′)← GUESSREFCHECK(P,Q,Ω)
5: if R = TRUE then
6: return TRUE
7: else
8: if Ω′ = TRUE then
9: return FALSE
10: else
11: Ω← Ω ∧ ¬Ω′
12: end if
13: end if
14: end while
15: end function
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Our algorithm (Algorithm 3) takes a modified version of Weise’s algorithm
and wraps it in a parameter search loop. The loop maintains a formula, Ω, that
constrains the possible valuations of parameters. On the first iteration Ω is sim-
ply the parametric constraint from the TPMS Q. On each iteration Ω is passed
to the sub-routine GUESSREFCHECK (Algorithm 4) that implements a modified
version of Weise’s refinement check. If GUESSREFCHECK “guesses” parame-
ters that allow it to build a closed BS-zone graph containing the initial states then
it returns true. If GUESSREFCHECK did not guess the correct parameters then
Ω is narrowed to exclude those valuations on the next iteration. Eventually, if
GUESSREFCHECK uses a complete guessing procedure, either witnessing param-
eter valuations will be found (and the algorithm returns TRUE) or it will not be
able to guess any more parameters and it will terminate with FALSE.
How can we make an effective guess procedure? Weise’s original algorithm
checks zone closure directly by using operations on zones. Indeed, the formula in
Definition 3.3.5 can be calculated by using only the future (D↑) and intersection
(D1 ∧ D2) zone operations which enables the use of efficient data structures to
represent zones such as DBMs. Another possibility is to represent the closure
property on zones using the zones’ characteristic formula and use an SMT solver:
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f(Θ) ∧ Ω ∧ ∀
ClkPQ→R≥0
[
(
D↑pq ∧ Inv(lp)
)→ (D↑pq ∧ Inv(lpq))
∧ (D↑pq ∧ Inv(lq))→ (D↑pq ∧ Inv(lpq))
∧
∧
a∈MAY(ActP∪ActQ)
(
D↑pq ∧ Inv(lpq) ∧ GPQ(a, lpq)
)
→ (D↑pq ∧ Inv(lpq) ∧ GQ(a, lq))
∧
∧
a∈MUST(ActP∪ActQ)
(
D↑pq ∧ Inv(lpq) ∧ GQ(a, lq)
)
→ (D↑pq ∧ Inv(lpq) ∧ GPQ(a, lpq)) ]
The above formula is satsifiable if the subformula contained by the quanti-
fier (i.e., the closure property) is valid with parameters assigned values satisfying
f(Θ) ∧ Ω. Thus, any model returned by the SMT solver is a set of parameter
valuations that make the zone closed.
Algorithm 3 eventually terminates assuming the oracle we use for guessing
parametric assignments terminates: First, Weise’s algorithm (Algorithm 4) termi-
nates because the parametric zone-graph it explores is finite and it can only expand
and remove a zone at most once. The outer guessing loop terminates (Algorithm
3) because the number of possible parameter valuations is finite and any valuation
of the parameters is tried at most once.
Algorithm 3 decides modal refinement for action-deterministic TPMS given
Lemma 3.3.2 and assuming Weise’s orginal algorithm is correct. First, it is sound.
If it returns true then by definition it has found a parameter assignment that makes
the initial zone of the product zone graph closed. If it returns false, then my
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Algorithm 4 Version of Weise’s zone-based refinement checking algorithm mod-
ified to assist a parameter search.
Precondition: Two TPMS P & Q and a boolean formula Ω indicating invalid parameter valua-
tions.
Postcondition: returns (TRUE, f(Θ)) if P <∼ Q for the given parameter valuation f(Θ), (FALSE,
f(Θ)) otherwise. If P <∼ Q then f(Θ) are the supporting witness parameter valuations. If
¬(P <∼ Q) then f(Θ) are parameter valuations that don’t support P <∼ Q.
1: function GUESSREFCHECK(P,Q,Ω)
2: PQ← SYNTACTICPRODUCT(P,Q)
3: f(Θ)← TRUEFORMULA()
4: seen← ∅, check ← EMPTYSTACK()
5: PUSH(check, 〈lpq,0〉)
6: while NOTEMPTY(check) do
7: 〈lpq, Dpq〉 ← POP(check)
8: if RELEVANT(〈lpq, Dpq〉) then
9: V ←CLOSEDPARAM(〈lpq, Dpq, f(Θ) ∧ Ω〉)
10: if V = FALSE then
11: if 〈lpq, Dpq〉 = 〈lpq,0〉 then
12: return (FALSE, f(Θ))
13: end if
14: REMOVE(〈lpq, Dpq〉)
15: PUSHALL(check, PRED(〈lpq, Dpq〉)
16: else
17: f(Θ)← f(Θ) ∧ V
18: end if
19: end if
20: if 〈lpq, Dpq〉 /∈ seen then
21: seen← seen ∪ 〈lpq, Dpq〉
22: PUSHALL(check, SUCC(〈lpq, Dpq〉)
23: end if
24: end while
25: return (TRUE, f(Θ))
26: end function
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definition and Lemma 3.3.2 it could not find any parametric assignment that makes
the initial zone closed.
3.4 Related Work
In [119] Larsen et al. first introduced what they called a modal process logic.
Their modal process essentially consists of a LTS where each transition has both
an action label and a may/must modality. The may-must modality constrains
the behaviors exhibited by potential implementations: If a specification contains a
must-transition then all implementations of that specification must have an equiv-
alent transition. If a specification has a may-transition then an implementation is
allowed to have an equivalent transition.
Recently there has been renewed interest in modal specifications as a formal-
ism for software product lines [121, 66, 31]. In software product lines a product
line architect designs a product line by working “top-down”: They start with ab-
stract models of the software components and then incrementally refine the ab-
stract model into concrete implementations by either removing may transitions or
turning may into must transitions. Much of the research efforts studying modal
specifications for product lines has focused on creating a “complete” set of ale-
braic operators for the formalism in questions. These operators usually include
parallel composition, conjunction, disjunction and quotient.
Parallel composition allows designers to combine two specification into a
larger system where the two sub-specifications interact with each other. Con-
junction allows designers to create a new specification that has the intersection of
behaviors from the operands while disjunction is the union. Quotient gives the
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“difference” between two specifications and is useful for synthesis.
There have been a number of interesting extensions to the basic idea of modal
specifications. Disjunctive modal transition systems [31, 64] allow for specifiers
to group may transitions into a disjunction. Then any valid refinement of the
specification must have a transition equivalent to at least one transition in the
disjunctive group. At some level, we have applied a similar idea in TPMS, where
a parametric clock constraint induces a number of possible MTTS.
Quantitative Modal Transition Systems [29, 120] add ranges of numerical
weights to the transitions of the specification. The weights can be used to de-
note a number of quantitative metrics, for example cost. One interesting class of
quantitative model transition systems are timed modal transition systems. Here,
instead of annotating edges with integer weights, an existing timed formalism,
such as timed-automata ([5]), is extended with a notion of may/must modality.
The first appearance of a timed modal specification in the literature can be
seen in [49] and Jens Godskesen’s PhD dissertation [68]. While they give a pro-
cess algebraic syntax for their specification the semantics of an implementation
are fundamentally the same as a Timed Automata with location invariants. In
this early work refinement of the timing behavior is allowed in a very restricted
sense: A refinement must spend less than or equal time in a given state as the
specification.
Later, [182] directly extends timed automata by allowing edges in the au-
tomata be either may or must. This means that while specifiers can express func-
tional variability over possible refinements they cannot express timing variability
separately: The semantics of refinement are given by applying the modality of
the edges to the infinite transition system in the operational semantics of the au-
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tomata. This means that if a specification has a must edge that is enabled between
time t1 and t2, then any refinement must have an equivalent edge enabled for the
same time duration: All refinements must preserve the time-non-determinism of
the specification’s must edges.
[35] establish the decidability of refinement and consistency (i.e., does this
specification have a refinement?) of timed modal specifications. The timed for-
malism Bertrand et al. studied coincides with the original formulation of timed
automata which had accepting states (but no location invariants).
[56] extends timed-automata with may/must modality on the edges but with
the extra restriction that all edges labeled with input events are must edges and all
edges with output events are may edges. While this is a significant restriction it
allows for game-theoretic characterization of their semantics which in turn reveals
elegant algorithms for the various algebraic operators including quotient.
[34] studied another restricted form of timed modal specification where edges
in event-clock automata are extended with modality. Event-clock automata are a
restricted form of timed automata where there is a clock associated with each edge
label. Whenever an edge is taken, its associated clock is reset.
In [32] Benes et al. proposes a unique modal-specification for real-time sys-
tems where timing and functional variability are seperate. Instead of using clocks
and guards over clock values to model time, Benes et al. annotate the edges of
the labeled transition system with durations. The durations indicate the range of
time the source state of the edge is allowed to wait before an action is taken. Tim-
ing variability is achieved by indicating whether the durations are controllable or
uncontrollable. Controllable durations admit implementations that use a duration
equal or less than the duration. Implementations must keep the same durations for
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all controllable durations. While [32] lets designers specify functional and timing
variability separately, the formalism of [32] does not offer any parallel composi-
tion operator.
Each of the timed specification theories described bove either doesn’t allow
for timing variability separate from functional variability or lacks a parallel com-
position operator (unlike TPMS). The specification theories of [182, 35, 56] and
[34] don’t separate timing from functional variability. This means that any imple-
mentation of their specifications must preserve all the timing behavior (including
non-determinism) of the specification. While [68] separates timing variability
from functional variability its notion of refinement only allows for “faster” imple-
mentations (TPMS is more flexible and allows the designer to write specifications
that allow, for example, not just faster but also more precise timing behavior). As
far as we know only the specification theory of [32] explicitly allows for timing
variability separate from functional variability. Unfortunately its lack of parallel
composition makes it unsuitable for reasoning about on-demand systems.
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Chapter 4
The On-Demand Systems
Description Language
The design of the language used to specify the applications in an on-demand
ecosystem will impact the viability of that ecosystem. The language will have
a large role in determining what applications developers can express and verify,
what applications the regulators will admit to the ecosystem, and what devices
and algorithms users can combine into a functioning system.
In this chapter we propose the On-Demand Systems Description Language
(ODSDL). The ODSDL would be used by application developers to program ap-
plications and to specify what devices that application needs to operate correctly.
Device manufacturers would use the ODSDL to specify the behavior and capa-
bilities of their device. This chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.1 we
lay down requirements that any language (or language framework) intended for
on-demand systems must satisfy. In Section 4.2, we give a high-level overview
ODSDL features and how those features help satisfy the previously described re-
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quirements. In Section 4.3 we provide a sketch of the language itself and illustrate
how it would be used to program an example application. In Section 4.4 we give
denotational semantics for ODSDL programs and prove important determinism
properties.
4.1 Key Language Requirements
A language intended to program on-demand applications (i.e., define on-demand
systems) must enable predictability, compositional flexibility, provide adequate
amounts of extensibility and be portable. If not, the number and types of sys-
tems available for end-users to instantiate will be limited. If the number and types
of systems are limited, then the value of the on-demand approach is practically
diminished. In this section we will describe what we mean by predictability, com-
positional flexibility, and existensibility and how each impacts the systems ulti-
mately available to end-users. For portability, we follow the generally accepted
meaning (e.g., as used in [144] or [81]).
Predictability
When an application developer creates an application they are effectively defining
a set of systems users can create. Developers will not be able to test every com-
bination of allowed devices and their application. Instead, developers will have to
predict the possible behavior of these systems by analyzing the application itself
(i.e., treat the application as a model of the systems it defines). The detail at which
system behavior can be predicted will affect what types of systems developers can
get admitted to the ecosystem: The safety assesment of low(er)-criticality appli-
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cations (e.g., smart-alarms [170, 107, 109]) will likely not depend on the detailed
behavior of the system while complex systems of higher-criticality (e.g., closed-
loop control of PCA) will require a detailed understanding of all the ways the
system’s software and devices can interact with each other and the environment
(i.e., patient).
The language used to define an on-demand system should include features
that allow the developer to control the behavior of the system’s software compo-
nents and how those software components interact with each other and connected
devices. Futhermore, the language must allow developers to model individual de-
vice behavior and extrapolate from the behavior models to the behavior of real
systems.
Compositional Flexibility
The compositional flexibility of an on-demand ecosystem is measured by its abil-
ity of the end-users to (safely) use different combinations of devices with the
same application. Compositional flexibility gives end-users more options in terms
of how they allocate (e.g., assign to patients) and procure devices, which in turn
can help drive down costs [1].
The compositional flexibility of an on-demand ecosystem will be affected by
the ecosystem’s standard device behavior language and the ecosystem’s notion of
application/device compatibility. Superficially, compositional flexibility and pre-
dictability seem to be at odds: Strict definitions of compatibility limit the number
of devices that can be used with a given application which in turn makes pre-
dicting overall system behavior “easier”. Conversely, permissive definitions of
compatibility mean more devices can be used with a given application but then
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the application developer must account for more possible behaviors. Ideally, the
ecosystem should standardize on a language that lets application developers write
permissive requirements when possible, and strict requirements when necessary.
Extensibility
As discussed in the intro to this dissertation, creating large complex standards is
practically difficult. Instead of developing a large complex standard that defines
the behavior of each device type, a better approach would be to use a standard-
ized extensible language to describe device behavior. Ideally, the language would
be relatively simple yet expressive enough for application developers and device
manufacturers to specify the behavior of new devices at whatever level of detail
is needed. The main benefit of using a standard extensible language is less stan-
dardization effort. The ecosystem stakeholders only needs to come to a consensus
on the language itself. There would no need for the ecosystem consortium to de-
cide the standard behavior for each device type. If a device manufacturer wants to
produce a new device, there is no need for them to conform to a standard for that
type.
Extensibility frees the manufacturer to add new capability to the ecosystem
(via devices with new behavior). Likewise, application developers would not be
restricted rely one the behaviors defined by any standard. If they want to develop
a new application that requires new behavior out of a device they are free to do
so: They can partner with a device manufacturer to ensure that a device with that
behavior is available in the ecosystem. Then, if that application is successful,
other device manufacturers may decide to market devices that also offer that be-
havior. In this way, a standard extensible language for device behavior would let
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the ecosystem grow organically with a minimum of standardization effort.
4.2 Key Language Features
The ODSDL addresses predictability, compositional flexibility, and extensibility
by incorporating (and tweaking) a number of previously studied concepts into a
single language. These concepts include the ability to specify the logical archi-
tecture of a system, write programs with logical execution time semantics, and
use a type of modal specification to specify device behavior. While there are three
concepts and three key language requirements there is not a direct mapping be-
tween these concepts and the requirements. Instead, each of these concepts helps
the ODSDL meet all of the requirements.
Logical Architecture Abstraction
Inspired by the AADL [65] and MetaH [175], the ODSDL gives application de-
velopers an abstraction by which they specify a system’s logical architecture. A
logical architecture specification is a description of a system’s functional com-
ponents (e.g., software modules, medical devices, etc.), how information flows
between those components, and abstractions that capture the “non-functional”
properties (e.g., timing) of those components. The logical architecture abstrac-
tion allows application developers to express different systems without specifying
particular hardware or hardware configurations which is necessary for application
portability.
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Logical Execution Time Semantics & Input Determinism
The ODSDL extends Logical Execution Time (LET) semantics [80, 79] to systems
of (device/software) components connected via publish/subscribe [63] communi-
cations. In LET semantics each communication or computation is specified with
a delay d, or logical execution time. Each time a computation or communication
activates, it reads its inputs and does its computation in zero time, then writes its
outputs in zero time after d timeunits have elapsed [110]. LET semantics support
the portabilty of applications by abstracting away timing variabilities in the exe-
cution of an induced by a platform’s underlying scheduler, current system load, or
the speed of the processor (or network).
In addition to having LET timing semantics, the value-semantics (i.e., the se-
mantics of the computations themselves) in the ODSDL are deterministic: For a
given state and input, an ODSDL task will always compute the same result. Deter-
ministic value-semantics, combined with the LET semantics, ensure that ODSDL
applications are input-stream deterministic: For a given stream of (timed) input
events (e.g., sensor readings from devices), an application will always generate
the same stream of (timed) outputs (e.g., actuator commands). Input stream de-
terminism directly supports predictability because if developers verify & validate
the application using testing, they have assurance that the system will behave the
same in the field (at least for the tested inputs). Furthermore, input-sequence de-
terminism can aid automatic and exhaustive verification techniques: For example,
a model-checker would not have to explore as many possible system executions
or event interleavings [67].
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Modal Specifications for Device Behavior
The ODSDL bases its device behavior specification sub-language on Time Para-
metric Modal Specifications (TPMS) (see Chapter 3) and uses weak-implementation
(see Definition 3.2.14) to define compatibility between applications and devices.
TPMS (and weak-implementation) directly supports predictability, compositional-
flexibility, and extensibility.
TPMS supports predictability by allowing the application developer to explic-
itly specify device behavior requirements and then directly analyze the composi-
tion of the application, device requirements specifications, suitable environment
model for safety: First, the developer would implement the application software,
specify its logical architecture, and declare the device behavior requirements. A
TIOA (a TPMS with no modal variabilty) model of the application software can
then be extracted from the implementation and composed with the device require-
ments TPMS and environment models. That composition can be fed into a model-
checker or other tool to verify that is satisfies the correct safety properties. If the
platforms use the weak-implementation relation to check for compatibility then
Theorems 3.2.3, 3.2.5, and 3.2.13 ensure us that all instantiated systems will sat-
isfy those same safety properties.
TPMS allow for compositional flexibility because they allow developers to di-
rectly control how permissive their specifications are by distinguishing between
required and allowed behavior. As their name suggests, required behaviors must
be present in all devices that satisfy a specification. Conversely, a device cannot
satisfy a specification if it includes more behavior that what is allowed. Applica-
tion developers can increase the permissiveness (and hence make their application
compatible with a wider range of devices) of their device requirements specifi-
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cations by adding allowed behavior or reducing required behavior. Furthermore,
TPMS allow developers to start with permissive specifications and then iteratively
refine them (e.g., following the definition of weak-refinement) until they arrive at
a specififcation for which they can prove overall system safety.
TPMS support extensibility and enables small standards. If TPMS are used by
application developers and device manufacturers to describe behavior, the ecosys-
tem consortium will not have to standardize behavior for different device types.
As long as the consortium standardizes the syntax and the meaning of the action-
labels (i.e., the physical phenomenon each action-label represents) then the plat-
forms will be able to automatically determine if a device’s behavior meets the
needs of an application. Furthermore, if the ecosystem consortium chooses to
standardize basic behavior for each device type, they can do so with a “loose”
specification which may be easier to achieve consensus on. Then, if necessary,
different stakeholders can refine the specification as needed via modal-refinement
(analogous to a programmer extending an abstraction).
4.3 Core Language Elements
The ODSDL provides three core language elements: system declarations, module
declarations and device declarations. All three are needed to define a complete
ODSDL application. Device declarations would also be used standalone by device
manufacturers to specify their device’s behavior.
In this section we will illustrate the use of each of these elements by showing
how they would be used to implement a PCA safety interlock, i.e., an applica-
tion that automatically disables a PCA pump if the patient is at risk of overseda-
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Figure 4.1: Logical architecture of a closed-loop PCA safety interlock.
tion (Figure 4.1). The application uses two medical devices: a pulseoximeter and
PCA pump. The pulseoximeter periodically samples the patient’s blood oxygena-
tion (SpO2 ) and then transmits those values to the controller. The controller is a
software component that decides, based on received SpO2 values, whether or not
the patient is at risk for oversedation. If the controller deems the patient at risk,
then it will send a ‘disable’ message to the pump which will cause the pump to
ignore future bolus requests from the patient.
The PCA safety interlock example will help us show why the different ODSDL
language features are needed and how they are used to define an on-demand sys-
tem. First, The PCA safety interlock is a real-time system and the application de-
veloper must ensure timely delivery of the message which will in turn depend on
them ensuring timing characteristics of the whole control loop (sensor sampling
delays, network transmission, and controller computation). Second, the safety of
of the PCA safety interlock is also clearly dependent how how the devices them-
selves behave but tolerates some variability in behavior: For example, its perfectly
safe to use a pump that disables itself autonomously as long as it disables itself
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when told to by the controller. Third, both devices ahve input/output interactions
with both the environment and network which lets us demonstrate how to define
device behavior in terms of basic physical signal and data-types.
4.3.1 System Declarations
〈system declaration〉 |= system 〈identifier〉{ 〈body〉 }
〈body〉 |= 〈components〉 〈interactions〉
〈components〉 |= 〈device〉; 〈components〉 | 〈module〉; 〈components〉 | 
〈device〉 |= device 〈identifier〉 :〈type identifier〉
〈module〉 |= module 〈identifier〉 :〈type identifier〉
〈interactions〉 |= interactions { 〈interaction body〉 } | 
〈interaction body〉 |= 〈interaction〉;〈interaction body〉 | 
〈interaction〉 |= 〈identifier〉.〈identifier〉 flowsto 〈identifier〉.〈identifier〉 〈qos clause〉
〈qos clause〉 |= delay 〈number〉 | 
Figure 4.2: Grammar for ODSDL system declarations
ODSDL system declarations are used by application developers to specify the
logical architecture of the system managed by their application: They specify the
types of devices their application needs, the software modules that are used, and
the possible flows of data and commands between devices and modules. The
grammar for system declarations is included in Figure 4.2.
System declarations always have two parts. In the first, needed devices and
software modules are declared. The declaration always associates an instance
with a type. This allows systems to use more than one of the same device or mod-
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1 system ClosedLoopPCA {
2 device pca : PCAPump;
3 device po : PulseOximeter;
4 module controller : PCAController;
5 interactions{
6 controller.disable_cmd flowsto pca.disable delay 100;
7 po.spo2 flowsto controller.spo2_in delay 100;
8 }
9 }
Figure 4.3: Top level specification for the closed-loop PCA system
ule type. The module or device type name is always a reference to an ODSDL
(device or module) declaration of the same name. The second part of the decla-
ration is called the interactions block. Interactions are dataflows that specify the
publish/subscribe relationships that carry data and commands between module
and device ports. Each flow is always declared by identifying the source module
instance/port and destination module instance/port. Each input port of a device or
module can have at most one flow coming into it (this restriction simplifies the
input-deterministic semantics of the system). There is no restriction on the numbe
of flows leaving an output port. Flows have a single QoS parameter called delay.
The delay sets how long the platform will take to propagate the data or command
from the source to the destination in milliseconds. The delay is not a deadline:
it is an isochronal parameter meaning the message will arrive exactely after the
delay has elapsed.
The system declaration for the example closed-loop PCA system is shown
in Figure 4.3. The declaration lists the sub-components of the system and how
they will exchange data and command . Lines 2 & 3 declare that the system
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will make use of two external devices; one with type PCAPump the other with
type PulseOximeter. Line 4 declares that one application module will be
used (of type PCAController). These modules are software units will execute
on the MAP. The types for both modules and devices are both references to the
appropriate module or device declarations.
The closed-loop PCA system has two dataflows: The pulse-oximeter will pe-
riodically publish sampled SpO2 values to the controller, which may cause the
controller to issue a command to disable the pump. Note that the interactions
block only consists of interactions between the devices and modules and not the
devices and the physical environment (e.g., the SpO2 signal, infusion rate, and
bolus event from Figure 4.1). Instead, device interactions with the physical envi-
ronment will be specifed in the device declarations themselves. Each dataflow in
the closed-loop PCA system has a delay of 100 which means that if the pulse-
oximeter sends a message at time t it will arrive at the input port of the controller
at t + 100 (likewise and command issued by the controller will arrive at the PCA
pump 100 milliseconds later.).
4.3.2 Module Declarations
Modules are the software units that implement the control/coordination algorithms
of an ODSDL application. Modules consist of input/output ports, state variables,
and a task.
The ports of a module are its logical interface to the rest of the system. Each
port is specified as either input (i.e., a destination for a dataflow) or an output
(source of a dataflow). The datatype of all ports is implicitly a long (i.e., a signed,
64-bit twos-complement integer). Each port is annotated with a minsep parame-
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〈module〉 |= module { 〈module body〉 }
〈module body〉 |= 〈signature〉 〈globals〉 〈task spec〉
〈signature〉 |= net input 〈port declaration〉 〈signature〉
| net output 〈port declaration〉 〈signature〉
〈port declaration〉 |= 〈identifier〉 〈identifier〉 〈port timing〉
〈port timing〉 |= minsep n1 maxsep n2 | 
〈vars〉 |= vars { 〈var list〉 }
〈var list〉 |= 〈var〉, 〈var list〉 | 
〈var〉 |= 〈identifier〉:〈identifier〉
〈task spec〉 |= task activated 〈trigger〉
delay n { 〈task body〉 }
〈trigger〉 |= periodically n | by port 〈identifier〉
〈task body〉 |= 〈locals〉 〈stmt〉
〈stmt〉 |= 〈identifier〉 := 〈axepr〉 | 〈stmt〉;〈stmt〉 | if 〈bexpr〉 then 〈stmt〉 else 〈stmt〉
| while 〈bexpr〉 do 〈stmt〉
〈send〉 |= send(〈identifier〉, 〈aexpr〉)
〈aexpr〉 |= n | 〈identifier〉 | 〈aexpr〉+〈aexpr〉 | 〈aexpr〉-〈aexpr〉 | 〈aexpr〉*〈aexpr〉
〈bexpr〉 |= true | false | 〈aexp〉 = 〈aexp〉 | 〈aexp〉 ≤ 〈aexp〉
| 〈aexp〉 || 〈aexp〉 | 〈aexp〉 && 〈aexp〉
Figure 4.4: Grammar for ODSDL module descriptions
ter which declares the minimum separation between message arrivals on that port
in milliseconds. Minimum separation informs the platform scheduler on how of-
ten it might need to dispatch a task (if the module’s task is dispatched whenever a
new value arrives on the port). Input ports contain the last value received on that
port. Tasks can read (but not write) input ports as if the input ports are variables.
Each module has a single task which can be programmed to read data from
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input ports, read and update state variables, and send data out the output ports.
The programmer has two options for how the task is dispatched: The module can
be dispatched periodically by the platform’s scheduler or when a new value arrives
on a particular port. Dispatch can be triggered by only one port. Programmers
must specify a delay (in milliseconds) for each module task. The delay must be
less than the task’s period. A task’s period is either specified directly (in the case
of periodically dispatched tasks) or the task inherits its period from the minsep
of the port that triggers it. Tasks can send data using the send operator. Tasks are
restricted from sending more than once out of the same port in the same execution:
the last sent value is what will be used. This restriction makes both resource
allocation easier for the plaform1.
Module tasks have LET semantics: When they are dispatched their execution
is “instantaneous” but all send events they generate will not happen until after
they task delay has elapsed. If a module receives values on a port at the same
time a task is to be dispatched, the port values are updated before the task is
dispatched. The LET semantics combined with the input port write/task dispatch
ordering ensures that modules are input deterministic: For a given stream of inputs
on the input ports, the module will always produce the same output stream on its
output ports.
Figure 4.5 shows the ODSDL module declaration for the PCAController.
The controller receives SpO2 measurements on its input port and generates disable
commands on its output port. The module has a single state variable, last spo2
1If we dropped this restriction then we would have to do static analysis of the task itself to
figure out how many times it could send out a port in the worst case. Furthermore, sending more
than once out of the same port at the same time instant means we would have to decide which
value the receiving port accepts.
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1 module PCAController {
2 net input "spo2_in" Integer minsep 200 maxsep 700
3 net output "disable_cmd" Event minsep 100 maxsep inf
4 vars { }
5 task activated periodically 200 delay 100{
6 if(spo2_in < 90){
7 send("disable_cmd", "")
8 }
9 else{ }
10 }
11 }
12 }
Figure 4.5: PCA Controller module declaration
which it uses to record the most recently received SpO2 reading. The process
of this module is very simple; it is activated periodically and samples the most
recently received value on the spo2 in port which it copies into the last spo2
state variable. If the SpO2 value is below some threshold it will send a disable
signal to the PCA pump. If a task activation is scheduled for the same instant as
when spo2 in receives an update the port will always be updated before task
activation. Because the task’s delay is 100, if it is dispatched at time t and if it
decides to send the disable command, the command will be sent at time t+ 100.
4.3.3 Device Declarations
Device declarations in the ODSDL have two uses. First, they are used by appli-
cation developers to specify the required and allowed behavior of the devices that
are used with their application. Second, device manufacturers use device declara-
tions to model the behavior of their devices. If the certification authority certifies
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〈device declaration〉 |= device 〈identifier〉{ 〈body〉 }
〈body〉 |= 〈signature〉 〈clocks〉 〈parameters〉 〈constraints〉 〈vars〉 〈invariants〉 〈init〉
〈behavior〉
〈signature〉 |= net input 〈port declaration〉 〈signature〉
| net output 〈port declaration〉 〈signature〉
| sensor 〈identifier〉
| actuator 〈identifier〉 | 
〈port declaration〉 |= 〈identifier〉 datatype 〈identifier〉 〈timing〉
〈timing〉 |= minsep 〈number〉 maxsep 〈number〉 | 
〈clocks〉 |= clocks { 〈identifier list〉 }
〈invariants〉 |= invariants { 〈inv list〉 }
〈inv list〉 |= (〈expr〉,〈expr〉),〈inv list〉 | 
〈parameters〉 |= parameters { 〈identifier list〉 }
〈constraints〉 |= constraints { 〈expr〉 }
〈vars〉 |= vars { 〈var list〉 }
〈var list〉 |= 〈var〉, 〈var list〉 | 
〈var〉 |= 〈identifier〉:(〈number〉 〈number〉) | 〈identifier〉:(〈string list〉)
〈init〉 |= init ( 〈expr〉 )
〈behavior〉 |= behavior ( 〈behaviors〉 )
〈behaviors〉 |= 〈guarded update〉, 〈behaviors〉 | 
〈guarded update〉 |= when 〈expr〉 andsync 〈action〉 then 〈modality〉 do 〈cexpr〉
〈action〉 |= 〈identifier〉! | 〈identifier〉? | 〈identifier〉!〈identifier〉
| 〈identifier〉?〈identifier〉
〈modality〉 |= may | must
Figure 4.6: Grammar for ODSDL device declarations
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that the device implements the modeled behavior, the device declaration would be
embedded into the device itself. Then, each time the device is connected to a plat-
form it would register its device declaration with the platform where it can be used
for device/application compatibility checking. Device declarations are a syntactic
sugar for TPMS introduced in Chapter 3. The grammar for device declarations is
given in Figure 4.6.
Like module declarations, device declarations begin with a declaration of ports.
Unlike module declarations, device declarations have four types of ports: net
input, net output, sensor, and actuator. The net input and net
output port types are the same as in module declarations: They declare the logi-
cal interface the device exposes to the application over the network. The sensor
and actuator port types declare the device’s logical interface to its physical
environment. Sensors represent inputs from the environment while actuators are
treated as outputs. Unlike the network ports, sensors and actuators must be spec-
ified with a physical type. The physical types give the interpretation of a signal
on one of those ports. The physical types, their interpretation, units, and allowed
value ranges would be standardized by the ecosystem consortium.
The (required & allowed) behavior of devices are modeled using a guarded
command language version of TPMSs which allows developers to expression both
timing and functional variability in satisfying devices. Parameters, constraints on
parameters, clocks, and invariants are the same as in TPMSs. Device declarations
can have state variables and a valuation of the state variables correspond to a loca-
tion in TPMS. Programmers write transitions using guarded commands. Program-
mers express each transition as a predicate (guard) over device state (clocks &
state variables), synchronization actions over the device’s ports, may/must modal-
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ity, and updates to the device state: When the guard is true the transition is enabled
and the updates happen in “0-time”.
Synchronization with ports is expressed using standard CSP [85] synchroniza-
tion syntax with data: p ! v denotes sending value (or value of variable) v out
port p. p ? v means receiving a value over port p into variable v. TPMS do not
explicity sending data as part of synchronization. ODSDL desugars into TPMS
by creating a special action label for each value that can be sent out of each port
(i.e., p ! 1 in a device declaration would translate into p1! in the corresponding
TPMS).
We chose not to restrict the language in a way to prevent modeling errors
such as deadlocks. For example, it is possible to specify a device that is not
ready to receive a signal from the application when the application sends it, which
will result in a deadlock. This is a tradeoff: Fewer restrictions make it easier
for the programmer to express certain types of behavior, but the programmer is
responsible for ensuring that their specifications don’t deadlock when composed.
In practice this may not be a significant issue as the model checker we developed
for TPMS can automatically check for deadlock freedom.
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show the device requirements specification of the closed-
loop PCA application. The PulseOximeter samples SpO2 from the environ-
ment every 500 to 600 milliseconds then it emits the sampled data out of its spo2
port. Note how the constraints on the parameters allow for timing variability:
This specification allows for devices that are imprecise (e.g., non-deterministically
sample between every 500 to 600 milliseconds) or precise (e.g., samples every t
milliseconds where t is fixed and constrained by 500 ≤ t ≤ 600).
The PCAPump can receive a “disable” command from the network and a bolus
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1 device PCAPump {
2 net input "disable" Event minsep 10 maxsep infinity
3 sensor "breq" physicaltype BolusRequest
4 actuator "rate" physicaltype FlowRateMlHour
5 clocks{ x }
6 parameters{ alpha, beta, gamma }
7 constraints{ alpha <= beta & beta <= 3 & gamma <= 4 }
8 vars{
9 loc : ("idle", "starting", "disabled", "infusing")
10 }
11 invariants{
12 (loc = "starting", x <= beta),
13 (loc = "infusing", x <= gamma)
14 }
15 init{ loc = "idle", FlowRateMlHour = 0 }
16 behavior {
17 when (loc = "idle") andsync ("breq") then must do (loc := "starting", x
:= 0),
18 when (loc = "idle") andsync ("disable") then must do (loc := "disabled",
x := 0),
19 when (loc = "starting" & alpha <= x) andsync ("rate" ! 10) then must do
(loc := "infusing", x := 0),
20 when (loc = "starting") andsync ("disable") then must do (loc := "
disabled", x := 0),
21 when (loc = "starting") andsync tau then may do (loc := "disabled", x :=
0),
22 when (loc = "infusing" & gamma = x) andsync ("rate" ! 0) then must do (
loc := "idle"),
23 when (loc = "disabled") andsync ("disable") then must do (loc := "
disabled", x := 0),
24 when (loc = "disabled") andsync tau then may do (loc := "idle")
25 }
26 }
Figure 4.7: Requirements on PCA pump interfacing and behavior
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1 device PulseOximeter {
2 net output "spo2" Integer
3 sensor "pspo2" physicaltype PercentBloodOxygenSaturation
4 clocks{ p }
5 parameters{ alpha, beta }
6 constraints{ 500 <= alpha & alpha <= beta & beta <= 600 }
7 vars{
8 loc : ("sensing", "sending"),
9 lastval : Integer[0 .. 100]
10 }
11 invariants{
12 (loc = "sensing", x <= beta),
13 (loc = "sending", x <= 0)
14 }
15 init{ loc = "sensing" & lastval = 0 }
16 behavior {
17 when (loc = "sensing" & x >= alpha) andsync ("pspo2" ? lastval) then must
do (loc := "sending", x := 0),
18 when (loc = "sensing") andsync ("spo2" ! lastval) then must do (loc := "
sensing", x := 0)
19 }
20 }
Figure 4.8: Requirements on Pulse-Oximeter interfacing and behavior
request from its environment while it has an “infusionrate” port that outputs to the
environment. Note how the behavior specification gives the interpretation of these
commands. When the pump receives a “disable” command it sets the infusion rate
to 0 and moves into a state where it ignores subsequent bolus requests (line 24).
When the pump gets a bolus request it implements the bolus by increasing the
infusion rate for a bounded amount of time then it sets the rate back to 0. Note
how the PCAPump declaration expresses functional variability: The behavior on
line 27 is a may behavior. The pump may decide to abort a bolus for some internal
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reason (e.g., due to some technical alert). However, if a pump does not exhibit
this behavior then it might still satisfy this declaration.
4.4 Semantics
In this section we give the semantics of ODSDL programs and prove that ODSDL
programs are input-deterministic. By program, we mean the parts of an ODSDL
specification whose execution is controlled by the platform, i.e., the software mod-
ules and the dataflows. Logically, the boundry of an ODSDL program is at the
input/output ports of devices: The output ports of the devices are the inputs to the
program, while the input ports of the devices are the outputs of the program.
4.4.1 Preliminaries
We define the semantics of ODSDL modules and dataflows denotationally over
streams of time-stamped event sets. Definition 4.4.1 gives the three types of events
a module or dataflow can create and/or react to: Modules and devices can send
values out of their output ports, modules and devices can receive values on input
ports. A dataflow can get send events on its input which are converted to receive
events on its output. Only modules can get schedule events on their inputs, which
denote the dispatch of the module task.
Definition 4.4.1 (Event). An event is one of send (m, p, v), recv (m, p, v),
sched (m) or update (m,x, n).
• send (m, p, v) denotes module m sending value v out port p.
• recv (m, p, v) denotes module m receiving value v on port p.
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• sched (m) denotes the dispatch of module m’s task.
A stream is an infinite sequence. Our semantics require two types of streams
(event-streams and state-streams) so we first give a generic definition of streams
(Definition 4.4.2).
Definition 4.4.2 (A-Stream). An A stream is an infinite sequence of elements
from the set A. A-streams are co-inductively defined: If a ∈ A and s is an A-
stream then a :: s is an A-stream. An A-stream can be destructed using the head
(hd) and tail (tl) functions:
• hd (a :: s) = a.
• tl (a :: s) = s.
Timed-event streams are an infinite sequence of event sets each associated with
a timestamp (Definition 4.4.6). Each element of the stream is a tuple that denotes
what events happen when. For example the tuple
({recv (m, p1, 1) , recv (m, p2, 2)}, t) means that module m receives 1 on port p1
and 2 on port p2 at time t. Because the events that happen at time t are collected
into a set, there is no ordering condition between events; they all happen “simulta-
neously” at t. Note that the well-formedness condition ensures that time increases
discretely and uniformly.
Definition 4.4.3 (Timed-Event Stream). A timed-event stream is a stream where
each element is a tuple (E, t) where E is a set of events that occur at time t.
Timed-Event Streams must be well-formed. A stream s is well-formed if both:
1. hd (s) = (E, t) and hd (tl (s)) = (E ′, t+ 1).
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2. tl (s) is well-formed.
If s is a timed-event stream then s (t) gives the set of events that happen at
time t: Let hd (s) = (E, ti). If ti = t then s (t) = E else s (t) = tl (s) (t).
The composition process used to define program semantics requires us to
“merge” two or more event streams into a single stream. Definition 4.4.4 gives a
precise definition of a function, merge, that takes two or more streams and merges
them. Informally, two or more streams are merged by constructing a new stream
whose event-set at each timestamp is the union of all the event-sets from the argu-
ment streams at that same timestamp.
Definition 4.4.4 (Stream Merge). merge : ES × ES → ES is a function that
takes two timed-event streams s1 and s2 and gives a new timed-event stream s3
where s3 (t) = s1 (t) ∪ s2 (t). Formally merge is defined co-inductively: Let
(E1, t) = hd (s1) and (E2, t) = hd (s2). Then merge (s1, s2) = (E1 ∪ E2, t) ::
merge (tl (s1) , tl (s2)). Note that merge is only defined for streams that are well-
formed and have the same initial timestamp. For convenience we often want to
merge more than two streams at once. The above definition can be generalized to
n > 2 arguments by iteratively merging pairs:
merge (s1, . . . , sn) = merge (. . .merge (. . . , sn−1) , sn)
ODSDL modules carry state. We call a snapshot of the module’s state a con-
figuration (Definition 4.4.5). Module variables include both programmer defined
variables and the module’s input ports (the input ports hold the last value they
received).
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Definition 4.4.5 (Module Configuration). The configuration of a module is given
by Ω, which is a map of variables to values. If v is a variable, then Ω (v) is the
value of v in Ω.
Our semantics will relate module configurations to time. We do this via timed-
state streams (Definition 4.4.6).
Definition 4.4.6 (Timed-State Stream). A timed-state stream is a stream where
each element is a tuple (Ω, t) where Ω is a module configuration at time t. Timed-
State Streams must also be well-formed. A stream s is well-formed if both:
1. hd (s) = (Ω, t) and hd (tl (s)) = (Ω′, t+ 1)
2. tl (s) is well-formed.
4.4.2 Tasks
The a module’s task in the ODSDL is written in a language based on the simple
language IMP [185]. Unsuprisingly, the operational semantics of ODSDL tasks
largely mirrors the semantics of IMP a student would learn in their undegraduate
programming languages course (the operational semantics of ODSDL tasks are
given in Figure 4.9). The main difference from IMP is the addition of the send
construct. By definition, a module can’t send more than one value out the same
output at the same time. Rules Send1 and Send2 ensure that only the last value
passed to a send call is actually sent: The configuration of a task is given by
the triple 〈S,Ω, δ〉, where S is a program statement, Ω maps program variables
to values and δ is the set of send (m, p, v) events corresponding to the values the
module will send as a result of its task’s execution.
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Definition 4.4.7 (Task Evaluation). If a module m’s task final configuration when
evaluated in state Ω is 〈S,Ω′, δ〉, then eval (m,Ω) = (δ,Ω′). The rules for task
evaluation are given in Figure 4.9. By convention a is used to denote an arithmatic
expression and b is used to denote a boolean expression.
4.4.3 Modules, Dataflows and Programs
Each dataflow is an ODSDL program is a simple stream processing process that
converts input send events into output receive events timeshifted by the delay of
that dataflow:
Definition 4.4.8 (Semantics of Dataflows). For a dataflow connector
c = i.j flowsto k.l delay d its semantics are defined by the greatest binary rela-
tion Rc between c’s input timed-event streams and its output timed-event streams
such that if (sin, sout) ∈ Rc then (E, t) = hd (sin), (E ′, t+ d) = hd (sout) and
E ′ = {recv (k, l, v) | send (i, j, v) ∈ E} and (tl (sin) , tl (sout)) ∈ Rc.
Dataflows are clearly input-deterministic:
Lemma 4.4.1 (Dataflows are Input Deterministic). For a dataflow conntector c let
Rc be defined as in Definition 4.4.8. If (sin, s1out) ∈ Rc and (sin, s2out) ∈ Rc then
s1out = s
2
out.
Proof. We proceed by co-induction on the streams. Let (Ein, t) = hd (sin).
Then there is only one possibilty for hd (sout) which is (E ′, t+ d) with E ′ =
{recv (k, l, v) | send (i, j, v) ∈ E} (when c connects i.j to k.l). We conclude the
proof by applying the co-induction hypothesis to show that if(
(Ein, t) :: tl (sin) , (E
′, t) :: tl
(
s1out
)) ∈ Rc
116
Lookup
Ω (x) = n
〈x,Ω, δ〉 → 〈n,Ω, δ〉
Sum
n3 = n1 + n2
〈n1 + n2,Ω, δ〉 → 〈n3,Ω, δ〉
Add1
〈a1,Ω, δ〉 → 〈a′1,Ω, δ〉
〈a1 + a2,Ω, δ〉 → 〈a′1 + a2,Ω, δ〉
Add2
〈a2,Ω, δ〉 → 〈a′2,Ω, δ〉
〈n+ a2,Ω, δ〉 → 〈n+ a′2,Ω, δ〉
Sequence1
〈s0,Ω, δ〉 → 〈s′0,Ω, δ〉
〈s0; s1,Ω, δ〉 → 〈s′0; s1,Ω, δ〉
Sequence2 〈{}; s1,Ω, δ〉 → 〈s1,Ω, δ〉
Cond
〈b,Ω, δ〉 → 〈b′,Ω, δ〉
〈if b then s0 else s1,Ω, δ〉 → 〈if b′ then s0 else s1,Ω, δ〉
CondTrue 〈if true then s0 else s1,Ω, δ〉 → 〈s0,Ω, δ〉
CondFalse 〈if false then s0 else s1,Ω, δ〉 → 〈s1,Ω, δ〉
While 〈while b do s,Ω, δ〉 → 〈if b then (s; while b do s) else {},Ω, δ〉
Assign1 〈x := n′,Ω, δ〉 → 〈{},Ω[x 7→ n′], δ〉
Assign2
〈a,Ω, δ〉 → 〈a′,Ω, δ〉
〈x := a,Ω, δ〉 → 〈x := a′,Ω, δ〉
Send1
U = {e | e = send (o, p, n) ∧ e ∈ δ}
〈send (n′, p) ,Ω, δ〉 → 〈{},Ω, (δ − U) ∪ send (o2,m.p, n′)〉
Send2
〈a,Ω, δ〉 → 〈a′,Ω, δ〉
〈send (a, p) ,Ω, δ〉 → 〈send (a′, p) ,Ω, δ〉
Figure 4.9: Task Execution Semantics
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and
(
(Ein, t) :: tl (sin) , (E
′, t) :: tl
(
s2out
)) ∈ Rc
then (E ′, t) :: tl (s1out) = (E
′, t) :: tl (s2out)
Each module is also a stream processing process (Definition 4.4.9). Each mod-
ule converts receive events on its input ports into send events on its output ports.
Note that at any time instant, modules execute tasks in a configuration where all
the input port updates for that time instant has been applied. Like dataflows, the
outputs resulting from a task computation are timeshifted by the module’s delay.
Definition 4.4.9 (Semantics of Modules). Let the input timed-event stream sin
of a module m be the merge of the input timed-event streams of its ports. The
semantics of a module m with a task-delay of d is defined by the greatest ternary
relationRm over the module’s input timed-event streams, timed-state streams, and
output timed-event streams satisfying:
• Let (Ein, t) = hd (sin), (Ω, t) = hd (sΩ) and (Eout, t+ d) = hd (sout).
• If (sin, sΩ, sout) ∈ Rm then either:
1. If sched (m) ∈ Ein then (Eout,Ω′) = eval (Tm, update (Ein,Ω)) and
hd (tl (sΩ)) = (Ω
′, t+ 1) and (tl (sin) , tl (sΩ, tl (sout))) ∈ Rm.
2. If m’s task is triggered by port p and recv (m, p, v) ∈ Ein then
(Eout,Ω
′) = eval (Tm, update (Ein,Ω)) and
hd (tl (sΩ)) = (Ω
′, t+ 1) and (tl (sin) , tl (sΩ, tl (sout))) ∈ Rm.
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3. If sched (m) /∈ Ein and m’s task is not triggered by any
recv (m, p, v) ∈ Ein then Eout = ∅ and Ω′ = update (Ein,Ω) and
hd (tl (sΩ)) = (Ω
′, t+ 1) and (tl (sin) , tl (sΩ, tl (sout))) ∈ Rm.
For a given start state, modules are input-deterministic:
Lemma 4.4.2 (Modules are Input/State Deterministic). For a module m let Rm
be defined as in Definition 4.4.9. If (sin, s1Ω, s
1
out) ∈ Rm and (sin, s2Ω, s2out) ∈ Rm
and hd (s1Ω) = hd (s
2
Ω) then s
1
out = s
2
out and tl (s
1
Ω) = tl (s
2
Ω).
Proof. We proceed by co-induction on the streams. Let (Ein, t) = hd (sin) and
assume that hd (s1Ω) = hd (s
2
Ω) = (Ω, t). There are three cases to consider:
Case 1 (sched (m) ∈ Ein). Since hd (s1Ω) = hd (s2Ω), hd (s1out) = hd (s2out) =
(Eout, t+ d) with (Eout,Ω′) = eval (Tm, update (Ein,Ω)) (because task evalua-
tion is deterministic relative to state and update (Ein,Ω) is unique). We also see
that hd (tl (s1Ω)) = hd (tl (s
2
Ω)) = (Ω
′, t+ 1) because update (Ein,Ω) is unique.
Application of the co-inductive hypothesis lets us conclude that for
(
(Ein, t) :: tl (sin) , (Ω, t) :: (Ω
′, t+ 1) :: tl
(
tl
(
s1Ω
))
, (Eout, t+ d) :: s
1
out
) ∈ Rm
and
(
(Ein, t) :: tl (sin) , (Ω, t) :: (Ω
′, t+ 1) :: tl
(
tl
(
s2Ω
))
, (Eout, t+ d) :: s
2
out
) ∈ Rm
it is the case that (Eout, t+ d) :: s1out = (Eout, t+ d) :: s
2
out and (Ω
′, t+ 1) ::
tl (tl (s1Ω)) = (Ω
′, t+ 1) :: tl (tl (s2Ω)).
Case 2 (m’s task is triggered by port p and recv (m, p, v) ∈ Ein). Same as Case
1.
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Case 3 (sched (m) /∈ Ein andm’s task is not triggered by any recv (m, p, v) ∈ Ein).
The proof proceeds as in the first two cases except with hd (s1out) = hd (s
2
out) =
(∅, t+ d).
The semantics of ODSDL programs are given by relating the inputs/outputs of
devices, modules and dataflows according to how they are interconnected in the
interactions block:
Definition 4.4.10 (Semantics of Programs). Let x be an ODSDL program with
the set of device specifications S, set of module instances M and set of dataflow
connectors C. Let t be the moment in time p is started. Then the semantics of
p are given by the greatest binary relation Rx over timed-event streams such that
(sin, sout) ∈ Rp when:
• Each module m ∈ M ’s input stream smin is the merge of all the output
streams of the connectors c such that c = i.j flowsto m.p and with m’s
task scheduling stream smsched. If m’s task is activated periodically with pe-
riod p, then ∀n∈N sched (m) ∈ smsched (tn). Otherwise ∀n≥t ∅ = smsched (n).
• The head of each module m ∈ M ’s state-stream is (Ω, t) where Ω maps
each variable to its initial value.
• Each connector c ∈ C’s input stream is equal to the output stream of module
(or device) m if c = m.j flowsto l.k.
• sin is the merge of all the input-streams of connectors c ∈ C such that
s.j flowsto m.k such that s ∈ S and m ∈M .
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• sout is the merge of all the output-streams of connectors c ∈ C such that
m.j flowsto s.k such that s ∈ S and m ∈M .
Because dataflows and modules are input-deterministic, so are programs:
Theorem 4.4.3 (Programs are Input Deterministic). For a program p let Rp be
defined as in Definition 4.4.10. If (sin, s1out) ∈ Rp and (sin, s2out) ∈ Rp then
s1out = s
2
out.
Proof. Because the each of the modules m ∈M have their configurations initial-
ized to only one possible value all modules will map each input-stream to a unique
output-stream (Lemma 4.4.2), and connectors map each input-stream to a unique
output-stream (4.4.3) it follows from the Definition of Rp that s1out = s
2
out.
4.4.4 Devices
The semantics of device specificiations are given in terms of Time Parametric
Modal Specifications (Chapter 3). However, we do not need to go into details
to describe how the devices relate to the timed-input and output event streams
used here. Each device specification is fully captured by a digital TPMS of its
behavior. Each digital TPMS models a set of input-output timed automata (IOTA)
with digital semantics. We require each IOTA to be deadlock and timelock free,
thus each IOTA induces a set of infinite timed input and output words.
Definition 4.4.11 (Timed Word). A timed word is a (possibly infinite) sequence
of alternating actions and delays d ≥ 0 where d ∈ R. We say that a timed-word is
digital if it is always the case that d ∈ N. For example:
0→ a 5→ b 2→ . . .
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Is a digital timed-word.
If a word w contains only delays and actions from a IOTA’s input alphabet we
say w is a timed-input word. Likewise if w contains only actions from the output
alphabet it is a timed-output word.
Each IOTA from an ODSDL device specification is input-enabled by construc-
tion so we can convert the timed-event output stream of an ODSDL program into
an infinite timed word over the specification’s inputs. Likewise we can convert
the timed-words over the outputs of a IOTA into an input timed-event stream for
the ODSDL program.
Definition 4.4.12 (Stream Semantics of Devices). Let X be the TPMS corre-
sponding to device specification D and let JX K be the set of IOTAs implied by
X . Let W be the union of all the timed words of all the IOTA in JX K. The the
stream semantics of device specification D is given by the greatest relation RD
that satisfies the following: (sin, sout) ∈ RD if sin is the timed-event stream cor-
responding to the input-projection of some infinite word wi ∈ W and sout is the
timed-event stream corresponding to the output projection of wi.
4.5 Related Work
Programs executing as part of a larger cyber-physical system typically have real-
time requirements: in order to be correct they must perform the correct computa-
tions at the correct time. This presents major challenges for program portability
and program verification. Real-time programs are typically not portable because
their timing is dependent on the processor and how the underlying operating sys-
tem allocates (i.e., schedules) processor time to different programs. If a real-time
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program is run on a different processor or operating system it will have different
timing characteristics which in turn could cause the program to violate its timing
requirements. Even if a program meets its timing requirements (e.g., always com-
pletes before its deadline) execution non-determinism (e.g., caused by operating
scheduling decisions or speculative effects in the processor) can make it difficult
for developers to reproduce bugs or to relate testing results back to assurance
claims. Difficulties with portability and verifiability of real-time code drive up
the development costs for real-time software systems. Furthermore, the platform
approach to on-demand systems requires portable real-time programs.
In the 1990’s DARPA invested in the MetaH [177, 176] program to address
problems surrounding real-time program portability and verifiability. MetaH re-
sulted in a set of tools and programming constructs for the development of dis-
tributed real-time software systems. MetaH allowed developers to construct soft-
ware systems out of components that communicate through ports. Each compo-
nent may have a number of periodic or sporadic real-time tasks that do the actual
processing. Tasks in MetaH can read or write to their container component’s ports.
MetaH addresses time-determinism by assuming that tasks only share data via
ports, and that the results of a computation are only “visible” at a task’s deadline
(regardless when the computation actually finished). This ensures that computa-
tions are time-deterministic if all the tasks of the software system are schedulable
on the given platform. MetaH inspired the Architecture Analysis & Design Lan-
gauge (AADL) SAE standard [65] and many of MetaH’s features have found
their way into AADL.
In 2001 Henzinger et al. rediscovered many of MetaH’s determinism features
and included them in the Giotto programming language [80, 79]. In fact, it is
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fairly accurate to think of Giotto as equivalent to the periodic subset of MetaH.
There are, however, two major differences betweem Giotto and the periodic subset
of MetaH. First, Henzinger et al. provide formal operational semantics for Giotto
programs. Second, Giotto is not coupled to an underlying scheduler (MetaH as-
sumed a form of rate-monotonic scheduling).
[58] describe the PTIDES deterministic programming model for distributed
real-time embedded software. PTIDES semantics are based on discrete event
simulation: Programs in PTIDES consist of actor components which can com-
municate with each other via ports and channels that link those ports. Whenever
a PTIDES actor sends a message it is timestamped. The timestamp is used by
the underlying PTIDES exection platform to ensure that each actor only processes
input messages in timestamp order [59, 189, 188]. Because receipt of a message
triggers actor computation, PTIDES supports aperiodic execution. Periodic exe-
cution can be achieved with a specialized clock actor that generates messages at
period boundaries. Because PTIDES programs consist of communicating actors
(as opposed to a collection of tasks) new schedulability techniques needed to be
devised to asses the schedulability of PTIDES programs. Christos Stergio estab-
lished the decidability of PTIDES scheduling in his PhD dissertation [169]. He
showed that in general schedulability is no harder than the reachability problem
for timed automata, and if only a subset of PTIDES is considered it is equivalent
to earliest deadline first schedulability analysis.
For on-demand systems we want a programming model that is deterministic,
has precise formal semantics, is easy (i.e., efficient) for paltforms to schedule,
provides familiar programming constructs and allows for both periodic and ape-
riodic computation. The programming model of MetaH (and AADL) don’t yet
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have a complete and formal semantics. Giotto only allows periodic computation.
While PTIDES has discrete event semantics these are never precisely given. For
example it is unclear what should happen if an actor receives two events with
the same timestamp. Furthermore, PTIDES does not precisely couple model-time
with physical time: Actuators must receive their messages prior to the expiration
of the timestamp, but when the actuator acts on the message is undefined (presum-
ably it happens after, but not too long after, the timestamp). The actor construct
of PTIDES is also different from what most programmers are used to (i.e., tasks).
Furthermore, the schedulability analysis of PTIDES programs can be quite com-
plicated (both operationally and in terms of time-complexity) which is not suitable
for a platform that must perform schedulability analysis on-demand.
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Chapter 5
A Prototype Medical Application
Platform
In this Chapter we describe the Medical Device Coordination Framework (MDCF)
and the MIDdleware Assurance Substrate (MIDAS). The combination of the MDCF
and MIDAS results in a prototype MAP implementation designed to demonstrate
the feasibility of key technologies essential to the viability of the MAP concept.
As discussed in Chapter 2, a MAP could host any number of safety- or privacy
critical applications. Ideally, the MAP certification criteria in a real on-demand
ecosystem would require that all MAPs satsify the following “high-assurance”
features:
1. Enforce a high degree of (potentially complete) of isolation and separation
between independent applications and system components.
2. Employee sound techniques to secure sensitive (i.e., private data) and deter-
mine the authenticity of devices and applications.
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3. Utilize fault-tolerant (or fault resistant) hardware and algorithms.
4. Be verified & validated (possiiblly with formal, machine-checked, proofs)
to the highest level of assurance1.
While all the above are important for a real MAP, this chapter does not focus
on how each and every possible high assurance feature could be implemented and
incorporated into the MDCF/MIDAS. Indeed, many useful high assurance fea-
tures (such as those listed above) have been studied extensively in the literature
and in some cases are available in commercial products (see the related work Sec-
tion 5.6.1). Instead, this chapter focuses on describing the platform capabilities
that are both new and necessary to make our vision of a MAP ecosystem work.
A key challenge for any MAP is to provide determinism in a dynamic, open,
and distributed environment. Most distributed systems with strict determinism re-
quirements are designed assuming the system itself will be static (i.e., the tasks
and data-flows that comprise the “digital” portion of the system are fixed from the
factory). Consequently, most technology developed to enable determinism have
not been designed to work for systems that are dynamic, open, and distributed.
For example, the networking technology typically used in high assurance real-
time systems (e.g., the Time Triggered Architecture [113], Time Triggered Eth-
ernet, FlexRay [53], etc.) can provide the needed timing guarantees and inter-
component isolation but must be configured “offline”. Likewise, while there has
been a number of promising distributed deterministic programming models devel-
oped (e.g., PTIDES) their execution strategies require complex procedures (both
operationally and computationally) for schedulability analysis which makes on-
line admission control difficult.
1e.g., the criteria laid out for DO-178C Level A or EAL7
127
This chapter presents three contributions towards enabling strict determinism
in an open, dynamic, and distributed system. The first is the MIDAS. MIDAS
combines Software Defined Networking (SDN) [136] with a publish/subscribe
communications abstraction. MIDAS enables programmers to specify timing con-
straints on logical flows of data between producers and consumers. MIDAS then
enforces the timing constraints and specified isolation by reconfiguring the un-
derlying network packet switching infrastructure on the fly. The second contribu-
tion is a determinizing scheduler that implements the DLT semantics of ODSDL
programs. The resource demands of the execution strategy employeed by the de-
terminizing scheduler can be reduced to a traditional task-set specifciation which
enables the use of relatively simple schedulability analysis techniques. The third
contribution is a collection of minor modifications to existing real-time schedul-
ing techniques. These minor modifications are necessary for us to use classic
real-time scheduling theory with real COTS operating systems and networking
hardware.
This Chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 gives a functional overview
of the software architecture of the MDCF/MIDAS. Section 5.2 gives a detailed
overview of the MIDAS Channel-Service. The MIDAS Channel-Service provides
the hard real-time publish/subscribe communications primitives leveraged by the
determinizing scheduler to implement the DLT semantics in a distributed system.
Section 5.3 describes the overall operation of that determinizing scheduler and
how it achieves the LET semantics. Section 5.4 describes a variety of practical
scheduling techniques used by the MDCF/MIDAS to ensure that tasks and mes-
sages always meet their deadlines. Section 5.5 an evaluation and performance
assesment of the MDCF/MIDAS’ ability to guarantee deterministic application
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Distributable Components
Application 
Manger
Device 
Manager Resource Manager
Determinizing Scheduler
Real-Time Message Bus
App1 App1 App1
Figure 5.1: MDCF Software Architecture.
execution.
5.1 MDCF Architecture and Functional Overview
The MDCF/MIDAS is a set of integrated services intended to run on top of a
traditional real-time operating system. These services work with each other, the
underlying hardware and operating system to manage the lifecycle of MAP ap-
plications and provide a predictable environement for those applications to exe-
cute in. Figure 5.1 shows the software architecture of the MDCF/MIDAS. The
MDCF/MIDAS is comprised of the MIDAS Real-Time Message Bus, a Device
Manager, an Application Manager, and a Resource Manager that supports the De-
terminizing Scheduler.
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5.1.1 Real-Time Message Bus
The Real-Time Message Bus (RTMB) provides a publish/subscribe messaging
service and is used a number of ways by the MDCF/MIDAS components to com-
municate with other. Devices use the RTMB to communicate with the MDCF
via combination of public (i.e., atrium) and private topics (e.g., announce the de-
vice’s presence, engage in authentication, etc.). The Application Manager & Re-
source Manager use the RTMB as the underlying transport medium for ODSDL
dataflows. The RTMB leverages software defined networking (SDN), and in par-
ticular the OpenFlow protocol, to guarantee the timeliness of any time-critical
messages. The design and operation of the RTMB will be elaborated in Section
5.2.
5.1.2 Device Manager
The Device Manager manages the association lifecycle of devices used with MDCF
applications. Each stage of the association life-cycle of a device defines to what
extent it is available to be used by an application. Figure 5.2 is an illustration of
the MDCF device connection protocol and shows the relationship between each
stage (state) of the lifecycle. Transitions between states are either annotated with
CSP [85, 84] style communications across channels implemented with the RTMB
or locally detected events.
When a device is first plugged into the network it is in the Disconnected
state. Once the device detects it has been plugged in, it annouces itself to the
MDCF Device Manager and begins the process of authentication (state
Authenticating). Once the device has been successfully authenticated (i.e.,
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the MDCF has validated the device’s certification credentials) the device trans-
mits its behavior specification and becomes “associated”, or available for with an
application (Associated). If the MDCF or RTMB detects a disruption in the
underlying network transport the device is considered Lost until the transport
medium has recovered.
After the device has transmitted its specification, but before the device can
be used with an application, the Device Manager will direct the RTMB to create
topics to carry any medical data streams the device may output. In general, a
single unique topic is created for each output port of the device’s specification
(see Figure 5.3). If the RTMB or Resource Manager cannot allocate the resources
to create the necessary topics the association process will halt.
5.1.3 Application Manager
The Application Manager controls the lifecycle of MDCF applications (see Figure
5.4). When a user wants to start an MDCF application they use the MDCF console
to select the desired application and the set of devices they wish to couple with
the application. The Application Manager first checks whether the application
and selected devices are compatible. If so, the MDCF works with the Resource
Manager and RTMB to perform admission control, i.e., it checks if it can ensure
that the application’s QoS requirements are always met given the application’s
resource needs and the current demand on the platform’s resources. If the appli-
cation QoS requirements can be met the platform reserves the necessary resources,
instantiates the application and then binds the application to the selected devices
(Figure 5.4). The binding process involves subscribing the application to the top-
ics corresponding to the devices publish ports and the devices to topics carrying
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Disconnected
Authenticating
Authenticated
Associating
Lost
Reconnecting
Associated
to_mgr_atrium ! auth
 auth fail or timeout
from_mgr_atrium ?
 auth success
to_mgr_atrium ! device capabilites
from_mgr_atrium ? 
topic assignment
 transport layer failure
to_mgr_atrium ! reconnect
 reconnect failed
reconnect 
success
Figure 5.2: Device connection protocol
application to device messages. Figure 5.5 shows how the dataflow declaration
from the pulse-oximeter alarm is realized when an instance of the application is
bound to a PulseOximeter with UID 1.
5.1.4 Resource Manager
The Resource Manager ensures that every running application’s timing require-
ments will always be met and that they maintain their DLT semantics. The re-
source manager is comprised of two sub-systems:
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PulseOximeter
spo2
PulseOximeter UID = 1
spo2 PulseOximeter1.spo2
Device Type Declaration
Device Instance topic mapping
Port Declaration
QoS: 
   minsep = 490
   maxsep = 510
   datatype = int
Topic QoS: 
   minsep = 490
   maxsep = 510
   datatype = int
unique topic created for 
device instance by device 
manager after successful 
association
Device starts publishing 
after topic creation
Figure 5.3: Relationship between a device’s logical data ports tand RTMB
topics.
1. A low-level scheduler that makes sure all tasks and messages complete prior
to their deadlines.
2. A high-level scheduler, which we call the determinizing scheduler, that ma-
nipulates when messages and the output of tasks become visible to imple-
ment the DLT semantics of ODSDL programs.
When a user requests the MDCF to start an application the Resource Manager
does admission control. First, it transforms the application’s timing specification
into a resource specification (e.g., task set). Second, it generates a resource con-
figuraton (e.g., prioritization) for the resource specification. Third, it checks the
resource configuration for feasibility (i.e., whether all timing requirements will
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Application and 
Devices
Application 
and devices 
compatible?
Can Guarantee 
QoS?
Reserve Resources 
Perform Mode Change
Bind 
Devices and 
start 
Application
Notify User of 
mismatch.
Notify User of 
resource 
unavailability
Notify User of mode 
change failure
Yes Yes Succ.
No No Failure
Figure 5.4: Platform system instantiation process
be satisfied). If the configuration deemed feasible the resource configuration is
applied and the application is started.
After the application has started, the determinizing scheduler takes control
of application task execution and dispatch. The operation of the determinizing
scheduler is elaborated in Section 5.3 and the algorithms and scheduling tech-
niques used by the MDCF prototype are elaborated in Section 5.4.
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po : PulseOximeter
spo2
gen : AlarmGenerator
spo2_in
Application Specification
PulseOximeter UID = 1
spo2
AlarmGenerator
Instance 0
spo2_inPulseOximeter1.spo2
Instantiated Application
delay = 50
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QoS: minsep = 480, maxsep = 520, delay = 50
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Application module automatically 
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instantiation
Figure 5.5: Example mapping of MDCF application dataflow declarations to
publish/subscribe relationships
5.2 The Real-Time Message Bus
The MIDAS Real-Time Message Bus (RTMB) is a publish/subscribe middleware
designed to enforce end-to-end real-time guarantees. The RTMB is able to do this
even if users change the configuration of the network during runtime (i.e., add or
remove nodes) or the network contains malicious nodes (i.e., nodes that attempt
disruption of legitimate applications with denial of service attacks). The RTMB is
able to do this because, unlike traditional real-time middleware, it uses recent soft-
ware defined networking technology to enforce resource allocation directly in the
network switches. Because the RTMB enforces timing behavior of network com-
munication directly in the network infrastructure (as opposed to asking the end
systems to politely share resources) its real-time guarantees are robust. If a de-
vice on the network becomes faulty and starts spamming the network with errant
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packets, other devices or applications in the network will not notice. These fea-
tures make the RTMB appealing as the communications substrate for on-demand
systems and is why the MDCF uses the RTMB to implement the real-time com-
munications channels from ODSDL applications.
5.2.1 Publish Subscribe and Quality of Service
The publish/subscribe abstraction consists of publishers (producers of data), sub-
scribers (consumers of data) and topics (names used to organize the communi-
cations space). Publishers send updates to topics. As their name suggests, sub-
scribers choose to subscriber to certain topics. When a topic receives an update
from a publisher, that update is disseminated to all of that topic’s subscribers.
Figure 5.6 shows a system with one publisher, one topic and three subscribers.
Recall from Chapter 4 that the real-time channels in ODSDL have an asso-
ciated latency parameter and that the ports on module and device components
have minimum and max separation. Not coincidentally the RTMB publishers and
subscribers specify minimum and maximum update separation. Subscribers can
specify maximum end-to-end network latency. This latency describes the amount
of time it takes the network to transmit the whole update from the publisher to the
subscriber (see Definitions 5.2.1 and 5.2.2).
Definition 5.2.1 (Network Latency). Let PT be a publisher publishing to topic T
and ST be a subscriber to T . Let t1 be the moment PT starts transmitting message
m on the network and let t2 be the smallest time t after m has been fully received
by ST . The end-to-end network latency of m is L (ST ,m) = t2 − t1.
Definition 5.2.2 (Guaranteed Maximum End-to-End Latency). Let PT be a pub-
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Topic Name: BoilerPressure
Data Type: int32
Publisher
minSep: 10 ms
maxSep: 15 ms
Subscriber A
maxSep: 20 ms
maxLatency: 5ms
Subscriber B
maxSep: 14 ms
maxLatency: 5ms
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maxSep: 15 ms
maxLatency: 1ms



Figure 5.6: Real-Time Publisher and Subscribers with QoS.
lisher publishing to topic T and ST be a subscriber to T . If ST requests a guaran-
teed maximum latency, denoted Lmax (ST ), then ∀mL (ST ,m) ≤ Lmax (ST ).
Note that the latency semantics of the RTMB are not quite the same as in
the ODSDL: latencies in the RTMB only concern the time it takes to move the
message across the network while in the ODSDL channel latency is the delay be-
tween the moment one software agent sends the message and the receiver receives
it. RTMB latency (i.e., network latency) is a component of ODSDL channel la-
tency which also includes the time it takes the message to move through the host’s
network stack and get deserialized.
Figure 5.6 illustrates how MIDAS will match QoS between publishers, sub-
scribers, and the underlying system. Subscriber A is admitted to the system
because its required maxSep (20ms) is greater than or equal to the publisher’s
(15ms).
In this example the RTMB has determined it can guarantee the requested maxi-
mum latency. Subscriber B is not admitted because it requires a maxSep of 14ms
which is smaller than the publisher’s. Finally, Subscriber C is not admitted to
the system only because the underlying middleware has determined that it cannot
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guarantee C’s requested maximum end-to-end latency.
5.2.2 RTMB Overview
The RTMB achieves real-time guarantees on open networks built from COTS
equipment by handing complete control over the network to the middleware via
the OpenFlow [137] software defined networking protocol. Tight integration of
the middleware with OpenFlow provides several benefits. First, it gives the mid-
dleware complete control over how data packets on the network are forwarded,
prioritized, and rate-limited. Second, many COTS switches can be made Open-
Flow capable with a firmware update. This means that existing network deploy-
ments can be made OpenFlow capable (and therefore could be made suitable to
carry traffic for on-demand systems). Third, in many OpenFlow switches all
OpenFlow rule processing occurs at line rate. This means that the middleware
can affect configuration changes in the network without any appreciable loss of
network peformance.
We now describe the operation of an OpenFlow network. An OpenFlow net-
work consists of two types of entities: OpenFlow switches and OpenFlow con-
trollers. An OpenFlow hardware switch is a Layer 2/3 Ethernet switch that main-
tains a table of flow entries and actions.
The flow table associates each flow with an action set which tells the switch
how to handle a packet matching the flow. Table 5.1 shows an example flow table.
The table has two flow entries which match against input port, Ethernet address,
IP address and UDP port number. There are two actions associated with each
flow. While the OpenFlow specification describes a number of different actions
our prototype utilizes the enqueue and meter actions. The meter action requires
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Input Port Datalink IP UDP Action
VLAN ID Src Dst Type Src Dst Src Port Dst Port
3 0 89ab 89ac IP 192.168.1.1 192.168.1.2 100 101 meter=1,enqueue=4:7
4 0 89ac 89ab IP 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.1 101 100 meter=2,enqueue=3:2
Table 5.1: Example OpenFlow flow table
the switch to apply traffic policing to the flow. The enqueue action requires the
switch to place the packet on an egress queue associated with a specific port during
forwarding.
When an OpenFlow switch receives a packet on one of its interfaces, it com-
pares that packet to its flow table. If the packet matches a flow table entry, it
applies the action set associated with that flow entry. If the packet does not match
an existing entry the switch performs what the OpenFlow protocol calls a packet-
in. When the switch performs a packet-in, it forwards the packet to the OpenFlow
controller (a piece software running on a server in the network). The controller
analyzes the packet and can execute any arbitrary algorithm to generate a new
flow rule. The controller can then update the switch’s flow table with the new
rule. Packet-in allows the OpenFlow controller to learn the topology of the net-
work (i.e., learn what ports on what switches different hosts are connected to)
and then effect complex routing, forwarding and QoS strategies with algorithms
implemented in a normal high level programming language like Java or C++.
We now provide an overview of how the RTMB provides real-time guarantees
on OpenFlow enabled COTS networks. The RTMB implements a Global Re-
source Manager (GRM) which contains a specialized OpenFlow controller. When
a publish-subscribe client comes online it first connects to the GRM. This al-
lows the GRM to learn where on the network the client is located (i.e., the switch
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Figure 5.7: Deployment of the RTMB on an OpenFlow enabled network.
and port it is connected to). Then, when a client requests a subscription with
a specified QoS, the GRM will peform admission control. First, the scheduling
algorithm in the GRM will generate a new network configuration based on the
new QoS request. The new configuration is then analyzed by a schedulability test
which determines if any QoS constraints could be violated with that configuration
(see Section 5.4.2 for an example scheduling and schedulability algorithm). If a
violation is possible, the client is notified and their request is not granted. If QoS
is guaranteed in the new configuration, the GRM commits the network configu-
ration to the network using OpenFlow and then admits the client. Note that this
system architecture allows us to handle non publish-subscribe best effort traffic
(e.g., web-browsing) on the same network transparently; the GRM will automat-
ically map best effort traffic to the lowest priority queues on each switch. See
Figure 5.7 for an example RTMB deployment.
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Figure 5.8: Client Library
5.2.3 Middleware Design
Now we describe the various software components in the RTMB. The RTMB
adopts a brokerless architecture and the functionality of middleware is separated
into two software stacks implemented in Java. The client library provides the
publish-subscribe abstraction to clients that wish to be publishers or subscribers.
The Global Resource Manager (GRM) runs on a server connected to the network
and is responsible for managing active topics, publishers, subscribers and the un-
derlying network configuration. Both the client library and GRM have features
specifically designed to enable automatic QoS guarantees.
Client Library
The architecture of the client library is illustrated in Figure 5.8. If the application
is a publisher, messages flow from the application to a local topic queue by way
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of the local topic manager. This allows the client library to perform a zero-copy
transfer of data between publishers and subscriber that are running on the same
host. Each local topic queue always has a special subscriber: the data-coding
layer. The data-coding is responsible for serializing messages prior to transmis-
sion on the network. After a message has been serialized, a sender object transmits
it onto the network. The type of sender used depends on what transport protocol
was negotiated with the GRM. Symetrically, the receivers receive messages from
the network, pass those messages to the data coding layer where they are dese-
rialized and then placed on the appropriate topic queue. Subscribers are invoked
when the topic queue associated with their topic becomes non-empty.
The Client Library has one important feature used to support automatic QoS
guarantees: it statically infers the maximum serialized message sizes from mes-
sage types. When a publisher comes online it specifies the type of message it will
publish. The API passes this information to the topic management layer, which in
turn asks the data coding layer for message size bounds on that type. In our pro-
totype, the data coding layer uses Java reflection to determine the structure of the
type and infer the maximum number of bytes used to represent a message of that
type on the network.2 Maximum message size information is used by the GRM
when it performs the schedulability analysis of a network configuration.
2Our prototype currently only supports non-inductive types (e.g., record types) that can be
easily analyzed for size-bounds.
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Global Resource Manager
The GRM (Figure 5.9) is responsible for orchestrating all activity on the network
to ensure that data is correctly propagated between publishers and subscibers. To
accomplish this, the GRM must maintain configuration information about the net-
work and implement the appropriate scheduling and network reconfiguration al-
gorithms. Because we are concerned with providing guaranteed timing, the GRM
must keep record of how switches in the network are interconnected, where clients
are plugged into the network, the performance characteristics of each switch, and
which multicast addresses are associated with what topics.
These various responsibilites are decomposed along module boundaries. Sev-
eral of these modules’ functions do not need to be extensively elaborated: the
client manager is a server process that handles client’s requests (e.g., to start pub-
lishing on a topic); and the topic manager maintains a record of active topics and
the network addresses associated with each topic, the OpenFlow controller imple-
ments the OpenFlow protocol and exposes a simple API to the flow scheduler to
reconfigure the network.
The flow scheduler implements the admission control, scheduling and network
reconfiguration algorithms used to ensure QoS constraints are not violated (see
Section 5.4.2).
We now elaborate the network graph and the switch model data in more de-
tail. The switch model database is a repository of performance and timing char-
acteristics for different models of OpenFlow switch. This information is vitally
important to the GRM; it needs to know how each switch in its network behaves.
The information in the switch model repository is created before the middleware
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is deployed on a network. In our protoype each switch model is represented by an
XML file that is read by the GRM when the GRM starts up. Each switch model
contains the model name of the switch, the number of ports on the switch, the
number of egress queues associated with each port, the bandwidth capacity, and
the number and precision of the hardware rate-limiters and the internal multiplex-
ing latency of the switch’s switching fabric.
The network graph maintains both static and dynamic network configuration
information. The static information is specified at deployment time; it defines
what switches are on the network (the model, etc.) and how they interconnect. The
dynamic information is either learned via OpenFlow (e.g., what ports on which
switch are specific client connected) or set by the flow scheduler.
Figure 5.10 illustrates a simple network graph. The network consists of two
switches. These switches are connected via an uplink cable on each of their port
1. Each switch is connected to two clients (denoted by dotted circles).
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5.3 Determinizing Scheduler
ODSDL semantics dictates that tasks and message transfers always take a pre-
dictable Logical Execution Time. If a module or device sends a message at time
t along a dataflow with delay D then the message should arrive at its destination
at precisely t + D. If a modules task, with a specified relative deadline D, starts at
time t, then its computations proceed as if the state of the input ports are frozen.
Then, the results of the computation manifiest at precisely t + D. In reality, the du-
ration it takes to transmit messages between devices and modules can vary from
moment to moment due to network loads and how the networking infrastructure
schedules network packets. Likewise, the actual execution time of a task can vary
significantly due to different program execution paths, the state of the underlying
processor (i.e., branch predictors, pipeline scheduling, cache and so on.) The Job
of the Determinizing Scheduler is to orchestrate the computation and communi-
cations of application processes so they behave according to the ODSDL LET
semantics.
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At a high level, the Determinizing Scheduler works as follows. All ODSDL
application tasks and communications in the MDCF are separated into two types
of phases: A work phase where the bulk of the communications and computations
are performed and an I/O phase where the I/O of the application processes are
made visible to other processes or the environment. A Determinizing Scheduler
service is present on all the system components (i.e., the platform and devices)
and maintains a two-level scheduler. The top-level scheduler runs at the highest
system priority and will execute the lightweight microtasks corresponding to the
I/O phases of application processing. The bottom-level scheduler schedules tasks
associated with the work phase of application processes. The bottom-level sched-
uler can implement any scheduling discpline, as long as all tasks run at a priority
lower than the Determinizing Scheduler and all work-phase tasks finish prior to
their deadlines. As the work-phase tasks execute the MDCF runtime works with
the Determinizing Scheduler to trap all I/O operations (e.g., calls to the ODSDL
send function) and schedule a corresponding microtask to manifest the I/O event
at the appropriate time in the future.
How can the Determinizing Scheduler make the I/O events happen at the cor-
rect time? There are two obvious challenges. The first challenge is the time quanta
from ODSDL semantics: It is only 1 ms in duration. If microtask execution takes
to long or has to much jitter then event wont happen at the prescribed time. For-
tunately, as we will see, the microtasks can be engineered so they are both very
fast and predictable. They are fast because they typically only involve swapping
references. They are predictable because they dont involve much branching or
data. The second challenge has to do with time in a distributed environment. The
“correct time for an event as defined by the ODSDL semantics is a moment on a
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global shared timeline. In reality, each component will have access to a different
clock which will not be perfectly synchronized. However, as long as all clocks
are synchronized within some  s.t.,  ≤ 1/2 ms the Determinizing Scheduler can
manifest the I/O events when all clocks agree its the correct time.
There are two parts of this section. Section 5.3.1 gives an overview of the
operation of the Determinizing Scheduler as well as psuedocode describing its
functions. Section 5.3.2 makes a precise correctness claim and gives an informal
proof for the correctness of the Determinizing Scheduler.
5.3.1 Operation
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Figure 5.11: Example determinizer event queue.
The first-level of the Determinizing Scheduler runs at the highest system pri-
ority. It maintains a queue of microtask sets (Figure 5.11). Each microtask rep-
resents one ODSDL event (i.e., send, sched, recv). Each microtask set is times-
tamped indicating when the events in that queue should happen. Assuming all
clocks in the system are synchronized within , the first-level scheduler will wake
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Algorithm 5 Update and (Re)Schedule Future Events
Precondition: (e, t) is an ODSDL event/timstamp pair where t > tnow .
Precondition: T is the event queue.
1: function SCHEDULEFUTURE((e, t))
2: tnext ←GETNEXTACTIVATION()
3: E ←M(t) . creates an empty queue at t if there is no entry for t
4: INSERTORDERED(E, e) . recv ordered before sched, snd
5: if t < tnext then
6: SETNEXTACTIVATION(t)
7: end if
8: end function
up after the local clock c equals t +  to start processing the microtasks sched-
uled for time t. It will finish task processing before c equals t + (1 − ). After
it has finished processing the events for time t it will sleep until it is time to pro-
cess the next batch of events. Algorithm 5 gives the function used by the MDCF
runtime to schedule microtasks. Algorithms 6 and 7 give procedures used by the
Determinizing Scheduler to process the pending microtask queue and execute the
microtasks. We will walk through each.
Algorithm 5 is used by the MDCF runtime to schedule microtasks. For exam-
ple, when a application task that was dispatched at t and with deadline D calls the
ODSDL send function, the MDCF runtime will schedule a send microtask for
time t + D. When the MDCF requests some microtask to be scheduled at time
t Algorithm 5 will find the microtask set with the matching timestamp (creating
one if non exists). If the new event must happen earlier than any event currently
in the queue the Determinizing Scheduler’s next wakeup time must be reset. Ob-
serve that each microtask set is actually partially ordered queues, with recv events
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Algorithm 6 Process current events
Precondition: T is the microtask queue.
Precondition: The local clock c > tnow + 
Postcondition: The local clock c < tnow + (1− )
1: function PROCESSCURRENT
2: E ←HEAD(T )
3: tnow ←GETTIMESTAMP(E)
4: INSERTORDERED(E, e) . recv ordered before sched, snd
5: for e ∈ E do
6: COMMIT(e, tnow)
7: end for
8: REMOVE(E, T )
9: tnext ← GETTIMESTAMP(HEAD(T ))
10: SETNEXTACTIVATION(tnext)
11: SLEEPUNTILNEXTACTIVATION()
12: END FUNCTION
ordered before sched, snd events. This ordering ensures that events interleave in
the order defined by the ODSDL semantics.
Algorithm 6 is the main processing loop for the Determinizing Scheduler.
When it wakes up, it will locate the microtask set corresponding to the current
time. If the current timestamp is tnow, it will wakeup after the local clock reads
tnow + . The MDCF resource manager ensures that the Determinizing Scheduler
will have enough resources to finish by tnow + (1− ). After microtask processing
is complete, the Determinizing Scheduler will set a timer to wake itself up for the
next timestamp then put itself to sleep.
Algorithm 7 gives the processing logic for each type of microtask. sched(m)
tasks cause the Determinizing Scheduler to dispatch the work-phase task of mod-
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Algorithm 7 Commit Event Effect
Precondition: e is an event. t is the timestamp of the event. S is a set of tasks to dispatch now.
1: function COMMIT(e, t)
2: if e = sched(m) then
3: (P,D)←GETTASKSPEC(m)
4: if P ≥ 1 then . Is the task periodic?
5: SCHEDULEFUTURE((sched(m), t+ P ))
6: end if
7: DISPATCH(m,D, COPY(m))
8: end if
9: if e = send(ms, ps, v) then
10: F ←GETFLOWS(m, p) . The flows leaving ms.ps.
11: for (md, pd, D) ∈ F do
12: if ISREMOTE(md) then
13: RTMBSEND(md, pd, D, t+D) . Timestamp message and send via the
RTMB.
14: else
15: SCHEDULEFUTURE((recv(md, pd, v), t+D))
16: end if
17: end for
18: end if
19: if e = recv(m, p, v) then
20: m.p← v
21: if TRIGGERSTASK(m, p) then
22: S ← S ∪ {sched(m)} . Need to dispatch task after all other effects have been
committed.
23: end if
24: end if
25: for sched(m) ∈ S do
26: (P,D)←GETTASKSPEC(m)
27: DISPATCH(m,D)
28: end for
29: end function
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ule m to the bottom-level scheduler. If the task of m is periodic with period
P the Determinizing Scheduler will schedule another sched(m) microtask for P
milliseconds in the future. When the Determinizing Scheduler dispatches m’s
task it will give the task a copy of m’s input port state to work in. Running
the task with a copy ensures it executes with a snapshot of m’s state at time t.
The send(ms, ps, v) microtask involves the most processing: The Determinizing
Scheduler must retrieve all the data flows associated with port ms.ps and then
schedule a corresponding receive task D milliseconds in the future where D is the
specified delay of the flow. The relative complexity results from having to iterate
over all the flows associated with the port. Additionally, the logical destination
port of the flow may not be on the local processor. If the destination is not local
the Determinizing Scheduler will have to send a message to the remove destina-
tion. The message will contain the sent value (v) as well as a timestamp indicating
then the value should be logically received. The recv tasks are the simplest to pro-
cess: The Determinizing Scheduler sets the field variable of m representing port
p with the value v (if v is a complex or record type it can just update a reference).
5.3.2 Correctness
As mentioned at the start of Section 5.3 the ODSDL semantics define the timing
of events relative to a discrete global timeline but in reality the clocks distributed
througout the system will not always agree. So when we say that the Determiniz-
ing Scheduler implements the ODSDL’s LET semantics we actually mean that,
for a given execution of an ODSDL application, all the semantic events happen
and they happen when all the clocks think they should according to the local value
of their clocks. We call this notion logical execution time (LET) modulo clock syn-
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chronization . First we make this notion precise (Definition 5.3.2), then we give an
informal proof that the Determinizing Scheduler implements LET modulo clock
synchronization.
Definition 5.3.1 (Unit Floor). The unit floor function bxcu gives the integer por-
tion of the number x assuming x is converted to a quantity in units u. For example
if x = 5.67 milliseconds (ms) then bxcms = 5.
The unit floor function (Definition 5.3.1) is for convenience. It lets us compare
the discrete value of two clocks regardless of their units.
Definition 5.3.2 (LET Modulo Clock Synchronization). Let C be the set of sys-
tem clocks. Let R be the relation defined by the semantic event and state of an
ODSDL program. That program is executing with Deterministic Logical Time
(DLT) modulo Clock-Sync if for each element (E, t) of the event streams of R
each event e ∈ E happens (i) and happens when ∀
c∈C
bccms = t (ii).
Essentially, Defition 5.3.2 means that if there is some event e supposed to
happen at time t according to the ODSDL semantics, it will happen when all
clocks in the system, rounded down to the nearest millisecond, read t.
Definition 5.3.3 (-Precise Real-Time Clock). An -precise real-time clock c is
counter that increases its value monotonically with a rate approximating 1. The
counter must be able to represent increments at least as small as . Futhermore
 < 1/2 milliseconds.
Definition 5.3.4 (-synchronized clock). A set of -precise clocks C are -synchronized
if it is always the case that ∀
ci,cj∈C
| ci − cj |≤ .
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Definiton 5.3.3 defines the type of real-time clock needed by the Determiniz-
ing Scheduler. We say that the the clock increases at a rate approximating 1 to
account for small variations seen in real physical clocks. We will require that
clocks have enough precision to represent the maximum discrepency () between
clocks in the system. Definition 5.3.4 is a standard definition of clock synchro-
nization. We just require that the clocks be -precise and be synchronized within
.
Before we proceed with proving that the Determinizing Scheduler implements
logical execution time (LET) modulo clock synchronization, we need to establish
what moments of time synchronized clocks are guaranteed to read the same value
(Lemma 5.3.1).
Lemma 5.3.1 (-Offset Equality). Assume two clocks ci, cj are -synchronized
and  < 1/2 millisecond. If an event happens at some time when ci = t s.t.
bcicms +  < t < bcicms + (1− ) then bcicms = bcjcms
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that | ci − cj |≤  and for some valuation
of ci where it is the case that bcicms +  < ci < bcicms + (1 − ) but bcicms 6=
bcjcms. W.o.l.o.g. assume ci ≤ cj . Then cj ≤ ci + . Then it must be that
bcicms ≥ bci + cms which is a contradiction because we have that bcicms +  <
ci < bcicms + (1− ) and  < 1.
Now we can prove that the Determinizing Scheduler commits events at the
right time and when all clocks agree (Lemma 5.3.2).
Lemma 5.3.2 (The Determinizing Scheduler Commits Events at the Correct Time).
Let C be the set of system clocks. Assume all clocks ci, cj ∈ C are -precise and
| ci − cj |≤ . Let (E, t) be any timestamped queue of microtasks stored in the
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Determinizing Scheduler’s pending microtask queue. Then each e ∈ E will be
started and finished processing when ∀
c∈C
bccms = t.
Proof. Observe that the Determinizing scheduler will start processing all micro-
tasks e ∈ E when the local clock c > t +  and it will finish processing all the
tasks when c < t + (1 − ). The conclusion follows by application of Lemma
5.3.1.
Finally, using Lemma 5.3.2 we prove the overall correctness of the Deter-
minizing Scheduler. The proof of Theorem 5.3.3 is straight forward. Since we
know that the Determinzing Scheduler will always execute the microtasks at the
right time (Lemma 5.3.2) we only need to check that it generates the correct ef-
fects for each type of event. The proof simply compares the effect required by the
semantics to the effect created by the scheduler.
Theorem 5.3.3 (The MDCF implements DLT modulo Clock Sync.). Let C be the
set of system clocks. Let R be the set of the merges of the input / output event
streams of an ODSDL program. Assume all clocks ci, cj ∈ C are -precise and
| ci− cj |≤ . Then for each element (E, t) of any event stream se ∈ R each event
e ∈ E happens (i) and happens when ∀
c∈C
bccms = t (ii).
Proof. Consider any element (E, t) of se from R.
• Case send (m1, p1, v) ∈ E. Recall that for a dataflow
f = m1.p1 flowsto m2.p2 delay d it must be the case there is some ele-
ment the event stream (E ′, t + d) and recv (m2, p2, v) ∈ E ′. We know by
the definition of Algorithm 7 that the Determinizing Scheduler will sched-
ule a microtask for recv (m2, p2, v) to happen at ti. We know by Lemma
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5.3.2 that send (m1, p1, v) will be committed when ∀
c∈C
bccms = t and that
recv (m2, p2, v) will be committed when ∀
c∈C
bccms = ti
• Case recv (m1, p1, v) ∈ E. Recall that the semantics require that any task
scheduled at t see m1.p1 = v. By Algorithm 7 the Determinizing Scheduler
will always update m1.p1 = v before any tasks are dispatched because it
defers all task dispatches to the end of the processing cycle. Also recall that
updates to m1.p1 may trigger m1’s tasks at time t. By Algorithm 7 we know
that if an update tom1.p1 triggers the execution of the module’s task the task
will be dispatched at the end of the Determinizing Scheduler’s processing
cycle. By Lemma 5.3.2 we know that the task recv (m1, p1, v) will commit
when ∀
c∈C
bccms = t.
• Case sched (m) ∈ E. Recall that the semantics require all resulting send
event from the task execution happen at t + D (D is the task’s deadline).
By the definition the Determinizing Scheduler will dispatch the task for
module m at time t with a copy of the port variables from after all receive
events for t have been processed which ensures that the task will execute
in a state where the values of the ports are “frozen” to a value defined by
the semantics. All calls to send by ODSDL applications are trapped and
scheduled to happen at t + D therefore by Lemma 5.3.2 sched (m) will
commit when ∀
c∈C
bccms = t and all the resulting send events will commit
when ∀
c∈C
bccms = t+D.
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5.4 Practical Real-Time Scheduling
The MDCF must schedule tasks and messages to ensure that all processing and
communication always completes before application specified deadlines. Unlike
many real-time systems whose configuration is fixed from the factory, the MDCF
is highly dynamic: as users start and stop applications the MDCF needs to auto-
matically (re)-allocate resources in a way that won’t disrupt the operation of the
other applications. Typically, this has been the domain of dynamic scheduling
algorithms such as Earliest Deadline First (EDF) [130] or Least Slack First [143].
Dynamic scheduling algorithms make scheduling decisions by reacting to the
state of the system. For example, in EDF, whenever a task activates or finishes,
the scheduler looks at all active tasks and sets the one with the closest impending
deadline to the highest priority. This makes it easy to add or remove new tasks at
runtime.
Unfortunately, many real-time operating systems and networking technolo-
gies do not implement a dynamic scheduling discipline. Instead, fixed-priority
scheduling is used. In fixed-priority scheduling, the system designer assigns each
task (or data-stream) a priority. Then, during runtime, the scheduler will use the
assigned priority to determine execution order. There have been several algo-
rithms and techniques developed to assign priorities in fixed-priority scheduling
such as Rate Monotonic (RM) [130] or Deadline Monotonic (DM) where priori-
ties are assigned with increasing task rate (i.e., period) or deadline.
If the number of available priorities were unbounded then that would not be
such a problem. Unfortunately most real operating systems and networking tech-
nologies only provide a limited number of distinct priority levels. For example,
the ethernet switches controlled by MIDAS typically only provide 8 different pri-
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ority levels [187]. This presents a problem for the us: often the number of tasks
or data-flows required to support an application running on the MDCF are much
larger than the number of available priorities. This means tasks will have to share
priorities. This also means that as users start and stop applications priorities will
potentially need to be re-shuffled in a way that does not cause tasks or flows to
miss deadlines.
In this section we will show how to extend existing fixed priority scheduling
techniques to make them applicable to the dynamic environment the MDCF/MI-
DAS operates in. Specifically, we develop a priority assignment algorithm for
the limited priority setting that is asymptotically faster than the state-of-the-art.
Then we devise a simple priority reassignment protocol that ensures tasks or flows
will not miss deadlines during priority reassignment. Finally, we adapt existing
scheduling and schedulability techniques to work with the primitives and packet-
processing semantics of OpenFlow switches.
5.4.1 Fixed Priority Scheduling Techniques
In this section we review basic fixed-priority scheduling concepts from the real-
time scheduling literature and then develop a new priority assignment algorithm
for the limited priority environment.
Preemptive Fixed Priority, Real-Time Scheduling Problems and the Periodic
Task Model
Preemptive fixed priority scheduling is a scheduling discipline where each task
is assigned a priority. If the processor is executing some task and another task
arrives with higher priority then the original task is suspended (i.e., preempted)
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and the processor starts executing the higher priority task.
Let T = {T0, T1, . . . , Tn} be a set of tasks with each Ti = (Pi, Ci, Di). Each
task defines an infinite sequence of job arrivals where Pi is the minimum sepa-
ration between consecutive arrivals, Ci is the number of timeunits it would take
to finish the job assuming there is no resource contention, and Di is the relative
deadline of each job. When Ti is specified with only Pi, Ci and Di then it is pos-
sible the the first job of all tasks arrive at the same moment. These task sets are
called synchronous. Sometimes a term Ji is associated with Ti to specify the re-
lease jitter of Ti. Sometimes a term Ai is used to specify the arrival offset of the
first job of Ti.
Response Time Analysis
Response Time Analysis (RTA) [25] is used to determine the worst case response
time of a task in a task set given how each task in the task set is prioritized.
Formally, given a task set T where each task Ti ∈ T is the tuple (Pi, Ci, Di) such
that Ti is the minimum separation between Ti’s release, Ci is the computation cost
of Ti and Di ≤ Pi is the deadline, the worst case response time of a task Ti is
determined by calculating the smallest Ri such that the following response time
equation is satisfied (hp (i) is the function that returns the set of tasks with priority
higher than Ti’s):
Ri = Ci +
∑
Tj∈hp(i)
⌈
Ri
Pj
⌉
Cj (5.1)
If Ri > Di then we say that Ti is not feasible. If one wants to determine what
Ti’s worst case response time would be if it were sharing priority level pwith other
tasks, the response time equation must be modified with an extra term accounting
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Algorithm 8 RTA-based interference check
1: Let hp← {Tj ∈ τ |j < y} . j has a higher priority than i
2: Cp ←
∑
Tp∈pi Cp . tasks at the same priority interfere with each other
3: R0y ← Cy + Cp
4: while Rk+1y > Rky ∧Rk+1y ≤ Dy do
5: Rk+1y ← Cy + Cp +
∑
Tj∈hp
⌈
Rky
Pj
⌉
Cj
6: end while
7: if Rk+1y > Dy then
8: return true
9: else
10: return false
11: end if
for the extra delays caused by tasks executing at level p. If one assumes that jobs
sharing a priority level are executed in the order that they were dispatched then
the following equation can be used:
Ri =
∑
Ty∈p
Cy
+ Ci + ∑
Tj∈hp(i)
⌈
Ri
Pj
⌉
Cj (5.2)
Algorithm 8 implements the fixed point computation for equation 5.2 and then
checks whether Ri > Di.
Response Time Analysis can be used as the basis for a task-set schedulability
test: if all tasks in the set have a worst-case response time less then their deadline
under a priority assignment then the task-set is schedulable (also called feasible)
under that assignment. The RTA equations and algortihms described here are ex-
act which means that if RTA (Ti) = Ri then it is possible that there is a schedule
execution where Ti takes Ri to complete and there is no execution where Ti takes
more than Ri. Exact schedulability tests are useful because they provide a true
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representation of worst-case resource usage which enables more efficient use of
resources. The downside of exact tests is their computational complexity: Ex-
act schedulability for fixed priority task sets is an NP-Hard problem. While the
fixed-point algorithm 8 usually converges quickly in practice the number of times
it needs to be called should be minimized, especially in interactive systems such
as the MDCF.
Deadline Monotonic Scheduling
Given a task set T as in Section 5.4.1, Deadline Monotonic (DM) scheduling
assigns higher priorities to tasks with smaller relative deadlines, i.e., if Di < Dj
then pri (Ti) > pri (Tj). If the tasks arrive synchronously without and release
jitter then DM scheduling is optimal in the sense that if there exists some priority
assignment under which a task set is feasible, then it will be feasible under the
DM assignment also. The proof of optimality is straight forward. It works by first
assuming there is some non-DM priority assignment under which T is feasible.
Then it is easy to show that the non-DM schedule can be transformed into the
DM schedule by swapping each out of order pair one by one. After each swap,
T is still feasible: Assume pri (Ti) > pri (Tj) and Di > Dj . Since T is feasible
under this assigment it must be the case that there is enough slack at pri (Tj) for
Tj to finish by Dj . If we swap the priorities of Ti and Tj we know that Tj will
still meet its deadline because there are fewer higher priority tasks to interfere
with it. Ti will still meet its deadline because there is was enough slack at its
new priority level for Ci + Cj to complete by Dj . Since Dj < Di we know
there is still enough free processor to complete Ci units of work by Di. Deadline
Monotonic scheduling is useful because it is fast: The priority assignment can
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be determined simply by sorting the task set by the deadlines. Unfortunately
Deadline-Monotonic scheduling assumes that there exists at least one priority for
each task in the task set.
Audsely’s Algorithm
The one well-known method of finding a minimum priority assignment for fixed
priority scheduling is Audsley’s algorithm [27]. Audsleys algorithm is concep-
tually simple. Let n =| T |. Audsley’s algorithm proceeds by trying to find
some task Ti ∈ T that is feasible if all the remaining tasks in T are at a higher
priority. This can be checked by performing response time analysis for Ti with
hp (Ti) = T − Ti . If such a task is found, it is assigned priority n. This process
continues until no task can be found that is feasible at priority n. The algorithm
then proceeds to fill priority level n− 1 and so on (see Algorithm 9).
If an exact feasibility test is used then Audsley’s algorithm is optimal in two
ways. First, if there exists a feasible fixed priority assignment the algorithm will
find it. Second, it will always minimize the number of priority levels needed:
If there exists an assignment using 1 ≤ p ≤ n levels then the algorithm will
find an assignment with 1 ≤ p′ ≤ p levels. Unfortunately, as stated earlier,
exact feasibility tests have the potential to be expensive and Audsley’s algorithm
will perform O (n2) feasibility tests in the worst case. As it turns out Audsely’s
algorithm is more powerful than what is needed for the MDCF: the algorithm
will find optimal assignments for task sets specified with offsets for the arrival of
each task’s first job. As described in the next subsection if this assumption can be
relaxed (i.e., if it is possible for the first job of each task to arrive at the same time)
then we can get an order of magnitude theoretical speed up and get by with only
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Algorithm 9 Audsley’s Algorithm
1: pri← ∅ . initial priority assignment
2: T′ ← T
3: for j ∈ [n . . . 1] do
4: unassigned← true
5: for Ti ∈ T′ do
6: if Ti is feasible with hp (Ti) = T′ − Ti then
7: prin← prin ∪ (Ti 7→ j)
8: T′ ← T′ − Ti
9: unassigned← false
10: end if
11: end for
12: if unassigned then
13: return ∅ . No feasible assignment exists
14: end if
15: end for
16: return pri
O (n) feasibility checks.
A Faster Priority Assignment Technique
If it is possible for the first job of all tasks to arrive at the same time then the
minimal priority assignment for implicit deadline task-sets can be determined with
only O (n) feasibility tests. The algorithm works as follows, first assign each
task Ti ∈ T a priority according to its Deadline Monotonic ordering. Then if
T is feasible under the Deadline Monotonic partition the ordering by greedily
combining priority levels from the lowest to the highest as long as the combination
does not cause any task to miss a deadline: Start from the lowest priority task Tn
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Algorithm 10 Priority Partition Algorithm
1: pri = DM (T) . Start with the Deadline Monotonic assignment
2: n =| T |
3: p← n . p tracks current priority level
4: for i = (n− 1)→ 1 do
5: if Any task at p interferes with task Ti then
6: p← i
7: else
8: pri← pri [Ti 7→ p] . Reduces range (pri) by 1
9: end if
10: end for return pri
and check to see if T is still feasible when pri (Tn) = pri (Tn−1). If Tn and Tn−1
can share the same priority level reassign Tn−1 to Tn’s priority and then try to
merge Tn−2. If Tn may cause Tn−1 to violate its deadline then they cannot share a
priority level so the algorithm proceeds by trying to merge Tn−1 with Tn−2 and so
on (See the PriorityParition procedure in Algorithm 10).
It is easy to see that PriorityParition produces a feasible priority assignment:
Assume w.o.l.og that tasks Ti and Tj are merged onto the same priority level.
Assume that Ti had a higher deadline monotonic priority. Ti won’t cause Ti to miss
a deadline if they share a priority level because Ti already maximally interfered
with Tj due to its higher priority. Ti won’t miss a deadline due to Tj (or any other
task at the same priority) because PriorityParition would not have merged Tj with
Ti if that was the case.
The argument that PriorityParition applied to a deadline monotonic assign-
ment (DM-PriorityParition) minimizes the number of required priorities is less
obvious. It is sufficient to prove two facts: First, PriorityParition produces the
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smallest order-preserving partitioning. An order-preserving partitioning preserves
the relative priority assignment of the original assignment up the partitioning:
Definition 5.4.1 (Order-Preserving Partitioning). pri′ = Partition (pri,T) is order-
preserving if for any Ti, Tj ∈ T, pri (Ti) < pri (Tj) implies that pri′ (Ti) ≤ pri′ (Tj)
Second, any partitioning can be converted to a deadline-monotonic order-
preserving partitioning that uses the same or fewer priority levels. What
Theorem 5.4.1. Let pri′ = Partition (pri,T). Let pri′′ be some other order-preserving
partitioning of pri, then pri′ uses the same or fewer priorities than pri′′ (i.e., range (pri′) ≤
range (pri′′)).
Proof. Assume range (pri′′) ≥ range (pri′). The proof proceeds by transforming
pri′′ into pri′. Because both pri′′ and pri′ are order-preserving the only way they
can differ is that there must be some task Ti in pri′′ at a higher relative priority
partition than in pri′. If Ti can be demoted in pri′′ then range (pri′′) will either
stay the same or get reduced by one. Note, that if Ti can be demoted in pri′′ then
PriorityParition would have made the same choice. The process of demotion can
be applied iteratively until pri′′ = pri.
Theorem 5.4.2. If pri′ is a feasible mapping of τ , then there exists a feasible
deadline monotonic mapping dm− pri such that |dm− pri| = |pri′|.
Proof. The proof works by transforming any feasible non-deadline monotonic
mapping of T, pri′ into a mapping pridm which preserves the deadline monotonic
ordering a while maintaining range (pri′) = range
(
pridm
)
. We use the following
dual index scheme to track the priority assignment of each task in the mapping:
Tij denotes the task that is assigned to the ith priority level (i.e., Tij ∈ pi) and
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that Tij is the jth task in pi. In the following example, range (pri′) = 2 and each
priority level has two tasks:
pri′ = {T11 7→ 1, T12 7→ 1, T21 7→ 2, T22 7→ 2}
For the purposes of this proof assume that each list pi corresponding to the
tasks assigned to priority i in any partitioning is sorted according to the deadline
monotonic order (i.e., for the example pri′ above, D11 ≤ D12 and D21 ≤ D22).
Next imagine the list of tasks that would be created if each px s.t. x ∈ range (pri′)
were laid down in order, end to end. For example, if pri′ is the example mapping
above, then the imaginary list is:
{T11, T12, T21, T22}
In order to reason about that task list mathematically we define an index map-
ping function, IM (i, j, pri′, ) which will allow us to recover the imaginary list
position of any mapped Txy.
IM (i, j, pri′, ) =
(
i−1∑
x=1
|px|
)
+ j
For convenience we will also define the function Index (Tij, pri) which returns
the index of Tij in the original non-partitioned priority assignment pri:
Index (Tij, pri) = pri (Tij)
We can now define a mapping with deadline-monotonic ordering as follows:
The proof proceeds as follows: First assume there is some feasible mapping
pri′ such that:
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∃Tij∈T pridm (Tij) 6= IM (i, j, pri′)
That is, pri′ does not preserve the deadline monotonic ordering. pri′ can be
transformed into the deadline monotonic mapping pridm
′
without any additional
priority levels by iteratively applying the following process:
1. Locate the lowest priority out of order task: Find the largest j and i s.t.
IM (i, j, pri′) 6= pridm (Tij).
2. The task found in step 1 is out of order because at least one task which would
have a lower deadline monotonic priority has been assigned to some higher
priority level in pri′. Find this task and reassign its priority to i. Formally,
move the task Txy s.t. x < i and Index
(
Txy, pri
dm′
)
> Index
(
Tij, pri
dm′
)
.
Figure 5.12 illustrates this step.
After repeated application of steps 1 & 2, pri′ will be transformed into the
deadline monotonic preserving mapping pridm
′
, and no new priority levels will be
required. Is the pridm
′
created by this transformation Feasible? Yes it is.
Each time task Txy is demoted to priority i the feasibility of any task Tij′ ∈
pi are not affected because they are already assumed feasible when subject to
interference from task Txy because the task set is feasible when Txy has higher
priority than any Tij′ . Can Txy miss any deadline after it has been demoted to
priority level i? No. Because pri′ is feasible then:
 ∑
Tij′∈pi
Cij′
 ≤ Dij − IDijhp(i)
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That is, the total cost of every task executing at priority level i plus the inter-
ference over [0, Dij] by higher priority tasks must be less than or equal to Tij’s
deadline. When Txy is removed from priority level x, and then add that task to
priority level i the equation now becomes:
 ∑
Tij′∈pi
Cij′
+ Cxy ≤ Dij − IDijhp(i) + Cxy
because Txy no longer executes with a higher priority than i, but still con-
tributes at most one job’s worth of delay because each job at a given priority level
is executed in FIFO order.
Finally, because Txy was out of deadline monotonic order with respect to Tij
it must be the case that Dij ≤ Dxy. Therefore: ∑
Tij′∈pi
Cij′
+ Cxy ≤ Dxy − IDijhp(i) + Cxy
Thus Txy will never miss a deadline if its priority is demoted from level x to
level i.
Finally, we can now prove that PriorityPartition
(
τ dmlist
)
is the feasible pri-
ority assignment of τ that uses the fewest number of priorities:
Theorem 5.4.3. If pri′ is any feasible priority assignment of T, then
range
(
pridm
′
)
≤ range (pri′).
Proof. The theorem follows directly from the optimality of the deadline mono-
tonic ordering and application of Theorem 5.4.2.
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Figure 5.12: Reordering a task map.
A Simple Mode Change Protocol
Fixed priority scheduling, limited priority levels and minimial priority assign-
ments introduce a small wrinkle for systems that change their task-sets over the
course of their runtime (i.e., perform a scheduling mode change). The wrinkle
is this: due to the finite priorities, the priority assignment may assign a different
priority to the same task even if it executes in both the source mode and the target
mode. How do we ensure that task will still meet its deadline as new tasks are
added (or removed) and its priority modified? In general, solving this problem
is non-trivial and there are a number of complex mode change protocols that can
deal with this problem under a variety of different assumptions [165].
Fortunately, the MDCF only exhibits two types of scheduling mode changes:
tasks are added (i.e., when a new application is launched) or tasks are removed
(i.e., when an application exits). Assume that the source mode taskset T is feasible
under priority assignment pri and destination mode taskset T′ is feasible under pri′.
If T ⊆ T′ then the mode change can be performed simply by assigning each task
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Ti ∈ T to priority pri′ (Ti) in reverse priority order (i.e., starting with the task
that has the lowest priority in the new mode). If T′ ⊆ T then the tasks should be
assigned in priority order.
5.4.2 Flow Scheduling
A valid flow scheduler must perform three tasks: First, when a subscriber comes
online and requests a subscription to an existing topic the flow scheduler must
generate a candidate network configuration using OpenFlow configuration primi-
tives. Second, the scheduler must analyze the new configuration and determine if
it guarantees the timing constraints of all admitted flows plus the new one. Third,
if the new configuration is acceptable the scheduler must reconfigure the network
carefully so no constraints of existing flows are violated during the reconfigura-
tion. All three of these activities are non-trivial: Distributed scheduling is known
to be NP-Hard if an optimal schedule is desired and there are no known exact
schedulability tests for the general network setting [41].
In light of these difficulties, we do not describe an optimal approach. Instead,
we focus on a strategy that is both fast (i.e., polynomial-time in the size of the
network), exploits the types of configuration primitives by OpenFlow, and allows
for the safe transition from one valid configuration to another. Analysis and im-
provement of the approach in terms of network utilization and schedulability is
left for future work. We start be describing how the strategy would apply to a
network consisting of a single switch, then extend it to the multi-switch case.
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Single Switch Scheduling
The flow scheduler generates a candidate network configuration in several phases.
First, for each publish-subscribe relationship the flow scheduler queries the Open-
Flow controller to determine what switch port each publisher and is connected to
and the network address associated with a given topic. Then, for each publisher
P publishing to T , the flow scheduler configures a rate-limiter. The rate-limiter
is configured with a maximum burst size B and and maximum rate R, and is set
to apply to all packets that enter the switch on the port connected to P destined
to the network address associated with T . If a publisher P specifies a minimum
separation between each message of minSep, and maximum message size of M ,
then the burst size and rate are set as follows:
B = M, R =
M
minSep
This allows P to burst its entire message onto the network while ensuring that
P cannot overload the network if P becomes a babbling idiot.
Before we can describe how the flow scheduler prioritizes flows we need to
explain how to calculate upper bounds on the worst case latency of message. La-
tency in a switched network has a number of sources. The first is due to the
bandwidth of the network link. The second is due to the physical wire that con-
nects a network node to a switch: an electrical signal takes time to propagate along
a wire (in most networks the latency effects of the wires are small because they
are relatively short). The third is the multiplexing latency of the switch. Switch
multiplexing latency is the time it takes a switch to move a bit entering the switch
on one port to the output queue of another. On modern non-blocking switches
this is usually on the order of several microseconds. Finally, there is queuing la-
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tency, which is the amount of time a message spends waiting in an egress queue.
In a modern switched Ethernet all these latencies are fixed (i.e., do not change
due to network load) except for queuing latency. Messages placed from different
flows placed on queues associated with the same switch port are in contention for
shared “forwarding resources.” We now formally define the fixed latency, queuing
latency, and end-to-end latency for a single switch.
Definition 5.4.2 (Wire Latency). The functionw (N1, N2) denotes the signal prop-
agation latency between network stations N1 and N2. A network station can be
either a switch, or a publisher/subscriber.
Definition 5.4.3 (Fixed Latency). Let f = (PT ,ST ). Let the maximum message
size of a message publish to topic T be M . Then the fixed portion of the end-to-
end latency, denoted LF (PT ,ST ), between PT and ST is:
LF (PT ,ST ) = M
C
+ w (PT , s) + w (ST , s) + smux (5.3)
where C is the network bandwidth and smux is the multiplexing latency of switch
s
Definition 5.4.4 (Queing Latency). Let (PT ,ST ) be the flow from PT to ST ,
and let s (i) be the ith port on switch s which the flow is routed out of, then
the queuing latency of the flow (PT ,ST ) with priority p at switch/port s (i) is
Q (PT ,ST , s (i) , p).
Definition 5.4.5 (End-to-End Latency). The end-to-end latency is the sum of the
fixed and queuing latency:
Le2e (PT ,ST ) = LF (PT ,ST ) +Q (PT ,ST , s (i) , p) (5.4)
171
How can we calculate Q (PT ,ST , s (i) , p)? We adapt an approximate tech-
nique for calculating the response time of a task under fixed priority scheduling
on a uniprocessor. In [36], Bini et al. provide a linear equation for calculating
an upperbound worst case response time of a task. Assuming Pi is the minimum
separation between consecutive arrivals of task Ti, Ei is the worst case execu-
tion time and hp (i) is the set of tasks assigned priority higher than Ti, then the
response time Ri is bounded from above by:
Rubi =
Ei +
∑
j∈hp(i)
Ej
(
1− Ej
Pj
)
1−
∑
j∈hp(i)
Ej
Pj
(5.5)
This equation is useful in our application because the per-task workload ap-
proximations Bini et al. used to derive the response time bound also approximate
the traffic pattern of a flow conforming to a rate-limiter. We then transform Equa-
tion 5.6 into a worst-case bound on latency due to queuing by substituting mes-
sage sizes divided by bandwidth for execution cost, minSep for the periods, and
subtracting the overall message transmission cost for our flow3 Additionally, let
hp (p, s (i)) be the set of flows with priority higher than p at port i on switch s:
Q (PT ,ST , s (i) , p)ub =
MT
C +
∑
j∈hp(p,s(i))
Mj
C
(
1−
Bj
C
minSepj
)
1−
∑
j∈hp(p,s(i))
Bj
C
minSepj
− MT
C
(5.6)
We can now use the upper-bound on worst-case switch latency to determine
how to prioritize each flow. Common techniques for priority assignment in real-
3This is because the response time for a task also takes into account the execution time for that
task. We only want a upper bound on the interference.
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time systems include the Rate Monotonic (RM) and Deadline Monotonic order-
ings (DM) [26]. Unfortunately, both RM and DM theory require that each flow
is assigned a unique priority. This is not possible on real networking hardware:
most Ethernet switches only provide 8 priority queues per port for egress traf-
fic. To overcome this limitation, we use Audsley’s Optimal Priority Assignment
(OPA) algorithm [24]. OPA has two desireable properties: It is optimal locally
(if a flow set will meet its latency requirement at a single switch under any fixed-
priority configuration it will also under OPA) and it minimizes the number or
priority levels required to schedule the flow set. Because each port of the switch
is independent in terms of its egress queueing, we only need to differentiate the
priorities of flows exiting the switch on the same port.
We now describe a version of Audsley’s OPA adapted to assign priorities to
flows in an OpenFlow switch. Our modified OPA takes as input a set of flows
(denoted F) forwarded out of the same port. OPA starts by attempting to as-
sign flows to the lowest priority level. If a flow f can exceeed its latency bounds
at a given priority level, OPA moves on and will attempt to assign that flow a
higher priority later. Conservatively, a flow (PT ,ST ) can miss its latency bounds
if Q (PT ,ST , s (i) , p)ub + LF (PT ,ST ) > Lmax (ST ). If OPA exits before as-
signing a priority to every flow, then the flow set is not schedulable with any fixed
priority assignment. If the number of priority levels required to schedule F is
greater than the number of priorities provided by the switch, then the flow sched-
uler deems the flow set unschedulable.
Before admitting a new subscriber the flow scheduler must reconfigure the
network to accomodate the new flow without causing existing flows to violate
their latency requirements. Existing flows must be migrated to their new priorities
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in a specific order to avoid priority inversions. To safely accomplish the recon-
figuration the flow scheduler maps existing priorities according to their priority
assignment in the new configuration: flows with lower priority are reprioritized
first.
Extension to Multi-switch
The prototype flow scheduler supports real-time guarantees on networks consist-
ing of
multiple switches by tranforming the distributed scheduling problem into a se-
quence of local (i.e., single switch) scheduling problems. Before we proceed we
modify Equations 5.7 and 5.4 to describe the sources of latency for a flow that is
forwarded through a sequence of switches. As in the single switch case there are
fixed and queuing sources of latency:
Definition 5.4.6 (Multiswitch Fixed Latency). Let ρ be a path of lengthm through
the network from PT to ST . Let Nk be the kth network node (switch or publish-
er/subscriber) on ρ.Let the maximum message size of a message publish to topic
T be M . Then the fixed portion of the end-to-end latency, denoted LρF (PT ,ST ),
between PT and ST is:
LρF (PT ,ST ) =
M
C
+
∑
1<k≤m
w (Nk−1, Nk) +
∑
1<k<m
smuxk (5.7)
Definition 5.4.7 (Multiswitch Queuing Latency Latency). Let ρ be a path through
the network with length m from PT to ST . Then the queuing latency due to all
the switches on ρ is the sum of all the queuing latencies of the switches along the
path:
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Qρ (PT ,ST ) =
∑
1<k<m
Q (PT ,ST , sk (i) , pk) (5.8)
Definition 5.4.8 (Total Multiswitch End-to-End Latency). Let ρ be a path through
the network crossing m switches. Then the total end-to-end latency due to both
fixed and queuing delays along ρ is:
Lρe2e (PT ,ST ) = Qρ (PT ,ST ) + LρF (PT ,ST ) (5.9)
Given these equations for end-to-end latency for flows crossing multiple
switches we describe how MIDAS generates and applies network configurations
for multi-switch networks. As mentioned earlier in this section distributed schedul-
ing is in general quite difficult. Further complicating matters is that MIDAS must
be able to reconfigure the the entire network without causing any QoS constraint
violations for existing flows. This is challenging because the reconfiguration of an
upstream switch will impact the worst case load on downstream switches. Imagine
for example a simple network consisting of two switches s1 and s2. Now imagine
some flow f forwarded along the path s1, s2. Say that the minimum separation
between bursts of f at s1 is 20ms and the worst case queuing latency at s1 is 3ms.
This means that the minimum separtion that could be observed by s2 is 17ms (the
case where the first burst of f is delayed the maximum amount and then the sec-
ond burst is not delayed at all). Now assume a new flow f ′ is admitted to the
network and it is prioritized higher than f on s1. This will increase the worst-case
queuing latency of f (e.g., to 10ms) at s1 and further contract the worst-case burst
separation observed by s2 (down to 10ms).
We avoid having to calculate network-wide side effects each time a new sub-
scriber is admitted by transforming the distributed scheduling problem into a
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sequence of local scheduling problems: When a subscriber ST requests a sub-
scription to T with a latency constraint Lmax (ST ) we first calculate the short-
est unweighted path ρ between PT and ST . Next, we uniformly allot a portion
Lmax (ST ) to each switch: for each switch sk in ρ we calculate Lmax (ST )sk
where:
Lmax (ST )sk =
Lmax (ST )− LρF (PT ,ST )
|ρ|
That is, we split the allowed queuing latency up evenly between all the switches
along ρ. We now recursively calculate the worst case minimum separation ob-
served at each switch on the path. Let minSepk be the minimum worst case
separation of bursts at switch sk then:
minSepk+1 = minSepk − Lmax (ST )sk
Finally, we apply the single switch schedulability, priority assignment and
network reconfiguration algorithms using each Lmax (ST )sk and minSepk for the
appropriate switch. Because we fixed the allotted switch queuing latency when
the flow as admitted, the minSepk values will never change.
5.5 Evaluation & Performance Assesment
This section describes the experimental results of an evaluation of some of the
MDCF / MIDAS’ key features.
5.5.1 Scheduling and Resource Reservation in the RTMB
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Figure 5.13: Experimental setup
We evalauted two aspects of MIDAS. First we wanted to see if the network
scheduling used in the MIDAS improved the timing performance relative to that
of a standard switch. Second, we wanted to see how robust the MIDAS timing
guarantees are. In order to evaluate these two aspects we deployed the MIDAS on
our OpenFlow test bench (Figure 5.13).
Our OpenFlow test-bench consists of 4 computers and an OpenFlow capa-
ble switch, a Pica8 P3290 [3]. Each of the 4 computers were plugged into the
switches’ data-plane ports (i.e., OpenFlow managed ports). The GRM was also
plugged into the control-plane port which carries OpenFlow management traffic.
Measuring end-to-end timing in a distributed network accurately is challenging
due to clock synchronization issues. We avoid these synchronization issues by
exploiting OpenFlow to let us run publisher’s and subscribers on the same hosts:
we add an OpenFlow rule that causes the switch to intercept packets from certain
flows, rewrite the packet headers, and then retransmit the packet back out the port
it arrived on. This allows us to ‘fool’ the client; it can publish to Tx and subscribe
to Ty but in reality it the messages being published to Tx are being sent back mod-
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ified so they look as if they are from Ty. This allows us to compare the timestamps
of messages using the same system clock while still subjecting the message to the
same queuing, multiplexing and wire latencies it would experience if it was being
sent to another host.
All timing measurements we done on Host A. Host A was running real-time
Linux with IBM’s RTSJ-compliant Real-Time JVM. The RTMB client library
on Host A was scheduled with the highest system priority using RTSJ Java’s
NoHeapRealtimeThread’s to ensure that they would not be interfered with
by the Java garbage collector or other processes on the system. All timing mea-
surements were made by using the system’s millisecond precision real-time clock
API. Prior to running our experimental scenarios we lower-bounded the amount
of latency added by the Linux TCP/IP stack and the JVM by sending a message to
the loopback interface. This latency was consistently 1ms, which means that ob-
served latencies as recorded by the software are usually 1ms more than the actual
network latency.
For each experiment we used the same 3 publishers each publishing to a dif-
ferent topic (T1, T2, and T3) with a single host subscribing to each topic. Table
5.2 lists each topic, relevent QoS (minSep of the publisher and max latency from
the subscriber), and the bandwidth required by each. The publish-subscribe set
is designed to be representative of a demanding plug and play medical system:
T1 represents a high framerate/resolution video stream, T2 & T3 represent high
resolution data coming from ECG and EEG machines. For each experiment we
captured all messages received within a 10 second window and recorded their la-
tencies. During following discussion, we use Sx to denote the subscriber to topic
x and Px as the publisher to x.
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Topic minSep Max. Latency Message Size (Bytes) Bandwidth
T1 3ms 2ms 192192 512.512mbit/s
T2 3ms 3ms 96000 256.000mbit/s
T3 11ms 8ms 64000 46.545mbit/s
TOTAL: 815.057mbit/s
Table 5.2: Experimental Publish-Subcribe Set
Scenario 1: Comparison to Best-Effort
Here we compare the performance of the middleware in two network settings. In
the first setting, we configure the Pica8 to behave like a normal L2/L3 switch (it
uses a fair-queueing strategy to forward ethernet frames in this mode). We call this
the ‘best-effort’ setting. In the second setting we place the network under control
of the MIDAS using the strategy of Section 5.4.2. We ran three experiments where
we observed the end-to-end latencies of messages published to each topic. In the
best-effort setting ST3 still met its latency constraints. The same was not true for
ST2 or ST1 . Due to space, we report the data concerning ST2:
Figure 5.14 shows the latency of each message over the observation window
for ST2 . Figure 5.15 shows the same for the MIDAS managed setting. Each point
on each graph represents the end-to-end latency of a single message sent to T2
and received by the subscriber. The x-axis is the moment (in milliseconds) that
the message was transmitted. The y-axis is the latency of that message. Even
accounting for jitters in the operating system and JVM the end-to-end deadline
of ST2 is repeatedly violated on the best-effort system (observe the number of
samples in the 5ms row of Figure 5.14). Additionally, ST2 never received 48%
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Figure 5.14: Best Effort
of the messages that were sent. This is because the messages are quite large and
the egress queues can be overrun in the best effort setting. Any loss of a single
ethernet frame will result in the loss of the whole message. All messages arrived
in the MIDAS-managed setting. While it would be possible to reduce the message
drop rate in the best effort setting by causing the senders to retransmit on failure,
doing so would increase the effective latency of the message. Taking into account
the 1 ms latency added by the JVM and TCP/IP stack, no messages violated the
latency requirement when the MIDAS was managing the network configuration
(All samples in Figure 5.15 are 4ms or less).
Scenario 2: Fault Containment
In this scenario we modify the publishers to T1 and T2 so they simulate babbling
idiots (i.e., set theirminSep to 0) and we record the latencies of messages flowing
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Figure 5.15: MIDAS
to T3. In this experiment the publishers were able to saturate a 1 gigabit per second
Ethernet link each. We modified PT1 and PT2 because MIDAS will configure
their respective flows with the highest priority which means they have the most
opportunity to starve the other flows if they misbehave. This represents a worst
case scenario for our approach. When run on the best effort network (i.e., with
no flow prioritization) PT1 and PT2 were able to starve enough of the network
forwarding capacity from the flow associated with PT3 to cause all messages to be
dropped. Figure 5.16 contains the observed latencies when MIDAS was managing
the network. Again, each point in the graph represents a single message. The y-
axis is latency of that message, and its x-value is the moment the message was
transmitted. Under MIDAS, no messages were dropped and all messages arrived
earlier than their required latency bounds, 8ms.
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Figure 5.16: Latency bounds for ST3 when PT1 and PT2 are malfunctioning
5.5.2 Performance of the Determinizing Scheduler
We measure two aspects of our Determinizing Scheduler implementation. First,
we measure the worst case execution time (WCET) of each type of Determinizing
Scheduler microtask. The WCET time of the microtasks are important because
it will affect the schedulability of applications: If the MDCF/MIDAS is running
many applications at once, or those applications generate many I/O events, the
Determinizing Scheduler will have to execute many microtasks in a millisecond.
Second, we measure the level of timing determinism actually achieved by the
implementation.
Both evaluations were performed on the same hardware running and operat-
ing system combination. The hardware consisted of a workstation equipped with
an Intel Core i7-2600 and 8GB of RAM. The processor frequency was locked
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at 3.5Ghz, hyperthreading was disabled and only one core was enabled. The
operating system was Ubuntu Linux 14.04LTS running the RT PREEMPT ker-
nel patchset enabling fully preemptive priority-based real-time scheduling. The
Java JVM used was IBM’s WebSphere RT 2.0. The MDCF/MIDAS software
architecture and implementation lets us map the Determinizing Scheduler to a
NoHeapRealtimeThread [40] to ensure that the Java garbage collector will
not interfere with the Determinizing Scheduler. All other application tasks were
mapped to RealtimeThreads [40] with a priority dictated by the MDCF/MI-
DAS Resource Manager.
Microtask WCET
We randomly generated a set of ODSDL applications and extracted a set of mi-
crotasks associated with the applications. While the Determinizing Scheduler em-
ployees three types of microtasks (one each for the ODSDL sched, send and recv
event) we actually tested 6 “categories” of task:
1. recv - data is received on a port.
2. sched(P ) - periodic task is dispatched.
3. sched(A) - aperiodic task is dispatched.
4. send(1) - data is sent on a port with only one destination.
5. send(5) - data is sent on a port with 5 destinations.
6. send(10) - data is sent on a port with 10 destinations.
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Figure 5.17: Microtask execution times in microseconds.
We ran each extracted microtask 500 times and recorded the duration of each
execution. We used the Clock.getTime() methods exposed by the RTSJ run-
time which enabled us to record each execution time with microsecond precision.
Figure 5.17 shows the measured WCET for each task category. The upper and
lower bounds on execution time are indicated by the top and bottom whisker for
each category. The mean is indicated by the middle whisker and the boxes (when
present) show the range of the standard deviation.
On the test hardware our microtask implementation usually takes on the order
of 10 microseconds to execute. The cheapest microtask is for recv events because
the Determinizing Scheduler only needs to update a reference in the receiving
module. Both types of sched tasks are also cheap. sched(P ) is slightly (several
microseconds) more expensive because it must calculate the next dispatch mo-
ment and schedule a new microtask while sched(A) only needs to dispatch a task.
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The most expensive microtasks are typically for send events which makes sense
because a hash map datastructure must be accessed to retrieve the set of applica-
tion flows associated with the sending port. As expected, the cost of processing a
send event scales linearly with the number of flows associated with the port.
Depending on the mix of microtasks needed, these results indicate that modern
computing hardware can process 500 - 1000 microtasks in a given millisecond.
Recall though that these experiments were run with only a single core: Access
to multiple cores devoted to microtask processing potentially means even more
microtasks could be processed in a given millisecond on modern hardware as long
as datastructure locking is managed efficiently. Furthermore, these results reflect a
Java implementation. While modern Java compilers and JVMs offer competitive
performance relative to code generated from languages like C++ [129, 145], it
is possible that additional software optimzations, compiler optimizations, or a
different implementation language could shave microseconds from the costs of
each microtask.
Measured Application Determinism
Recall that the Determinizing Scheduler is designed to ensure that application
I/O events occur at the correct time, down to the millisecond, according to the
ODSDL’s semantics. Here, we evaluate our implementation’s ability to make
these I/O events happen at the right time. We randomly generated two ODSDL
applications each with 10 modules/tasks. Both applications were deemed schedu-
lable by the MDCF/MIDAS. One application had a task utilization U = 0.75,
while the other had U = 0.90. Figure 5.18 gives a template for the test mod-
ule. We used the UUniFast task-set generation method [37] to generate the period,
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deadline, and cost parameters for each task in order to achieve the desired system
utilization.
1 module DSTest {
2 net input "input"
3 net output "output"
4 vars {i, a, b, c}
5 task activated periodically [P] delay [D]{
6 i = 0
7 a = input
8 while(i < [I]){
9 b = a + c
10 c = b + a
11 iter = iter + 1
12 }
13 send("output", c)
14 }
15 }
16 }
Figure 5.18: ODSL test module template. [I], [P] and [D] are set according
to the test parameters.
In order to have our test module tasks actually require the specied cost, we
measured the cost for one of the task’s loop’s iterations. We validated that the
task cost scaled linearly with an increase in the number of iterations (I). We then
set the appropriate number of iterations for each module to achieve its specified
execution cost.
Next, we randomly selected one task from each application to instrument. The
instrumentation recorded the moment each time a job of the task finished relative
to its deadline. We then ran each application for 1 minute using both the Deter-
minizing Scheduler and a standard Deadline Monotonic scheduler and recorded
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(b) DM + Determinizing Scheduler
Figure 5.19: Task completion variability with 0.75 system utilization.
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Figure 5.20: Task completion variability with 0.90 system utilization.
the relative finishing times of the test tasks.
Figure 5.19 shows the results for the U = 0.75 application. As we can see,
when Deadline Monotonic scheduling is used the finish time of the task varied.
While most of the finish times were around 900 milliseconds prior to its deadline,
some jobs finished later. Under the Determinizing Scheduler, all jobs completed
at exactely the deadline.
The story repeats with the higher utilization (U = 0.90) application (Figure
5.20). Again, with the deadline monotonic scheduler the task job complete (and
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hence output moment) can vary. In fact, this task exhibited more variability than
the task in the lower utilization application. Again, the Determinizing Scheduler
makes all the job completions manifest at the specified deadline.
These results demonstrate that the Determinizing Scheduler apprach is able to
achieve a very good level of determinism and predictability (down the the mil-
lisecond) even when using desktop class hardware, Linux, and Java as an imple-
mentation language.
5.6 Related Work
There are two important areas of related work. First, The role of a Medical Appli-
cation Platform as a trusted base was inspired by the “separation kernel” concept
that is becomming more commonplace in security and safety critical systems.
Second, the idea that the platform could orchestrate computation and communi-
cations activities in order to achieve a sort of logical time execution was inspired
by a number of other real-time systems research projects. We give a brief survey
of the related work in each area and explain how that work relates to our contri-
bution.
5.6.1 Separation Kernels
Separation kernels are like thin operating systems designed to partition or sepa-
rate the different software functions they are hosting. The goal of the paritioning
is to ensure that a software function in one partition cannot interfere with the
software residing in another unless the systems integrator explicitly allows it. The
concept of a separation kernel was first applied to security intensive systems. Later
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the same concept (but with different features) was suggested for safety-critical
systems.
The Security Context
The first mention of a separation kernel was in a 1981 paper by John Rushby [162].
The separation kernel described by Rushby was intended to reduce the cost of
providing the assurance that a composite software system would not inadvertantly
leak data from high a security channel to a low security channel.
The composite software system consists of many individual software func-
tions. Some of these functions would be designed to only deal with low security
data, while other functions would process high security data. Clearly the software
functions that are destined to handle high security data should be exposed to as
much verification as is possible to assure that they will not mismange (i.e., leak)
that data.
But what about the low security software functions? If the composite software
system was constructed by linking the individual functions into a single program
execeutable then composite system as a whole would also need to be closely scru-
tinezed to ensure that low security functions do not somehow interfere with the
high security functions or otherwise gain access to classified data. Verification
of the composite system can be exponentially more complex (because one has
to worry about all the possible interactions between the individual components)
which results in a much higher verification cost.
The first core idea of the separation kernel is to mitigate the whole system veri-
fication cost by running each software function as a process isolated inside its own
partition. The job of the kernel, then, is to ensure that functions operating in one
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partition cannot interfere or interact with functions inside another (unless explic-
itly allowed by the systems integrator). But how is this different than just running
each software function inside its own process on a modern operating system with
memory protection?
The second core idea of the separation kernel is simplicity. A modern oper-
ating system itself is very complex. If it exhibits a security vulnerability or an
implementation defect one process may be able to interfere with another in unex-
pected ways. A high level of assurance for individual software functions is useless
if the underlying operating system cannot be verified to the same level of assur-
ance. Unfortunately a full fledged operating system can be more complex than
the individual software functions that it hosts. Therefore a good separation ker-
nel should be simple as to reduce the cost of its own verification and validation.
Rushby was a proponent of a separation kernel whose design and implementation
could be fully and formally verified via formal mathematical proof. In theory, this
would bring a high level of assurance to the implementation and design of the ker-
nel. System integrators could then focus their verification and validation efforts
on the high security software functions under the assumption that the separation
kernel would ensure that the low security software functions would not acess a
high security function or channel.
Since Rushby’y 1981 paper there has been many ongoing efforts to create a
formally verified separation kernel. [157] proposes a technique for the formal
verification of a separation kernel. In 2006, Heitmeyer et al. [78] were able to
produce a formally verified separation kernel and provide a high level of assurance
with respect to the requirements laid out in the Common Criteria. More recently,
Klein et al. [111] were able to produce the formally verified separation kernel
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seL4.
The Safety Context
Separation kernels for security work because they can enforce a useful negative
property: High security data cannot inadvertently flow from a high-sec partition
to a low-sec partition. Separation kernels are able to enforce this property because
they exist at a (low) level in the system software stack where they can mediate the
interactions between individual software functions and between software func-
tions and the underlying hardware.
While it is not exactely the same, there are significant parallels between the
challenges integrators of safety-critical systems face and those of security-critical
systems in terms of the cost of providing high assurance. Like security-critical
systems, modern safety critical systems can be composed of many software func-
tions. In any given system, each software function may have a different level of
criticality (i.e., some software functions may not have a safety-critical role while
other functions would). Thus if integrators want to combine a large number of
functions with a single computing platform they must either ensure that 1) the
composite system is verified to the highest level of assurance as a whole or 2)
verify each function indpendently and then use some lower-level mechanism to
ensure that the functions cannot interfere with each other in unexpected ways.
Option 2 requires some form of separation.
John Rushby recognized the utility of a separation kernel for safety critical
systems in 1986 [158]. In that paper Rushby makes a first attempt at formalizing
what it means to enforce a negative property but does not discuss actual enforce-
ment mechanisms. In the 1990’s there were efforts within the aviation industry
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to standardize the separation services that a kernel could provide and how those
interfaces would present to sofware functions as APIs (see: [54]). Those efforts
culiminated in what we now know as Integrated Modular Avionics, or IMA [160].
We must note that IMA is a concept, not a specific set of technologies, even though
there are a variety of platforms and technologies on the market that offer “IMA”
capabilities.
Unlike security separation kernels, IMA platforms have to do more than just
ensure one software function cannot access (or corrupt) another’s data. Because
avionics have real-time requirements, the system integrator must ensure that each
real-time function has access to appropriate computing resources when it is needed.
Computing resources can be processor time, the network, sensors, and actuators.
To ensure that functions have access to processor time system IMA integrators
will typically use a RTOS that complies with the Application Executive (APEX)
ARINC 653 [17] standard. In addition to running each software function in its
own protected memory partition with its own memory region (space partitioning)
these RTOS ensure each function access to processor time by employing preemp-
tive cyclic scheduling. At integration time, the execution schedule for each func-
tion is chosen. Each function is allowed to process its tasks during its scheduled
execution slot. The RTOS will forcibly preempt any task that runs beyonds its
function’s execution slot. This ensures that a malfunctioning task of one function
cannot prevent a different function’s access to allocated processor time.
There are a variety of network technologies designed to be used as the commu-
nications substrate of IMA systems such as Avionic Full Duplex Ethernet [18, 4]
the Time Triggered Protocol [114], or the ARINC 629 data-bus. Like the APEX
compatible RTOS, all these networking technologies must be configured (i.e.,
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choose the transmission schedule and/or priorities) during system integration to
ensure that each avionics function has access to networking resources at the right
time.
Integrated Modular Avionics have been successfully used facilitate systems
integration for a number of high profile aircraft including the Airbus A380 [94],
as well as the Boeing 787, C-130 and KC-767 Tanker [180].
5.6.2 Execution Strategies for Real-Time Determinism
In [81, 79] Henzinger et al. proposed the embedded-machine or e-machine. The e-
machine implements an execution strategy for real-time programs comprised of a
graph of periodic real-time tasks generated by the compilation of Giotto programs.
Like our determinzing scheduler, the e-machine separates task computation from
inter-task computation: The e-machine scheduler dispatches a task an keeps its
outputs until the task deadline at which point it moves the outputs to the next task’s
inputs and dispatches the next task. While [81] only supported periodic tasks,
there have been a number of extensions to support aperiodic and event driven
models [67]. Unlike the determinizing scheduler the various incarnations of the
e-machine are not designed for use in a distributed environment.
In [189], Zou et al. describe execution strategies for PTIDES [58, 59] pro-
grams based on Discrete Event Simulation. While the strategies described in [189]
can work in a distributed setting (unlike the e-machine) assesing their schedu-
lability is complicated relative to the Determinizing Scheduler. While the DS
transforms ODSDL into a set of aperiodic tasks where traditional scheduling tech-
niques can be used, [189] requires static analysis to determine causal relationships
between actors. Furthermore, current techniques to asses the schedulability for
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PTIDES programms utilizing the complete PTIDES programming model depends
on a reduction to reachability in timed automata and make not be appropriate for
online schedulability analysis.
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Chapter 6
Case Studies
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we take two of the motivating examples from Chapter 2 and use
them as case-studies. The goal is to tie the work in the preceeding chapters to-
gether. We will use the case studies to illustrate how the regulatory framework
(Chapter 2), On-Demand Systems Description Language (ODSDL, Chapter 4)
and Medical Application Platform (MAP, Chapter 5) work together to provide
safety assurance for on-demand systems via a safety argument. Additionally, these
case studies will give us the opportunity to evaluate the performance ramifications
of a modal refinement (Section 3.2) based device/application compatibility check
using realistic device specifications.
This chapter is organized as follows:
First we will describe some key assumptions about the regulatory framework
and on-demand ecosystem (Section 6.2). These assumptions will be critical to un-
derstand why certain claims in each use-case’s safety arguments are justified. Un-
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fortunately, as of this writing, there is no real regulatory framework as described
in Chapter 2. While our regulatory framework and ecosystem will be imaginary,
we will relate the key assumptions to realistic and/or concrete examples.
Next we will describe the case-studies (Sections 6.3 & 6.4). For each case-
study we will define the safety requirements and discuss scenario specific assump-
tions. We will then use the ODSDL to design an on-demand system to address the
clinical scenario and explain how the different features of the ODSDL help us in
our task. We will then construct an informal safety argument for the system. The
safety argument will illustrate how the regulatory framework, properties of the
ODSDL, and MAP combine to provide safety assurance for that particular sys-
tem specification. Because each safety argument is by its nature informal, there
is the possibility of assurance deficits (i.e., gaps that may make the argument un-
convincing). For each case study we will endeavor to identify important deficits
and discuss how the deficits may (or may not) be remedied.
Finally, we will benchmark our modal-refinement based compatibility check-
ing procedure using the device specifications from the case-studies (Section 6.5).
The goal of the benchmark is to ascertain how long checking modal refinement
takes for realistic specifications and to develop a preliminary understanding of its
practicality.
6.2 Ecosystem Assumptions
Here we make a number of assumptions about the ecosystem that apply to both
use-cases. These assumptions add detail to the basic processes outlined first in
Chapter 2.
196
ODSDL is Standard
We assume that the ODSDL is the standard used by application developers to
program applications and express requirements on device behavior, and it is used
by device manufacturers to specify how their device’s behave. Recall that the
ODSDL lets developers and manufacturers model device/environment interac-
tions with specific physical action types. These action types are just strings and
their physical meaning is not defined in the core ODSDL. Instead, it is the job
of the Ecosystem standards consortium to define a taxonomy of phsyical action
types, define the physical meaning of the action, and define the compliance crite-
ria for each action a device purports to generate or react to. We will give examples
in the case study specific ecosystem assumption sections later.
Furthermore, we assume that there is a certified Development and Verification
Environment (DVE) available to the ecosystem stakeholders (Figure 6.1). The
DVE enables an ecosystem specific form of Model Driven Development (MDD).
The DVE lets application developers program/specify their applications using
ODSDL. Then the developer can use the DVE to both automatically generate an
application bundle certified MAPs can execute as well as generate TPMS models
of the system that are suitable for model-checking, simulation, or other forms of
analysis.
Lastly, we assume that the notion of device/application compatibility used by
the ecosystem is that of weak modal-refinement between TPMSs (Section 3.2).
When a platform checks to see if the device chosen by the user is compatible with
an application is desugars the ODSDL specifications into TPMS specifications
and then checks whether the device TPMS weakly refines the requirements TPMS.
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Figure 6.1: Development & verification workflow in the Ecosystem’s ODSDL
Development & Verification Environment
Device Compliance
We assume that device manufacturers must follow some sort of MDD process
to design and implement their devices. In particular we assume that the device
manufacturers must design the “digital” (i.e., part the controls the sensors and
actuators) portion of their device by creating a timed-automata model and then
autogenerating an implementation with a tool like TIMES [9]. After the physical
implementation of the digital portion has been created, its timing characteristics
must be tested and verified to conform to the initial timed automata specification
following a process such as described in [97]. The portion of the device excluded
from the digital portion (i.e., the sensor and actuators) must be verified for com-
pliance according to specific criteria established for the sensor or actuator type.
We will discuss this more in detail in the ecosystem assumptions specific to each
use-case.
Furthermore we assume that each certified device properly implements the
ecopshere’s standard interoperability protocols and runs a local version of the de-
terminizing scheduler (Section 5.3): When connected, the device’s clock is al-
ways synchronized to the connected platform’s clock (within some ), and when
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the device receives a timestamped message carrying and ODSDL event, it won’t
manifest that event to the device’s control logic until the timestamp.
Platform Compliance
We assume that each certified platform properly executes ODSDL programs. This
includes properly implementing the ODSDL’s logical execution time semantics
and correctly implementing the procedure used to check modal refinement. Addi-
tionally, we assume that each platform is able to provide guarantees of separation
and isolation between concurrently running applications (e.g., [162, 7, 158, 160,
159]).
Furthermore, we assume that the correctness of the platform has been rigor-
ously verified, following the types of guidance for highly critical systems laid out
in, for example, the DO-178/254 guidance standards for avionics [98, 83, 146]
and the Common Criteria [154, 140]. 1. We also assume that, where possible, the
functional correctness of the platform software has been formally verified, e.g., as
in [111].
6.3 Laser-Ventilator Interlock
6.3.1 Scenario Specific Assumptions
Before we proceed with a description of our Laser/Ventilator interlock applica-
tion we need to make some assumptions. The first assumptions will concern the
1A discussion of what particular aspects of the referenced guidance should be applied is beyond
the scope of this dissertation. We merely assume that the platform is verified as extensively as any
other existing safety critical software system
199
clinical environment and the intended use of the application. Based on the sce-
nario assumptions we will devise the safety-property the application must satisfy.
Next, we will state some assumptions about the ecosystem compliance criteria for
laser-scalpels and ventilators. These assumptions about device compliance will
help the reader interpret the meaning of the ODSDL device requirements specifi-
cations used in the application, and they will be exploited in the safety argument
itself.
Clinical Environment & Intended Use
We assume that our application will only be designed to prevent surgical fires
and won’t try to protect the patient from O2 desaturation. We assume that the
anesthesiologist and the surgeon will still communicate during the procedure and
that the anesthesiologist will inform the surgeon if s/he should take a break from
cutting in order to let the ventilator run and increase the patient’s SpO2 level.
We also assume that the concentrated O2 in the patient’s airway dissipates
quickly after the ventilator has been stopped or paused. While the dissipating
is not instantaneous, we assume that is dissipates down to safe levels in under a
fraction of a second (though this may differ between patients, ventilator, and gas
mixture settings).
Laser/Ventilator Device Compliance
Table 6.1 contains a listing of the ODSDL physical type names we assume have
been standardized in our imaginary ecosystem. Each type is designated with a
name, and can represent a physical signal that is either just an event (i.e., “it
happened”) or an event that carries a value (i.e., “it changed its output to value
200
Physical Type Value/Event Description
LaserOutputWatts Value [0 . . . 100] Laser output energy in watts.
ReqPauseEvent Event When the pause request button is pressed.
ToggleOnEvent Event Pressure is applied to the laser activation button.
ToggleOffEvent Event Pressure is removed from the laser activation button.
VentFlowRateLSec Value [0 . . . 50] Gas flow rate in litres/second.
EmergencyBtn Event When the emergency button is pressed.
RateInputPanel Value [0 . . . 50] Req. flow rate received from device panel.
Table 6.1: Physical types used by devices in the Laser/Ventilator interlock
application.
v”).
We assume that if a laser scalpel has been certified its actual laser output will
match its specified output (LaserOutputWatts) within 2% if the laser is active.
We assume that if the laser specifes an output of 0 at discrete millisecond t (i.e.,
it is supposed to be turned off) it will physically disconnect the laser emitter from
the power circuit before t+ 1. This design requirement is verified by the certifica-
tion authority via manual inspection of each submitted laser-scalpel design. Req-
PauseEvent, ToggleOnEvent, and ToggleOffEvent are all events that represent
the physical signal generated when the surgeon presses one of two buttons on the
scalpel. ReqPauseEvent fires when the surgeon clicks a button for requesting
ventilator pause. ToggleOnEvent and ToggleOffEvent let use model a toggle
button: ToggleOnEvent fires when a button is depressed, ToggleOffEvent fires
when the surgeon lets off the button.
Likewise, we assume that if the ventilator has been certified its actual output
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will match its specified output (VentFlowRateLSec) within some error. How-
ever, once the ventilator indicates that it should be stopped by discrete millisec-
ond t, the ventilator mechanism (usually a piston or some other pump) must have
its movement fully arrested by time t + 1. The RateInputPanel even represents
when the operator programs and commits a new ventilator flow rate (e.g., types in
a new rate and hits enter.) We must note that real ventilators expose many more
parameters than just “flow rate”. Typically, you can specify respiratory rate, FiO2
(amount of O2 delivered), tidal volume, pressure and many others [186]. In this
case study we focus on flow rate as the primary ventilation parameter to simplify
the presentation. EmergencyBtn is an event that represents when the operator
presses a button to activate an “emergency mode”. Emergency mode is intended
to disable the pause feature of the ventilator if one exists.
6.3.2 Application Design
Our safety interlock (see Figure 6.2) consists of a laser-scalpel (Figure 6.3), ven-
tilator (Figure 6.4), and two application software modules (Figure 6.5). The envi-
ronment consists of an operator and patient. At a high level, the interlock works
as follows: when the surgeon wishes to use the laser scalpel s/he will depress a
“request” button on the scalpel. The scalpel will send an event to the application
requesting for it to be enabled. When the application gets the activation request
it will first ask the ventilator to pause. After the ventilator pauses, the ventilator
will acknowledge the pause request to the application which will in turn send an
“enable” message to the scalpel. The laser scalpel will remain enabled (i.e., can
be turned on) until just before the ventilator resumes gas flow.
Whether or not this system satsifies its safety requirement (i.e., that the ven-
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tilator is never on when the laser is) depends on the relative timing of the mode-
changes in the devices and the events received and generated by the application.
We will now discuss the specification of each component and how the specified
must behavior of each component helps satisfy the system safety requirement,
while any specified may behavior will not cause a violation.
The application requires that the laser-scalpel (Figure 6.3) start in a “disabled”
state (i.e., it will not react to the surgeon toggling the ‘on’ button). The scalpel
will only become receptive to the ‘on’ button after it has received an signal on
its allow network input port from the application and moved into the READY
control location. Once the scalpel is enabled the specification allows for some
timing variability in laser activation time (the parametric contraints on the invari-
ant of ACTIVATE and the guard leaving ACTIVATE). This variability is there to
account for possible power systems design differences between different scalpels:
Some designs may a longer take time to energize its circuits until a laser beam
is formed. Furthermore, some designs may be more or less predictable in terms
of their energizing time. This variability is not extended to the deactivation time:
it is required that the laser beam shutoff in the same millisecond as when the
btn off event occured. One critical aspect of laser specification is the amount
of time it remains enabled: The laser-scalpel will disable itself (and shutoff the
laser if active) once 4.979 seconds have elapsed since it was enabled. Why 4.979
seconds? As we will see our ventilator specification has the ventilator pause for 5
seconds and then resume, but due to variability in the ventilatory, network latency,
and application processing delays the ventilator may have already been paused for
up to 0.020 seconds before the laser scalpel gets enabled. Disabling the scalpel 1
millisecond early ensures that there is no overlap of time when both the laser and
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Patient
laser: LaserScalpel
vent: Ventilator
pause: PauseModule
en: EnableModule
Clinical Scenario
System Specification
req_pause
button_on
button_off
req
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pause_ackpause_ack
allow panel
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latency = 5ms
latency = 5ms
latency = 5ms
latency = 5ms
task 
deadline = 5ms
task 
deadline = 5ms
Figure 6.2: Laser/ventilator clinical scenario and safety interlock system
specification.
ventilator are on.
In addition to the timing behavior just described, the ventilator specification
(Figure 6.4) also admits some functional variability. First, it allows the operator
to change its programmed flow rate via the device’s panel (the may edges labeled
panel ? rate). It also admits ventilators that allow the operator to put the
machine into an “emergency” state where it will ignore all future pause requests.
The ventilator spec also allows some timing variability in pausing (the paramet-
ric contraints in PAUSING) and sending the pause acknowledgement message
(the parametric constraints in PAUSE1). The variability in PAUSING accounts
for mechanical differences between different ventilators (e.g., some pump mech-
anisms may have inertia to overcome before they fully stop) while the variability
in PAUSE1 can account for internal processing differences.
The application software modules themselves are quite simple (Figure 6.5).
The task of each module activates when the module receives and input on the
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t   
READY
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ACTIVE
c  4979
btn_req ?
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laser ! 5
t   ↵
c < 4979
actuators:
   laser : LaserOutputWatts
sensors:
   btn_req :  ReqPauseEvent
   btn_on :  ToggleOnEvent
   btn_off : ToggleOﬀEvent
vars:
  c : Clock
  t : Clock
params: ↵,  
                0  ↵     15
  
net inputs: 
   allow : Event
 
net outputs: 
   req : Event
 
LaserScalpelSpec
DEACTIVA
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allow ?
allow ?allow ?
allow ?
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c   4979
Figure 6.3: Requirements for laser behavior
input port and then sends an output 5 milliseconds later.
6.3.3 Safety Argument
Our safety argument for the Laser / Ventilator interlock application (Figure 6.6)
is an instatiation of the argument pattern from Section 2.4. We will describe each
node of the argument. The top-level goal of the argument (G: NoMutualActiva-
tion) is to argue that there is adequate assurance that all possible instantiations of
the the aser / Ventilator interlock application permitted by the ecosystem ensure
that the laser is never active when the ventilator flowing O2 to the patient.
The goal G: NoMutualActivation is discharged using the platform argu-
ment strategy (S: PlatArgSection 2.4) which requires that the property in ques-
tion is verified using a model-based reasoning step (G: ModelSat), and then that
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sensors:
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vars:
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net inputs: 
   pause : Event
 
net outputs: 
   pause_ack : Event
 
VentilatorSpec
c := 0
Figure 6.4: Requirements for ventilator behavior
all the models used have their adequacy justified given the safety property, sys-
tem, and environment in question. Note that we take advantage of our imagined
ecosystem’s reliance on the ODSDL and the certified DVE toolchain: The S:
PlatArg strategy is used in the context of models are automatically derived from
the ODSDL application specification (except the environment model).
The model-based reasoning step is captured by the goal G: ModelsSat and
its sub-argument. We took the application TPMS model autogenerated by the
DVE and composed it with a handcrafted TPMS model of the environment to cre-
ate a closed-model of the system. The environment model (Env) had two state
variables that represented the current laser (Env.laser input) and ventilator
(Env.vent input) input levels. The environment model also non-deterministically
generated btn req, btn on and btn off events to the laser-scalpel.
We used model-checking to verify two important properties of the closed sys-
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1 module PauseModule {
2 net input "req" datatype Event
minsep 100
3 net output "pause" datatype Event
minsep 100
4 vars { }
5 task activated by port "req"
delay 5{
6 send("pause")
7 }
8 }
(a) Pause module.
1 module EnableModule {
2 net input "pause_ack" datatype
Event minsep 100
3 net output "allow" datatype Event
minsep 100
4 vars { }
5 task activated by port "pause_ack"
delay 5{
6 send("allow")
7 }
8 }
(b) Enable module
Figure 6.5: Interlock software modules.
tem model:
• P1: The state Env.laser input > 0 ∧ Env.vent input > 0 is
not reachable.
• P2: The model does not have timelock.
P1 is simply a formalization of the mutual exclusion property from G: No-
MutualActivation. We checked P2 because the ODSDL device specification sub-
language does not prevent the application designer from committing any modeling
errors that result in deadlocks or timelocks. If the model had a timelock then the
model P1 could be vacuously true. We verified P1 & P2 using the PDR model-
checking engine in our tool ModalT. ModalT’s evidence includes a log file of the
model checking process as well as an inductive invariant over the model’s tran-
sition relation that implies that the bad states cannot be reached. The inductive
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Figure 6.6: Assurance case fragment for the Laser / Ventilator Interlock ap-
plication.
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invariant serves as a certificate and can be verified with an SMT solver that sup-
ports a theory of linear arithmetic over the reals. We also used the DVE to export
the TPMS model to the input-language supported by the Imitator model-checking
tool [10, 11, 12] which can check reachability of Paramteric Timed Automata
(PTAs) using parametric extensions of zone-graph methods [14, 13].
We argue the adequacy of the model-based reasoning in the sub-argument
rooted at goal G: ModelsAdequate. Our argument pattern requires us to justify
each model that we used. We justify our environment models by arguing that it
only needs to generate all possible operator inputs and correctly record the current
device mode. Since the model is simple, this can be verified by inspecting the
model itself (Ev: TheModelSpec).
Justifying the adequacy of the device models (G: LaserModelAdequate, G:
VentModelAdequate) is more interesting as that argument depends on the ecosys-
tem device certification criteria. Indeed, this part of the overall argument is critical
because it requires the application developer to show the connection between the
modeled universe and the real physical universe. We elaborate on the argument
for the laser model (G: LaserModelAdequate, Figure 6.7). G: LaserModelAd-
equate has two parts. The first part (G: CompatModelAdq.) is to show that
the models used in the model-based reasoning captures all the possible behav-
iors modeled by the specification of any compatible device. Since our imaginary
ecosystem uses modal refinement between TPMSs as its notion of compatibility,
and our models are TPMSs, this sub-goal is discharged with the property preser-
vation and compositional reasoning theorems of TPMS (Theorems 3.2.3, 3.2.9
and 3.2.13).
The second part (G: ImpModelAdq.) connects the behavioral spcification
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the device presents with its actual possible physical behaviors via the Ecopshere
properties and certification criteria. For this system it is critical that when the
laser model says the laser is off it is not actually emitting any laser energy. Recall,
though, that the compliance criteria we have assumed for lasers allows for lasers
that don’t output exacetly what they specify. There is some error allowed for phys-
ical differences and/or defects in the laser emitting medium and supporting power
infrastructure. Also recall that the compliance criteria requires that when a laser
says it is off, its laser emitting sub-system must have its power source physically
disconnected and that to achieve certification, the physical disconnection must be
externally verified. Our argument for G: ImpModelAdq. concludes by arguing
that laser output is irrelevent when the laser is on, but that the ecosystem certifi-
cation criteria and processes gives a sufficient amount of assurance that the laser
will actually be off when it needs to be.
Potential Assurance Deficits
Here we will discuss two classes of deficits the reviewer might identify. The first
class concerns the specified safety property. The reviewer might judge that the
safety properties argued for in the safety case are incomplete or don’t reflect the
right tradeoff between risks and benefits.
One potential problem with the top-level safety requirement is that it ignores
the potential for O2 desaturation of the patient. If the surgeon keeps requesting a
ventilator pause, and if the anesthesiologist is inattentive, they can keep the ven-
tilator stopped indefinitely, eventually causing the SpO2 levels of the patient to
dangerous levels. This deficit can be dealt with in a number of ways. It may
be that the safety case reviewer with expert medical knowledge judges the risk
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Figure 6.7: Arguement fragment for the adequacy of the laser model.
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of surgical fire large enough relative to the risk of desaturation that they allow
the deficit (i.e., the benefit of preventing fire outweighs the risk of accidental de-
saturation). Or, they may decide that the risk of desaturation is significant. If
they judge the desaturation risk significant enough, they can deny the certification
of the application and ask the application developer to redesign and satisfy extra
safety requirements (e.g.,, that the ventilator is never paused when the patient’s
SpO2 is below some expert defined threshold).
Another problem with our safety requirement is that it only targets the device
mode, rather than the physical state of the airway. Indeed, even if the ventilator
has been stopped, concentrated O2 may remain in the airway and contribute to
the fire hazard. The expert review may decide that the gases in the airway will
tend to dissipate fast enough and make the risk insignificant enough. On the other
hand, like with the previous example, they may want the developer to redesign
their application to ensure that the laser is not on when gases in the airway are
present.
The second class concerns the substance of the safety case itself: they might
not find the argument or its evidence compelling enough given the risks/benefits
to the clinical scenario. For example, the reviewer may judge that the compliance
criteria for either laser for verifying the “0” output is inadequate for this appli-
cation. For example, the compliance criteria might not make any mention of the
laser shutoff functions reliability, or if it does, it does not require a high-level of
reliability.
In addition to potential deficits linking the device’s modeled behavior to its
real behavior, the expert review might have reason to believe that the tools (e.g.,
ModalT, Imitator, or the DVE itself) used to design the application and perform
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the model-based reasoning are not adequately trustworthy. For example, they
might not believe the tools are free from defects that can significantly impact the
results.
6.4 Closed-Loop Management of Patient Controlled
Analgesia
6.4.1 Scenario Specific Assumptions
Like with the Laser/Ventilator interlock application we need to state some as-
sumptions before we can proceed. As before, the first assumptions will concern
the clinical environment and the intended use of the application. Based on the sce-
nario assumptions we will devise the safety-property the application must satisfy.
Next, we will state some assumptions about the ecosystem compliance criteria for
pulse-oximeters and PCA pumps.
Clinical Environment & Intended Use
We assume that the PCA management application is designed to be used with pa-
tients convalescing in an ICU, or a Medical Surgical Stepdown Unit (MedSurg
Unit). We assume, based on risk/benefit analysis and knowledge of physiology,
that medical professionals are in agreement that an SpO2 level of 75% is an ac-
ceptable threshold between safe and dangerous respiratory function (i.e., that an
SpO2 < 75 is dangerous but ≥ 75 is safe).
We assume then, that our application’s safety goal is to keep the patients
SpO2 ≥ 75 at all times. We also assume that a simple linear model (the one
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Physical Type Value/Event Description
PercentSpO2 Value [0 . . . 100] Blood oxygen saturation percentage (SpO2 )
InfusionRateMlMin Value [0 . . . 1000] Infusion rate ml/Min.
BolusReqEvent Event Bolus requested by the patient.
GenAlarm Event A non-specific alarm event.
Table 6.2: Physical types used by devices in the PCA management applica-
tion.
of Figure 6.13) of patient pharmokinetics is sufficient, i.e.,, it represents a worst-
case scenario of a patient who is very susceptible to opiod induced respiratory
distress.
PCA Pump/Pulse Oximeter Compliance
Table 6.2 contains a listing of the ODSDL physical type names we assume have
been standardized in our imaginary ecosystem for pulse-oximeters and PCA pumps.
PercentSpO2 represents an event where the pulse-oximeter samples the cur-
rent SpO2 value from the environment. We assume that the ecosystem compliance
criteria allows from some small error (e.g., 2-3%) from an reference value gener-
ated by an approved pulse-oximeter calibration tool [90, 89]. The calibration tool
simulates the red and infra-red light emission/reflection characteristics of human
tissue for a given SpO2 value.
InfusionRateMlMin represents an event when the infusion rate of the pump
changes to a different value. We assume that all compliant pumps have been
tested for flow accurancy at each programmable value of flow. Due to the physical
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Figure 6.8: Example trumpet curve. Taken from [171].
characteristics of the pump mechanism, it is not practically possible to have a
pump deliver precisely the flow rate it species. Typically, the accuracy of infusion
pumps are measured using “Trumpet curves” [148]. Trumpet curves (see example
in Figure 6.8) visualize the the maximum flow-rate error observed over a specific
window of time. They are called trumpet curves because the relative error over
a short window is much larger than over a long window, causing the graph to
resemble a trumpet. We assume that the compliance criteria for pumps is fairly
strict: The flow error can be no greater then 10% and must drop to less than 2%
after 100 milliseconds of infusion. BolusReqEvent represents an event that is
generated when the patient requests a bolus from the patient.
GenAlarm represents the activation of a non-specific technical alarm. The
alarm can result, for example, from the pump detecting some hazard such as air
bubbles in the infusion tube, some mechanism overheating, or the drug resevoir
becoming empty. Our assumed compliance criteria only requires that the device
generate an audible alarm at the same time as the event is fired.
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6.4.2 Application Design
Our application for preventing PCA overdose (Figure 6.9) works as follows: The
pulse-oximeter periodically samples the patient’s SpO2 and then transmits the
(possibly averaged) sample to the application module (Figure 6.12). If the re-
ceived SpO2 value is < 95 then the application sends a signal to the pump’s
disable network port. Otherwise the it will send a signal to the pump’s enable
port. When the pump gets an enable signal it will become receptive to bolus re-
quests from the patient. If a bolus is active when the pump gets a disable signal
the infusion is stopped.
Unlike the laser/ventilator interlock, satisfaction of the safety requirement de-
pends on the possible interations between the devices, application code, and pa-
tient: It is impossible to asses whether or not the safety requirements are satis-
fied without coupling the system specification to some model of patient physiol-
ogy and behavior. So instead of walking through each specfication with the aim
of showing the reader why the system “is safe” we will simply give a functinal
overview of the specifications and discuss why certain behaviors are present. The
question of safety verification will be examined in depth later in the safety argu-
ment section.
Figure 6.10 gives the pulse-oximeter specification. This particular specifi-
cation does not admit any modal variability (i.e., there is no timing or func-
tional variability allowed). Every 100 milliseconds the pulse-oximeter samples
the SpO2 value from the patient and then stores the sample in a 2-history buffer.
If the SpO2 ≥ 95 the pulseoximeter will transmit the average of the buffer to the
application. If the SpO2 is < 95 then it will transmit the most recent sample. The
reasoning is that if the SpO2 is high the averaging effect will help avoid spurious
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Figure 6.9: Closed-loop management of PCA clinical scenario and system
specification.
alarms, but if the SpO2 is low greater sensitivity is desired. While this specifi-
cation does not model any particular pulse-oximeter, it does capture the types of
behavior seen in real pulse-oximeters.
Figure 6.11 shows the specification for the PCA pump. The specification dic-
tates that the pump should not respond to patient bolus requests while it is dis-
abled. This specification admits both functional and timing modal variability.
The timing variability is designed to admit pumps with different pump mecha-
nisms: Different pump mechanisms can impact how long it could take to start or
stop an infusion. Observe the parametric timing constraints in STARTB, STOPB,
STOPBD, and STOPBDE. These locations are used to model the time it takes to
start and stop a bolus respectively. The starting locations are constrained with a
different set of parameters than the stopping locations to allow for pumps that take
a differnt amount of time to start vs. stop. The functional variability present in
the specification allows for pumps that can detect certain error conditions (e.g.,
217
SAMPLE
c  100
sensors:
   spo2 :  PercentSpO2
vars:
   c : Clock
   sample1 : Int
   sample2 : Int = 100 
net outputs: 
   spo2out : Int
 
PulseOx
SEND
c  0
c   100
c := 0
spo2 ? sample1
spo2out ! (sample1 + sample2) / 2  
sample1 >= 96
sample2 := sample1
spo2out ! sample1  
sample1 < 96
sample2 := sample1
Figure 6.10: Requirements for pulse-oximeter behavior
bubbles in the infusion line) and automatically cease infusion.
Figure 6.12 shows the PCA management application’s software module. When-
ever it gets a new SpO2 sample it checks if it is above or below the safe threshold
and enables or disables the pump accordingly.
6.4.3 Safety Argument
Like the Laser/Ventilator interlock application, our safety argument for the PCA
management application (Figure 6.14) is an instatiation of the argument pattern
from Section 2.4. The top-level goal of the argument (G: NoOverinfusion) is to
argue that there is adequate assurance that all possible instantiations of the the
PCA management application permitted by the ecosystem prevents PCA therapy
from depressing the patient’s SpO2 levels to < 75%.
Like before, the top-level goal G: NoOverinfusion is discharged using the
platform argument strategy (S: PlatArgSection 2.4) which requires model-based
reasoning step (G: ModelSat), and then that all the models used have their ade-
quacy justified. Again, we take advantage of our imagined ecosystem’s reliance
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Figure 6.11: Requirements for PCA pump behavior
on the ODSDL and the certified DVE toolchain: The S: PlatArg strategy is used
in the context of models are automatically derived from the ODSDL application
specification (except the patient model).
The model-based reasoning step is given in the sub-argument of goal G: Mod-
elsSat. We verified that the applications satisfies the desired property by using the
DVE toolchain to automatically extract ModalT TPMS and Imitator PTA models
from the ODSDL application specification. To model the patient’s physiology we
hand-crafted a TPMS model (Figure 6.13) of the patient behavior and pharmoki-
netics (i.e., the relationship between infusion rate, and the patient’s drug- and
SpO2 levels). This patient model is the same model used in [149, 21] and was
originally derived from a simple text-book model of opiod pharmokinetics.
The patient model is a “discrete simulation” of the patient’s opiod metabolism.
Each 100 milliseconds it takes a “simulation step”. At each step the current drug
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1 module SafetyCheck {
2 net input "spo2" datatype Int minsep 100
3 net output "enable" datatype Event minsep 100
4 net output "disable" datatype Event minsep 100
5 vars { }
6 task activated by port "spo2" delay 80{
7 if("spo2" < 95){
8 send("disable")
9 }
10 else{
11 send("enable")
12 }
13 }
14 }
Figure 6.12: SafetyCheck module for the PCA control application
level is computed by adding the current infusion rate to the current drug level
and substracted out the amount absorbed or metabolized away. The SpO2 level is
then computed by subtracting the drug level from 100. At any time, the infusion
pump can signal to the patient model of a rate change. Likewise, at any time, the
pulse-oximeter can sample the patient’s current SpO2 level. Patient behavior is
modeled with the value of the tolerance variable: If the drug level is less than
tolerance, the patient can request a PCA bolus. The patient model is always
receptive to alarm outputs from the pump (we have elided tese transitions from
Figure 6.13 for simplicity).
Like with the Laser/Ventilator application we use model-checking to verify
two properties:
• P1: Cannot reach a state such thatPatient.spo2 < 75.
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WAIT
c  100
output actions:
   spo2 :  PercentSpO2
   bolus_req : Event
vars:
   c : Clock
   curr_spo : Int = 100
   drug_level : Int = 0
   abs : Int = 2
   tolerance : Int = 3 
   curr_rate : Int = 0
Patient Model
STEP
c  0
c   100
c := 0
  
drug_level = drug_level + cur_rate - abs
c := 0
bolus_req!  
drug_level < tolerance
drug_level = drug_level + cur_rate - abs
c := 0
input actions:
   rate :  PercentSpO2
   
spo2 ! curr_spo  
spo2 ! curr_spo  
Figure 6.13: TPMS model of patient behavior and opiod pharmokinetics.
• P2: Cannot reach a timelock.
and like with the Laser/Ventilator application we use the two model-checkers
ModalT and Imitator. Both tools verified that both P1 and P2 are satisfied by the
system model.
We justify the adequacy of the patient model (G: PatientAdq.) by arguing
the model is sound, i.e., real patients react much less agressively to opiod infusion
compared to the model. The idea being if the model patient does not experience
overdose, neither will a real patient. The evidence we use to support this argument
is a citation to a textbook on opiod pharmokinetics.
Figure 6.15 illustrates the argument supporting the adequacy of the pulse-
oximeter model (G: PulseOxModelAdq.). Like with the laser/ventilator appli-
cation there are two parts to the argument: That the model used in the model-
checking captures all the relevent behavior of the compatible device models and
that the behavior of the device models captures the relevent physical behavior of
the devices. Like before, the first part is discharged with an appeal to the relevent
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device matching.
G: PatientAdq. 
The patient model is sound for 
checking for over-infusion.
G: PulseOxModelAdq.
The PulseOx model captures 
all relevant behavior of 
compliant and compatible 
pulse-oximeters
G: PCAapAlgModelAdq.
The application model captures 
the relevant behavior
Cntxt: Models 
The TPMS Automata 
models derived from 
the ODSDL spec: 
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& PCA
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TextbookCitation 
Reference showing 
most patients react 
less aggressively 
than model.
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Argue that the 
executable code was 
automatically generated 
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S:  ModelChecking
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checking results. 
& PDR Cert.
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of assurance for life-
critical apps.
Ev: 
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compliance criteria 
for platforms
G: 
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Cntxt: Ecosphere 
The regulatory 
framework of 
Chapter 2 with the 
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Sections 7.2 & 
7.4.1
Ev: Imitator
Imitator model-
checking results. 
Figure 6.14: Assurance case fragment for the PCA management application.
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theorems on TPMS refinement, property preservation, and compositional reason-
ing. For the second part we argue that any divergence from the modeled behavior
(in terms of timing or sensring errors) allowed by our ecosystem’s pulse-oximeter
compliance criteria is small and inconsequential relative the pharmokinetics and
patient physiology in question. For example, our assumed compliance criteria for
pulse-oximeter sensing error is +/-1 %. While this may allow a slight divergence
of the system’s modeled behavior with reality, it won’t make much practical dif-
ference to the health of the patient.
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Compositionality 
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pulseoximeters ensures that all 
implementation specifications 
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G: ImpModelAdq.
The PulseOx  model captures 
all behavior of compatible 
implementation specifications.
G: TimeScaleGood.
 The 1ms resolution timescale 
for compliance testing is 
precise enough.
G: SensingErrorAdequate.
 Sensing error allowed by 
compliance criteria is not large 
enough to significantly mitigate 
verification results
Ev: 
ComplianceCriteria 
The certification 
criteria for 
pulseoximeters
Ev: 
TextbookReference
Reference to the 
pharmokinetics of 
opioids in the 
expected patient pop.
Figure 6.15: Arguement fragment for the adequacy of the pulse-oximeter
model.
Potential Assurance Deficits
This safety argument for the PCA management application can harbor the same
kinds of deficits as those discussed for the laser/ventilator application. The review
might find fault with the top-level safety requirement (e.g., that it is incomplete).
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They also might find fault with the argument used to justify the adequacy of the
device models or platform. We will not re-hash the same deficits for this argument.
Instead we will focus on a new deficit related to the substance of the argument
resulting from the top-level safety requirement.
Unlike the laser/ventilator application, the safety requirement for the PCA
management application is phrased in terms of the patient’s physiologic state:
The PCA must cause the patient’s SpO2 to drop below 75. For the laser/ventilator
application it is easy to have confidence that the environment model is justified
(its simple and records the modes of the devices). The same cannot be said for
the patient model used here. Modeling of human physiology is very difficult, and
most so called high-fidelity models are quite complex (e.g., tens of differential
equations with tens of variables interacting with non-linear dynamics). The situ-
ation is further complicated when one tries to model sick patients where multiple
disease states are interacting. An expert reviewer might simply not accept that our
patient model adequately or soundly captures the behavior of the patients in the
population our application targets.
6.5 Performance Evaluation
It is important to ascertain the performance implications of using modal refinement
of TPMS as our notion of application device compatibility. While the refinement
checking problem for TPMS is at least as hard as checking two timed automata
for timed (bi)-simulation (known to be an EXPTIME problem [48]), the algorithm
we present in Section 3.3.5 uses a number methods (symbolic zones and modern
SMT solver capability) to potentially decide modal refinement quickly in practice.
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The goal of this section is report on how well an implementation of our algorithm
performs on the specifications used in our case studies.
6.5.1 Setup
For this evaluation, we implemented the scale insensitive refinement checking al-
gorithm from Section 3.3.5 using the Scala programming language. Zones were
maintained using a difference bound matrix [60, 33] library from the PRISM
model checker [116]. Our implementation used the Z3 SMT solver [57] version
4.4.2 to check for zone-closure and guess valid parameter values. Each refinement
check was run on a Linux workstation equipped with an Intel Core i7-4770 CPU
with 32GB of RAM. All timing information capture includes the time taken to
desugar an ODSDL specification into a TPMS and then run the actual refinement
checking algorithm on the TPMS.
For each device requirements specification we ran seven experiments which
we call Good, Tau1, Tau3, Tau5, BadConstant, BadArith and BadTrans. The
Good experiment simply took the device specification and transformed it into
a valid implementation by fixing appropriate parameter values and turning any
may transitions into must transitions. The Tau1, Tau3, and Tau5 are designed to
increase the state-space of the implementation with extra τ (silent) transitions that
do not affect the I/O behavior of the implementation. For each TauN experiment
we took the Good specification and interleaved in N =1,3 or 5 τ -transitions.
Each extra τ -transition has the affect of doubling the effective state space of the
device implementation specification.
For the BadX experiments we took the device implementation specification
created for Good and mutated it to create a bad implementation. BadConstant
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randomly selected a constant used in a clock constraint and changed it to some
random value. BadArith randomly selected some arithmetic expression (e.g., used
in a state variable update or output action) and changed it by either changing the
operator or by extending the expression with some new operation. For BadTrans
randomly added a new transition.
6.5.2 Results
Figures 6.16 & 6.17 show the results for the Laser / Ventilator interlock system
specifications and Figures 6.18 & 6.19 show the results for the PCA management
system.
We immediately see that our refinement checking algorithm is able to decide
refinement in under 9 seconds under all experimental variations for 3 of the 4 de-
vice specifications. Also, in general, it takes longer to check the refinement of a
valid implementation. This extra time makes sense, because the algorithm must
build and check the entire product zone graph of the specification and implemen-
tation when the implementation is valid.
As expected, refinement checking takes much longer when the state-space
of the specification is large. This phenomenon is exemplified most with the
pulse-oximeter specification. The pulse-oximeter specification contains two state-
variables (in addition to the control location variable) that buffer the sampled
SpO2 readings from the patient. The buffer variables can take on 100 possible
values. Combined with the two control locations the specification’s discrete state-
space (ignoring clock valuations) is 20,000. Interleaving in the tau transitions
quickly causes the state-space to explode (remember the refinement checking al-
gorithm has to potentially check the cross-product of the states). Nevertheless,
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Figure 6.16: Refinement checking time - laser-scalpel specification.
refinement is still decided in just over 6 minutes for the Tau5 version of the pulse-
oximeter implementation. While this might be too slow for a compatibility check
at the bed side during a medical procedure, it is still probably fast enough for a
compatibility “pre”-check performed by hospital technical staff prior to use. A
less significant example of this phenomenon occurs with the ventilator specifica-
tion. The ventilator specification allows the operator to adjust the programmed
flow rate from the front panel (range of 1− 50). Even with this internal state, the
Tau5 version of the ventilator implementation is still checked for refinement in
about 8 seconds.
One interesting comparison is between the PCA pump and laser scalpel spec-
ifications. Both specifications don’t contain any significant discrete internal state
(the PCA pump has 8 control locations vs. the laser scalpel’s 7) yet checking the
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Figure 6.17: Refinement checking time - ventilator specification.
valid implementations of the laser scalpel take signficantly longer. Why is this?
While we did not do any profiling of our algorithm the difference likely results
from the extra clock in the laser scalpel’s specification. More clocks mean the ex-
pression sent to the SMT solver must quantify over more variables and the DBMs
used to store the concretized zones have more dimensions. Furthermore, more
clocks are known to make zone graphs larger (to account for clock differences
that arise due to clock resets).
Finally, we observe that without exception, deciding modal refinement for in-
valid implementations was always very fast (just a fraction of a second). Why
is this? We believe that the speed results from the fact the algorithm essentially
does a breadth first search of the product statespace, and the types of errors we in-
troduced at the syntactic (ODSDL) level always manifest shallow in the semantic
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Figure 6.18: Refinement checking time - PCA pump specification.
(TPMS) level.
6.6 Related Work
To our knowledge there has not been any case-studies illustrating how to design
and assess an application for an ecosystem of interoperable medical systems.
However, there has been numerous case-studies designed to study specific clin-
ical scenarios where automation could be applied. There have also been a number
of case-studies where investigators have examined some device specific issues re-
lated to interoperability. We will give a brief summary of the most relevent works.
In [104] Kim et al. looked at the laser surgery fire prevention scenario and
proposed a system that could preserve its safety properties even in the presence
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Figure 6.19: Refinement checking time - pulse-oximeter specification.
of network failures. Kim et al.’s system worked by synthesizing a coordination
protocol on the fly based on safety property predicates declared before runtime.
In [20, 19], Arney et al. looked at the problem of synchronizing an x-ray machine
with a ventilator. There, the problem is sometimes the surgeon wants to take a
chest x-ray while the patient is under artificial ventilation. Arney’s et al.’s system
sychronized the x-ray with the ventilator so the x-ray image was taken when the
patient’s lungs were at peak inspiration (i.e., moving the least). This capability
would allow surgeons to take x-rays without having to turn off the ventilator.
Bu et al. [45] examined a version of Kim et al.’s system and proposed a type of
runtime verification to detect when specified safety constraints were violated. Bu
et al.’s argument being that model-checking a system a priori can be impractical
and perhaps it is better to simply detect problems when they happen and alert the
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operator rather than attempt to avoid problems altogether.
David Arney and colleagues also studied the problem of preventing overdose
due to PCA therapy [21]. Arney et al. designed several closed-loop control proto-
cols and verified different safety properties using both model-checking and simu-
lation. One of their protocols was designed to be resilient to network faults (i.e.,
the safety properties were preserved in the presence of dropped messages). Pajic
et al. published a much more detailed version [149] of the study that originally
appeared in [21].
Larson et al. looked at the requirements engineering process for infusion
pumps in [122] with a special eye towards requirements relating to interoper-
ability. Jakub Jedryszek expanded on [122] in his master’s thesis [95] where he
investigated how model driven development, in the context of AADL models,
could be applied to interoperable infusion pumps. Likewise, Shiwei Luan’s mas-
ters thesis [132] described the development of a modular infusion pump enabled
with interoperable capabilities.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
The goal of this dissertation was to illustrate how a collection of inter-related tech-
niques and technologies could help us achieve safe on-demand medical systems.
While the approach we described most likely isn’t the only way to achieve on-
demand system safety, it provides concrete technical details we hope can serve
as a foundation for future technical investigations and discussions on on-demand
system safety.
First we described the concept of “on-demand systems” and how they differ
from traditionally engineered systems. We identified three ways vendor neutral
on-demand capabilities could benefit healthcare: 1) Reduced medical errors and
clinician workload, 2) Device procurement flexibility for the Health Delivery Or-
ganization (HDO) and 3) Enable innovation by allowing smaller device and soft-
ware companies entry to the health-care technology market. We also identified
some key technical challenges. The list of challenges we identified is certainly
not complete (e.g.,, we do not address the security challenges facing connected
medical systems), but they are nonetheless important. We identified 1) Scalability
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limitations in current regulatory frameworks, 2) Standardization of behavior and
3) Timing predictability in open & distributed dystems as three challenges that
must be overcome if we want a viable ecosystem of on-demand medical devices
and software. We argued that if we fail to overcome these challenges then the
viability of the on-demand concept will be diminished.
We set out to address these challenges with a number of inter-related tech-
nical solutions. First we proposed a regulatory framework and associated assur-
ance argument pattern. The regulatory framework makes application developers
ultimately responsible for the system safety argument and enables a sort of com-
positional reasoning for safety. Devices would get certified against an interface
(behavior) specification. Applications would specify their required devices and
timing constraints and would be certified assuming their requirements are always
satisfied. Specialized computing platforms called Medical Application Platforms
(MAPs) would form a trusted base and ensure that applications are only used with
compatible devices and that the timing constraints are always satisfied.
Then, we introduced Time Parametric Modal Specifications (TPMS). TPMS
were designed specifically as a device behavior specification language for use in
an on-demand ecosystem regulated by our framework. TPMS allow application
developers to precisely specify required behavior and device manufacturers to
precisely specified what behavior their device offers. TPMS allows for “loose”
specifications (i.e., the application developer can specify the acceptable timing and
functional variability of a device) and offers a notion of refinement that can relate
device behavior to application requirements. TPMS refinement enables the type
of top-down reasoning required by our regulatory framework because it preserves
safety properties.
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Next we proposed the On-Demand Systems Description Language (ODSDL)
for application developers to write on-demand applications. The ODSDL lets
application developers specify the logical architecture of the system their appli-
cation creates (essentially they specify a virtual system). The ODSDL has two
features to support system predictability. First, it uses TPMS to explicitly specify
required device behavior. Second, it has predictable logical execution time seman-
tics (LET) which guarantees input deterministic exection of ODSDL applications.
We implemented a prototype Medical Application Platform with the MD-
CF/MIDAS and showed how the LET semantics of ODSDL applications can be
ensured in an open and dynamic “plug & play” environement. We described some
modifications of classical deadline-monotonic fixed priority scheduling theory
that enables its use in a dynamic and open environment. We assesed evaluated our
implementation and showed that the LET semantics were properly implemented
and that the prototype platform is resilient to “babbling idiot” faults.
Finally, we showed how each of the contributions above work together to en-
able system safety with two case-studies. We took two real clinical scenarios
(closed-loop management of PCA infusion and coordinating a laser scalpel/venti-
lator), designed applications to address each scenario’s safety requirement using
ODSDL, and then constructed a safety argument for each application assuming
our proposed regulatory framework exists. We then used the device specifications
created for the case-studies to evaulate the performance of our TPMS refinement
checker.
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7.1 Discussion
7.1.1 Can we truly ensure safety?
While we believe the work presented in this dissertation can serve as a blueprint
of techniques that can help practitioners create safe on-demand systems, the work
presented here does not guarantee system safety. Our goal instead was to show
how an appropriately designed regulatory framework and associated technologies
would allow the application developer to constrain possible system behavior with
enough confidence to make a reasonable safety argument. The work presented
here does not prevent a designer from producing an unsafe application, nor does it
prevent the regulator from approving an unsafe application: If the developer does
bad model-based reasoning and the reviewer doesnt detect that bad reasoning, then
they may allow a flawed application on the market. Concrete examples of possible
assurance deficits were given with the case studies in Chapter 6. The flawed
application may then cause an accident when it is instantiated and controlling real
devices.
Should we not try and build on-demand systems for safety critical situations
until safety can be guaranteed? We think that perspective is unreasonable, es-
pecially considering the techniques, technology and current regulatory processes
cannot 100% guarantee the safety of traditionally engineered monolithic systems.
Indeed, even for current traditionally engineered monolithic systems, safety as-
sessment at some point comes down to (hopefully expert) judgement. Why is
this? Its simply not possible for a human (i.e., designer, engineer, regulator and
operator) to know everything. For a given system we cannot know, with 100%
certainty, how it will behave or what the complete list of hazards are or even a
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complete notion of what “safe” is. Effectively, each time someone declares that
a system is safe they are actually doing a form a model based reasoning. While,
the “model” may not be a formal model, it still will be some approximation of
real-world behavior based on previous experience. Just like for our framework, it
is ultimately up to the reviewer to judge whether the models, evidence, and over-
all argument is sufficient given the intended use of the system and the associated
risk/benefit tradeoffs.
7.1.2 Do We Really Need Timing Guarantees?
A significant portion of this dissertation is devoted to describing how to make a
platform that can guarantee the timing distributed behavior of a system in an open
and dynamic environment. One may question whether strict timing guarantees
are really necessary to support plug & play medical applications and whether it
would be worth it to engineer a real platform capable of making those guarantees.
Indeed, many of the clinical algorithms proposed to address the clinical scenarios
enumerated by the MD PnP program are designed to tolerate deadline misses and
even network message drops (See, for example, [21, 149, 20] or [104]).
First, just because many applications don’t depend on strict timing guarantees
does not mean there aren‘t others that will. For example, many closed-loop control
applications (e.g., diabetic glucose control [151, 112, 51]) do not have currently
known solutions that are tolerant to deadline miss or network message loss.
Second, just because an application (or scenario) does not need timing guar-
antees does not mean it wont benefit from it. If a doctor or nurse deploys two
applications at the same time and these applications have significant mutual re-
source contention, so much so that deadlines are consistently missed, then those
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applications will consistently be in a “failsafe” mode and not able to offer clinical
utility. Furthermore, guaranteed timing and other determinism features simplifies
the job of the application developer: They will have fewer behaviors they must
consider and anticipate during design [124].
7.1.3 The Cost and Benefit of Modal Refinement.
Some readers may question the wisdom of using refinement checking to check
the compatibility between applications and devices. While our case-studies show
that in practice refinement checking can be relatively quick, TPMS refinement
checking is at least an EXPTIME problem [48] and the decision procedures we
have presented need to unroll a zone-graph and are susceptible to the state space
explosion problem.
Our decision to use modal refinement as our compatibility relation is the con-
scious result of a trade off. It seems that, on the one hand we could standardize de-
vice behavior and make compatibility checking very easy (e.g., a developer could
simply specify they need a device by its standard “type name). But that approach
would mean all the stakeholders would need agree on the standard behavior for
each device type. As discussed in the introduction, we don’t have confidence such
a standard could be achieved in a timely manner.
On the other end of the spectrum is our approach, where we standardize a
simple language to model behavior and rely on potentially expensive procedures
to decide compatibility between an applications requirements and a devices ca-
pability. Is there some middle ground approach that doesn’t require a complete
standardization of device behavior but also doesnt need an expensive compatibil-
ity checking procedure? At this time the answer is not clear.
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7.2 Gap Analysis & Future Work
Here we provide a combined “gap analysis” and future work section. The goal
of the gap analysis is to describe the “delta” between the current state of affairs
and what would be necessary to achieve safe medical device interoperability us-
ing the framework described in this dissertation. Unlike a traditional future work
section, which usually focuses on establishing a direction for technical research,
this section attempts to discuss the major technical and social gaps (which we fur-
ther refine into the categories of process and organization). Indeed, for the prob-
lem of safe medical device interoperability, it is likely impossible to completely
divorce the technical concerns of a solution from the social (e.g., regulatory) con-
text, therefore it is important to describe the current gaps on both fronts, and how
they inter-relate.
Table 7.1 provides a condensed summary of the gap analysis. Each row de-
scribes a requirement to make our framework work, a summary of the current (as
of this writing) status, suggestions for future work to remedy deficiencies in the
current status, and then an indication as to whether the gap would be addressed
by primarily social or technical means. For the rest of the gap analysis, we will
devote a subsection to discuss each row of Table 7.1.
7.2.1 Regulatory Support for Compositional Reasoning
Overall, the regulatory framework proposed in this dissertation is highly specu-
lative. As of the writing of this dissertation, we are not aware of any regulatory
framework that allows for compositional certification or approval: i.e., where in-
dividual components certified against an interface could be combined in such a
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Requirement Current Status Needed Future Work Social or
Techni-
cal?
Regulatory support for
compositional reasoning.
Only monolithic and/or
”pairwise” medical de-
vice system approval.
Development and regu-
latory acceptance of in-
terop. device ecosys-
tem similar to that as de-
scribed in Chapter 2
Organ. &
Process
Suitable criteria for
device interface compli-
ance.
Various “academic” ap-
proaches exists.
Investigate what types of
evidence is needed to sup-
port an assurance argu-
ment.
Organ. &
Technical
Physiological models ap-
propriate for model based
reasoning.
Models exist that capture
patient physiologic at var-
ious levels of accuracy,
complexity and fidelity.
Develop models that are
amenable to model based
reasoning and adequately
capture patient dynamics.
Technical
Expressive formal device
interface language.
TPMS expresses the
timed-reactive behavior
of devices with variabil-
ity.
Extend TPMS to supports
hybrid behavior and other
non-func. properties.
Technical
Trustworthy devices. Cryptographic techniques
to validate device certi-
fication are well under-
stood.
Techniques to detect
device-interface behavior
divergence
Technical
Rigorously verified and
validated platforms.
Operating systems have
been formally verified for
data handling properties.
Investigate how to for-
mally specify and verify
non-functional properties
(e.g., timing).
Technical
Table 7.1: Requirements, current status and gaps.
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way that enables compositional system level safety arguments. In the abstract, we
don’t believe that there are any serious technical reasons why such a regulatory
framework could not be adopted. The real challenge is organizational in nature:
all the various stakeholders would need to come together to form and manage
an interoperable component ecosystem such as described in Chapter 2. In prac-
tice, this could be quite difficult as all the stakeholders would need to come to
consensus on the interoperability protocol as well as the compliance criteria for
devices, applications and platforms. Each of these issues can be quite compli-
cated individually, together even more so. Additionally, different stake holders
will have difference incentives affecting how willing they will be to compromise
(e.g., device manufacturers will likely try to promote device compliance criteria
that favors their own devices).
Once an interoperability ecosystem has been formed, there is also the issue
of creating processes that lead to consistent enforcement. In practice the compli-
ance criteria agreed upon by the stakeholders will likely require some subjective
judgement on the part of the certifier (e.g., how do we know if the hazard list for a
specific device is complete?). It will be difficult for stakeholders to anticipate the
composite behavior of a system if the component compliance criteria is enforced
inconsistently. We believe that this is primarily a social challenge. It will re-
quire that the stakeholders properly train and monitor the individuals tasked with
certification.
Last but not least, the actual regulators will need to accept the certification
practices of a given ecosystem. The best way to address this challenge is again
through primarily social channels. For example, some regulatory agencies, such
as the US FDA, allow interested parties to make a regulatory submission for a
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non-existant or imaginary product (FDA calls this a “Pre-IDE” [93]). A regula-
tory submission, based on the assumptions and ecosystem framework described in
this dissertation would help open a social channel to the regulator and help us get
feedback from the regulator and identify regulatory & legal hurdles for the adop-
tion of a interoperable ecosystem. Feedback from the mock submission could then
be used to refine the overall design of the ecosystem and help the stakeholders pro-
pose changes to any existing laws that are limiting the adoption of interoperable
medical systems.
7.2.2 Suitable Criteria for Device-Interface Compliance
This dissertation assumes that there exist “suitable” criteria for device-interface
compliance. Indeed, in Chapter 6 we give some specific examples for specific de-
vice types. Unfortunately, our examples are clearly incomplete; we only assume
as much is needed to help make the safety argument for the case study applica-
tions. In reality an ecosystem will need comprehensive certification criteria for all
the different device types. The challenge here is both organizational and techni-
cal. The organizational aspect comes the fact the different stakeholders will likely
need to compromise: Detailed and rigorous criteria are good in the sense that they
may enable better prediction of device and composite system behavior. On the
other hand, overly detailed and rigorous criteria may prove to onerous for certain
stakeholders, e.g., small device manufacturers without enough resources to meet
the criteria.
There is also the very important technical and scientific question of how to
relate device compliance evidence to assurance for device behavior. For example,
one may require that device manufacturers follow a model-driven development
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process where they first specify their device’s behavior as a Timed Automata (TA).
Then a tool like TIMES [9] would be used to generate code that exhibits the
reactive and timing behavior specified by the TA. Now, if the device compliance
criteria only required the manufacturer to provide evidence that TIMES was used
to generate code from the model we probably shouldn’t have much confidence
that the specified timing behavior is perfectly achieved: timing divergence can
arise due to CPU non-determinism and other effects. Therefore, the code should
be tested on its hwardware platform to validate the timing behavior [96]. The
question then becomes, how much testing is needed to achieve the desired level
of confidence or assurance? Answering this question is a very important direction
for future scientific work.
7.2.3 Physiologic Models for Model Based Reasoning
Many medical applications will likely phrase some or all of their safety require-
ments in terms of the patient’s physiological state (e.g.,, our PCA case-study).
If safety requirements will be phrased in terms of the patient’s state and model
based reasoning must be used to verify & validate system safety, then we need
good patient models that can be incorporated into a model based reasoning frame-
work. Good patient models are primarily a technical challenge. While there are
physiologic models available for a wide variety of patient conditions and clinical
scenarios, their accuracy, fidelity, or complexity may not be appropriate for the
types of model based reasoning proposed in this dissertation. For example, the
patient model used in our PCA case-study is simplified approximation of patient
opiod pharmokinetics and likely misses out on certain safety relevant behaviors
found in real patients. Future work should focus on developing models that have
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enough fidelity to capture adequate amounts of safety related behavior while still
being amenable to practical model based reasoning. Alternatively, the community
could also investigate new model-based reasoning techniques that can effectively
utilize many of the existing high-fidelity and complex models currently in the
medical literature.
7.2.4 Expressive formal device interface language
TPMS as presented in this dissertation only allow developers to model “digital”
system behavior with respect to real-valued clocks. When used as a behavior
specification formalism in our framework this limitation forces the developer to
informally associate idealized digital behavior with possible physical behaviors in
the assurance argument itself. This reliance on informal reasnoning is one source
of the assurance deficits we identified in our case studies. One important area of
future work is to extend TPMS with the ability to model hybrid dynamics and
non-functional properties including reliability and error.
The ability to fully model the hybrid dynamics of a device (e.g., use a dif-
ferential equation to model how the infusion rate of an infusion pump changes
in response to a rate setting change) would allow application developers to reduce
their reliance on informal reasoning. Likewise, support for non-functional proper-
ties such as reliability or error will help application developers make their device
requirements more precise.
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier in the discussion, deciding refinement be-
tween two TPMSs can be expensive. In our case-studies, we discovered that de-
ciding refinement is often quite quick, except when the discrete state-space of
the specification was large. More efficient refinement checking procedures (e.g.,
244
exploiting efficient symbolic model-checking techniques) would be very useful in
practice, and might be necessary to deal with complex specifications. Future work
should focus on extending TPMS with support for more non-functional properties
as well as more efficient models for analyzing TPMS specifications.
7.2.5 Trustworthy Devices
One critical assumption we make is that devices will behave “according” to their
interface specifications. We rely on the certificaiton process to exclude devices
that don’t conform to their interface from the ecosystem. While we can rely on
well understood crytographic techniques to automatically detect whether or not a
device has been certified, it is much less clear how to check if a device has been
mis-deployed, modified or tampered with after certification. A problem could be
as simple as the nurse connecting a device to the wrong patient (e.g., connecting
the pulse-oximeter used in the PCA-interlock application to a different patient
not actually undergoing PCA therapy). Or it could be as nefarious as an adversary
that maliciously and subtly alters the behavior of a device to drive the patient to an
unsafe zone. An important avenue for future technical work is to understand how
we could enable the platform to automatically detect if a device is being operated
outside its intended use (i.e., on the wrong patient) or if its behavior is diverging
from is specified interface.
7.2.6 Rigorously Verified & Validated Platforms
Our framework assumes that the underlying platform will operate correctly, i.e., it
will correctly perform the device application compatibility check and that it will
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implement the LET semantics of the ODSDL. One important area of future work
is to understand how the “timing guarantee” or timing enforcement features of a
MAP could be formally verified. The separation property that separation kernels
like seL4 have been formally verified to satisfy are fundamentally about the state
of the system’s data [111]. Formal verification is enabled because the seman-
tics of the programming language used to implement the operating system, and
the semantics of the underlying CPU’s instruction set architecture (ISA) concern
data-manipulation. Formally proving that an operating system guarantees the tim-
ing behavior of its hosted applications seems to be fundamentally more difficult.
Neither the programming languages used to implement operating systems nor the
underlying CPU ISA typically include any aspect of timing behavior in their se-
mantics. While there has been some recent work formally verifying the worst case
timing behavior of operating system operations [39], anyone hoping to formally
verify an operating system that claims to offer application timing guarantees must
find a way to bridge the current semantic gap.
Another important area of future work: In Chapter 5 we listed a number of
features our prototype does not implement but a real MAP ought to have (Our
prototype focuses mainly on timing guarantees). These features include enforcing
time/space separation between applications, fault tolerant design, and a formally
verified implementation. While all of these types of features have been studied
extenstively in the literature it is not clear how all of these features would be im-
plemented in the same system. Furthermore its not clear if these features might
conflict. For example, our determinizing scheduler requires a single high priority
task to orchestrate all the I/O events of the running applications. The determiniz-
ing scheduler must be able to preempt an application at any time to service I/O
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events. Most separation kernels [55] enforce time/space isolation by executing
each application partition for a pre-specified amount of time [181]. Incorporating
a determinizing scheduler (or any sort of scheduling system that can change the
system schedule dynamically) will impact the design of these operating systems
and may introduce “knock-on” effects with regards to the verification of their sep-
aration features.
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